La Guajira – Multiple Interests Collide to the Detriment of Indigenous Communities and their Leaders. 

The population of La Guajira is faced with many challenges, from limited access to water and high rates of malnutrition to local corruption, large scale energy projects which have caused displacment of indigenous communities and the presence of illegal armed groups who pose threats to indigenous leaders in the desert peninsula. 

Originally published on June 28th, 2023 

7 min read

Article written by Valentina Caicedo, Isabella Guerrero, and Sebastián Rubio.

La Guajira has been historically impacted by the armed conflict in Colombia and continues to be affected by dynamics tied to both legal and illegal economies. Like many regions throughout Colombia, the department has seen a wave of violence and murders in recent years, in many cases linked to disputes over land, natural resources and drug trafficking. Social leaders in the region have been particularly vulnerable to attack, and many of them have been targeted for their activism in defense of human rights, environmental protection, and land rights. The high murder rate of social leaders in La Guajira has been attributed to illegal armed groups, including neo-paramilitaries, left-wing insurgents and drug cartels. The situation in this region is further aggravated by poverty, inequality, and the lack of infrastructure and basic State services. This text will look to explore these issues by looking at the case of Mariton Jusayu Ipana, an indigenous leader murdered in the region in 2022 as well as other related cases, and the dynamics present in the region. These cases will be looked at to allow us to understand the reality that these territories face due to armed conflict, drug trafficking, and other interests that perpetuate violence against these actors in our country.  

Mariton Jusayu Ipuana was an indigenous social leader from La Guajira who worked mainly in the defense of the human rights of his community. This work involved the defense of the Wayúu indigenous community and other communities present in the area. He was part of the Nación Wayuú organization, a non-profit Non-Governmental Indigenous Organization, and was a committed defender of Human Rights. Nación Wayúu fully defends and promotes human rights, the self-government of indigenous peoples and their exercise of authority (¿Quiénes somos?, n.d). This is done with the aim of contributing to the construction of a just and equitable society from the perspective of political, economic, social, and cultural inclusion. Mariton Jusayu was killed in front of his family by armed men who, after threatening the community of Malirrou where he resided, entered his home and killed him, according to the preliminary information collected by the Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (Indepaz), a national NGO which has been registering and verifying violence against activists in Colombia (Continúa el exterminio: asesinan a líder social indígena frente a su familia en Uribia, 2022). The heinous murder of Mariton is far from being an exception.  

Unfortunately, Mariton is not the only indigenous leader to have been killed in La Guajira in recent times. Nor is he the only representative of Nación Wayúu to be murdered. Aura Esther García Peñalver was murdered on March 30, 2021. This case is deeply related to the case of Mariton because she too was a Wayuu leader, traditional authority and part of the NGO Nación Wayúu, just as Mariton Jusayu was. As described by Mejía (2021), Aura Esther was a strong leader who defended and stuck up for the human rights of her population, especially the resources assigned towards children in the region, an issue of huge importance given the region is severely affected by issues of food security and access to drinking water. According to the news agency Blu Radio, 18 children died due to malnutrition in the department in the first three months of 2023. The National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC for its initials in Spanish) stated that the leader had been receiving calls and threats against her life for a long time due to the social work she carried out in the territory of Uribia, the indigenous capital of the region. This led her to seek help and protection from security agencies, but she was denied (La lideresa Wayuu Aura Esther García fue asesinada en Uribia, 2021). Just like Aura, there are many other cases that merit a closer look. For example, the case of Jose Victor Ceballos, who was a teacher and an active member of the NGO Nación Wayúu as well. He was killed in 2019, but he had been receiving threats since 2018 due to his social work (Valentina et al., 2019). Lastly, there is the case of Alexander Fonseca, who was an indigenous authority and teacher in La Guajira. Alexander was murdered in a massacre, where 2 members of his family died too (Cuarto de Hora, 2022). This is evidence of how state neglect, a power vacuum, and the lack of institutional responsibility have allowed several social leaders to lose their lives for defending human rights violations in their territories.  

Such a shocking series of murders demands a careful consideration of the context in which these crimes occurred. In La Guajira there are a variety of elements, situations and actors which have different interests. For example, the shortage of food and drinking water is a complex and historical problem within the communities or “rancherías”, causing the Wayúu community to cope with the worst numbers in the entire country for child death by malnutrition in 2021, highlighting their precariousness (Cruz, 2022). This issue is closely related to the corruption that affects, in addition to the nutrition of the communities, access to health services. This point can be evidenced by the fact that of the 12 governors it has had in the last 10 years, the majority have been dismissed for cases of corruption, some of these involving management of resources for the alimentation of children (Dejusticia, 2022). And this situation is aggravated by the presence of illegal armed groups due to the strategic position of the region. These armed groups (left-wing guerrillas such as the ELN or FARC dissidents and groups who developed from the demobilized AUC paramilitaries) subcontract local groups which leads to conflicts at a local level, generating selective assassinations or massacres that are not directly accredited to one particular armed group (Badillo & Trejos, 2021). Essentially, such a situation means that there are plenty of assassins available in the region for those looking to silence the voice of anyone deemed a threat or obstacle. Such a scenario allows us to make a possible connection between the murder of Mariton murder and the actions of these local groups, or whoever chooses to contract them.  

To further complicate the context in La Guajira, it’s a region rich in natural resources coveted by multinational companies. This means that in addition to actors such as the State and armed groups, there are also multinationals that have affected the lives of communities in the region in different ways. The establishment of the Cerrejon Coal Mine, for example, led to the displacement of the Tabaco community, leading to social upheaval and antagonizing rivalries between communities who had been displaced. Furthermore, indigenous communities blame the multinational for the deviation of the Ranchería river which has severely affected the communities water supply in addition to the pollution caused by the open-pit coal mine. Even more ominously, those activists who have taken legal action against the company and their associates have received death threats for their activism. thanks to the fact that, according to Global Legal Action Network, the mine has been linked to paramilitary groups (Devia, 2021; Quintero & Monsalve, 2022; Harrison, 2021). While the exploitation of fossil fuels has long been a source of controversy in Colombia and elsewhere, the transition to sustainable forms of energy has also caused problems for the Wayúu and other communities in La Guajira. In recent years, there has been a concerted effort to establish extensive wind farms in the department. Despite the economic progress that it could provide to the region and the country, it is important to understand the context and the real dynamics that are occurring in the region where the communities have been, at the very least, victims of displacement and harassment, in addition to deceit and “irregular” agreements as denounced by the Indepaz study center (Serrano, 2023). It seems all mega-projects in such a complex and troubled region have the potential to generate serious social impacts on the communities of the region.  

In conclusion, it is undeniable that the violence caused by armed groups and drug trafficking organizations has caused the murders of numerous social leaders and traditional authorities in La Guajira (PARES, 2020). In the same way, this is still happening due to the power vacuum in these territories and the lack of commitment of the institutions to the lives of the indigenous Wayúu communities in this area. It is important to understand the complex reality in this region. Disputes over arable land and water are key to understanding this complexity. Likewise, the interaction of different armed actors, multinationals and corruption in local government causes their interests to clash, ultimately affecting the population and its social leaders. As a recommendation, it is important to design and implement an integral plan” that goes beyond the military dimension. It is necessary to create policies that allow the border municipalities of La Guajira to have access to legal economies and a strong state presence to protect the rights of the people living there (Trejos, 2020). This is the very least that the communities, and leaders such as Mariton Jusayu deserve.  

Bibliography:  

Badillo, R. & Trejos, F. (2021). Gobernanza criminal fronteriza en La Guajira: grupos armados sin guerra. La Silla Vacia https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/historias-silla-llena/gobernanza-criminal-fronteriza-en-la-guajira-grupos-armados-sin-guerra/  

‌Serrano, J. (2023). Las multinacionales y energías renovables desplazan a los indígenas de Colombia. Yahoo News. https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/multinacionales-energ%C3%ADas-renovables-desplazan-ind%C3%ADgenas-140051275.html  

Devia, T. (2021). El arte de operar con impunidad: la historia de cerrejón en la guajira colombiana. Corporate Accountability Lab. https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2021/3/24/el-arte-de-operar-con-impunidad-la-historia-de-cerrejn-en-la-guajira-colombiana  

Cruz, R. L. (2022). La historia detrás de 327 niños muertos por hambre y sed en La Guajira. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/la-guajira-ninos-mueren-de-hambre-y-sed-en-esta-zona-de-704983  

Cuarto de Hora, (2022). Asesinan al lider social y docente Alexander Fonseca en la Guajira. Cuarto de hora. https://cuartodehora.com/2022/04/03/asesinan-al-lider-social-y-docente-alexander-fonseca-en-la-guajira/  

‌Dejusticia. (2022). 6 datos sobre la corrupción en La Guajira y 10 recomendaciones para superarla. Dejusticia. https://www.dejusticia.org/6-datos-sobre-la-corrupcion-en-la-guajira-y-10-recomendaciones-para-superarla/  

Quintero, D. & Monsalve. M. (2022). ¿Y si hablamos de Bruno, el arroyo que desvió Cerrejón en La Guajira?. El Espectador. https://www.elespectador.com/investigacion/y-si-hablamos-de-bruno-el-arroyo-que-desvio-cerrejon-en-la-guajira/  

‌Harrison, A. (2021). “Te vamos a matar”: Un caso de poder empresarial descontrolado. Global Witness. https://www.globalwitness.org/es/we-are-going-to-kill-you-a-case-study-in-corporate-power-left-unchecked-es/  

Valentina, N., Ripoll, A., Villanueva, S., & Viloria, D. (2019). José Victor Ceballos Espinayu: The indigenous teacher and activist slain for defending the rights of. La Libertad Sublime. https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/jos%C3%A9-victor-ceballos-espinayu-the-indigenous-teacher-and-activist-slain-for-defending-the-rights-of  

Continúa el exterminio: asesinan a líder social indígena frente a su familia en Uribia (Guajira). (2022). Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/08/21/continua-el-exterminio-asesinan-a-lider-social-indigena-frente-a-su-familia-en-uribia-guajira/?outputType=amp-type  

Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (Pares), (2020). Sin dios ni ley, un informe de la violencia en la frontera. https://pares.com.co/2020/02/10/sin-dios-ni-ley-un-informe-de-la-violencia-en-la-frontera/ [ Links 

¿Quiénes somos?. (n.d). Nacion Wayuu Ong. https://ongnacionwayuu.org/nosotros/  

Mejía, E. (2021). Asesinan a lider wayuu y autoridad tradicional en La Guajira. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/lider-social-es-asesinada-en-la-guajira-577822  

La lideresa Wayuu Aura Esther García fue asesinada en Urubia (La Guajira). (2021). El Espectador. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/la-lideresa-wayuu-aura-esther-garcia-fue-asesinada-en-uribia-la-guajira-article/  

Trejos, L. (2020). Panorama de los grupos armados organizados en La Guajira. La Silla Vacía. https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/historias-silla-llena/panorama-de-los-grupos-armados-organizados-en-la-guajira/  

Jiménez, A. (2023). A 18 aumentó el número de niños muertos por desnutrición en La Guajira en lo que va de este año 2023. Bluradio. https://www.bluradio.com/blu360/caribe/a-18-aumento-el-numero-de-ninos-muertos-por-desnutricion-en-la-guajira-en-lo-que-va-de-este-2023-rg10  

Indigenous Leaders in the Caribbean: The Cases of Benito Castillo, Mary Petro and Albert Mendoza.

Indigenous leaders Mary Petro, Albert Mendoza and Benito Castillo were murdered in the Colombian Caribbean in 2023. 

Originally published on December 6th, 2023

8 min read

Article written by Franklin Cervantes, Febe Peña & Ricardo Rincon. 

In examining the landscape of Colombian socio-politics, the experiences of leaders representing indigenous communities emerge as poignant narratives. The cases of Benito Castillo Gutiérrez, Mary Petro Villalba and Albert Mendoza Corso encapsulate not only personal tragedy but also the broader challenges faced by indigenous leaders. Their stories intersect with recommendations found in reports from the Truth Commission, Amnesty International and observations made by national organizations such as Indepaz. These leaders, embedded in recent Colombian history, symbolize the struggles inherent in advocating for justice, human rights and cultural preservation within a nation marked by violence and conflict. By delving into their lives and untimely deaths, we aim to unravel not just individual narratives but also to gain a deeper understanding of the systematic challenges encountered by those at the forefront of indigenous representation in Colombia.  

Our initial focus on the plight of leaders advocating for indigenous communities introduces the somber narrative of Benito Castillo. As a distinguished Wayuú leader actively contributing to economic collaborations between Venezuela and Colombia, Castillo’s untimely demise raises pressing questions about the safety and security of those committed to cultural and economic initiatives within indigenous spheres. Benito Segundo Castillo Gutiérrez, a distinguished 65-year-old Wayuú leader, played a pivotal role in both Venezuela and Colombia. His leadership extended to being the president of a transport cooperative in Alta Guajira and the renowned Ayatawacoop fuel cooperative, where he was a founding member (Mejía, 2023). The unfortunate incident of this heinous crime unfolded as Castillo faced a brutal attack at his residence. According to witnesses, two motorcycles were involved, with one assailant approaching the house gate and firing indiscriminately at the people present (Mejía, 2023). The severity of Castillo’s injuries, with two gunshot wounds, one in the trachea and another in the left maxillofacial area, led to his demise at a clinical center (Altamar, 2023). Castillo’s leadership legacy, remembered as a key figure in legalizing the fuel export process from Venezuela to the Colombian coast, highlights the intersection of economic and indigenous advocacy dimensions (Diario del Norte, 2023). This tragic event underscores the risks indigenous leaders face, even those with significant roles in cross-border economic initiatives. The following paragraph will delve into the details of the case of another murdered indigenous leaders, that of Mary Petro, and will unveil the threats faced by indigenous leaders in their pursuit of justice and community well-being.  

The ruthless assault on Mary Petro, a dedicated nurse and treasurer in the indigenous council of Cantagallo, Ciénaga de Oro, underscores the concerning vulnerability of those who serve their communities, prompting vital inquiries into the safety of rural healthcare workers in the Montería Metropolitan Area. The tragic incident involving the murder of nurse Mary Cruz Petro Villalba unfolded on the morning of April 25th (2023) in the rural area of Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba. As reported by Infobae (2023b), Mary Cruz Petro was a well-known indigenous social leader associated with the Zenu community. At the time of the events, she held the position of treasurer in the ancestral community council in the municipality of Ciénaga de Oro, Cordoba. According to Cortés (2023), the police from the department of Cordoba provided information stating that the crime was committed by two hitmen armed with a firearm in the rural area of ‘Salguero’ as she was on her way to work in the morning hours. Preliminary reports, as highlighted by Hernández (2023), suggest that the motive behind the attack on Mary Cruz Petro may have been robbery. The assailants, attempting to steal her motorcycle, resorted to lethal force when she resisted, tragically ending her life instantly (Cuello, 2023). In response to the heinous incident, the community, along with local authorities, expressed profound outrage. Coordinated efforts were initiated to apprehend the culprits, including the announcement of a reward of up to 20 million pesos for information leading to the identification and prosecution of those responsible (Hernández, 2023). The incident has raised serious concerns about the overall security situation in the region, particularly considering the recent surge in robberies in the Montería Metropolitan Area. This insecurity can also be seen reflected in the case of a journalist who was murdered in Ciénaga de Oro, a month after the death of Cruz Petro. His name was Luis Gabriel Pereira, 25 years old, who served as the director of the news portal Notiorense. According to Agencia EFE (2023), he was approached by two hitmen on a motorcycle, from which they shot him several times, causing his death. The subsequent section will provide insight into the threats and violence faced by Albert Mendoza, highlighting the broader challenges encountered by leaders representing indigenous communities.  

Albert Mendoza’s tragic fate amid the Kankuamo Indigenous Reserve in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta area serves as a stark reminder of the persistent threats and violence faced by indigenous leaders, highlighting the urgent need for comprehensive measures to safeguard their lives and preserve the cultural heritage of the Kankuamo community. Albert Camilo Mendoza Corso, a prominent indigenous leader and prosecutor for the Local Council of Elders in the Kankuamo community, met a tragic end on March 22nd (Europa Press, 2023). His lifeless body was discovered on a rural farm near Valledupar, bearing signs of a fatal blow to the head, possibly inflicted by a stone (Álvarez, 2023). Witnesses confirmed the head and facial injuries, indicating a brutal assault with blunt force (El Universal, 2023). Mendoza, also employed as a farm worker, served as the Prosecutor of the CKV Local Senior Council, adding layers to his community involvement (Álvarez, 2023). The circumstances surrounding Mendoza’s demise are emblematic of broader issues within the Kankuamo Indigenous Reserve. The region grapples with a series of victimizing events and acts of violation, including threats, dissemination of counterfeit pamphlets using illegal armed groups’ acronyms, and the incineration of culturally significant kankurwas (Infobae, 2023a), which are the major temples of the word, thought and reflection of the Arhuaco and Kankuamo culture. It is there where the three essential stages of the human being are enacted and ratified, the Gunseymuke (Baptism), the Munseimuke (Development) and the Juangawu (Marriage) (Despensa de la Sierra, 2022). These challenges highlight the perilous environment faced by indigenous leaders like Mendoza, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of systemic issues affecting social leaders in Colombia.  

Upon closer examination of the pervasive violence against indigenous leaders in Colombia, it becomes evident that the cases of Benito Castillo, Mary Petro and Albert Mendoza mirror a broader pattern of challenges faced by social leaders in the country. These cases resonate with the findings and recommendations outlined in reports from the Truth Commission (2022), Amnesty International (2023) and observations by Indepaz (2023), revealing a distressing pattern of violence and threats against those advocating for justice, human rights, and cultural preservation. Benito Castillo’s story exemplifies the risks faced by indigenous leaders involved in economic collaborations. His assassination, marked by a brutal attack, raises questions about the safety of individuals committed to both cultural and economic initiatives within indigenous spheres. This aligns with the broader context outlined in the Amnesty International Report (2023), indicating the alarming number of social leaders killed in Colombia and emphasizing the need for governments to ensure a safe environment for individuals to exercise their rights: In Colombia, at least 189 social leaders and human rights defenders were killed during 2022, reflecting an alarming situation that demands urgent attention and intervention. The tragic killing of Mary Petro, a dedicated nurse and indigenous leader, reveals the vulnerabilities of those serving their communities, particularly in rural areas. Her murder prompts critical inquiries into the safety of rural healthcare workers, echoing the concerns raised by the Truth Commission about violence against women and indigenous individuals (Truth Comission, 2022). The intersecting dimensions of gender-based violence and attacks on indigenous leaders underscore the multifaceted challenges faced by vulnerable communities. Albert Mendoza’s fate amid the Kankuamo Indigenous Reserve illustrates the persistent threats and violence encountered by indigenous leaders. His tragic end aligns with the observations made by Indepaz, revealing a broader pattern of victimizing events and acts of violation within indigenous territories: Between November 24, 2016, and July 31, 2023, 1,513 social leaders and human rights defenders were assassinated, highlighting the alarming extent of the violence against social leaders over the years (Indepaz & Temblores, 2023), with over 400 of these victims belonging to indigenous communities The statistics further reveal that the people assassinated belonged mostly to the following social sectors: communal, civic, farmers and Afrodescendants. Indigenous leaders are often the most targeted due to their roles in defending the land (Indepaz & Temblores, 2023). The violence against these leaders reflects the urgent need for comprehensive measures to safeguard the lives of indigenous leaders and preserve their cultural heritage, as recommended by Amnesty International (2023).  

In conclusion, the commonality in the challenges faced by leaders representing indigenous communities in Colombia points to a systemic issue that extends beyond individual cases. By examining these shared elements, it becomes evident that the violence against social leaders is deeply entrenched in the country’s socio-political landscape. Understanding these patterns is crucial for formulating comprehensive strategies to ensure the safety and protection of leaders advocating for the rights of indigenous communities. Recommendations for addressing this critical situation include implementing enhanced protection measures, advocating for legal reforms, facilitating international oversight, promoting community empowerment and launching educational campaigns. Pursuing these recommendations collectively, involving the government, civil society, and international partners, is essential to address root causes and systemic issues, leading Colombia towards a more inclusive and just future. In essence, these individual narratives collectively highlight the shared challenges faced by leaders representing indigenous communities in Colombia (Amnesty International, 2023). The cases resonate with the recommendations provided by various reports, emphasizing the urgent need for systemic changes to ensure the safety, security, and protection of those at the forefront of indigenous representation. The pervasive nature of these challenges calls for a holistic and coordinated effort to address the root causes of violence and create an environment where indigenous leaders can advocate for their communities without fear for their lives.  

References  

Agencia EFE. (2023). Asesinan a periodista en Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba. El Heraldo. https://www.elheraldo.co/cordoba/asesinan-al-periodista-luis-gabriel-pereira-del-portal-notiorense-en-cienaga-de-oro-cordoba  

Altamar, N. (2023). Líder Wayúu fue asesinado en ataque sicarial en Maicao, La Guajira. RCN Radio. https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/caribe/lider-wayuu-fue-asesinado-en-ataque-sicarial-en-maicao-la-guajira  

Álvarez, D. (2023). Líder indígena de Valledupar habría sido asesinado a pedradas cuando trabajaba. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/valledupar-lider-indigena-fue-hallado-muerto-en-una-via-rural-752507  

Amnesty International. (2023). Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/WEBPOL1056702023ENGLISH.pdf  

Commission for the Clarification of the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition. (2022). Recommendations for the Non-Repetition of the Acts of Violence Suffered by Women and LGBTIQ+ People in the Context of the Armed Conflict. Comisión de la Verdad. https://www.comisiondelaverdad.co/sites/default/files/2023-02/Recommendations-02_0.pdf  

Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition. (2022). My Body is the Truth: Experiences of Women and LGBTQ+ People in the Armed Conflict. Comisión de la Verdad. https://www.comisiondelaverdad.co/sites/default/files/2023-02/Final_IndigenousWomen-11%20de%20enero%202023.pdf  

Cortés, W. (2023). Asesinan a la enfermera Mary Cruz Petro en Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba. Canal 1. https://canal1.com.co/noticias/nacional/mary-cruz-petro/  

Cuello, Ó. (2023). Enfermera fue asesinada en Ciénaga de Oro en aparente atraco al que se opuso. El Heraldo. https://www.elheraldo.co/cordoba/enfermera-fue-asesinada-en-cienaga-de-oro-cordoba-en-aparente-atraco-al-que-se-opuso-995875  

Despensa de la Sierra. (2022). Las Kankurwas, casas sagradas. Despensa De La Sierra. https://despensadelasierra.com/las-kankurwas  

Diario del Norte. (2023). En La Guajira y en Zulia consternación por el asesinato del líder wayuú Benito Segundo Castillo. https://www.diariodelnorte.net/noticias/judiciales/en-la-guajira-y-en-zulia-consternacion-por-el-asesinato-del-lider-wayuu-benito-segundo-castillo/  

El Universal. (2023). ¡Qué crueldad! a pedradas asesinaron a popular líder indígena en finca. El Universal. https://www.eluniversal.com.co/sucesos/que-crueldad-a-pedradas-asesinaron-a-popular-lider-indigena-en-finca-FL8058362  

Europa Press. (2023). Asesinan a líder social indígena en el Caribe colombiano. La Jornada. https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2023/03/22/mundo/asesinan-a-lider-social-indigena-en-el-caribe-colombiano/  

Hernández, C. (2023). Asesinan a enfermera Mary Cruz Petro en zona rural de Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba. W Radio. https://www.wradio.com.co/2023/04/25/asesinan-a-enfermera-mary-cruz-petro-en-zona-rural-de-cienaga-de-oro-cordoba/  

Infobae. (2023a). Van 31 líderes sociales asesinados en el país con el homicidio de Albert Camilo Mendoza Corzo. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/03/23/van-31-lideres-sociales-asesinados-en-el-pais-con-el-homicidio-de-albert-camilo-mendoza-corzo/  

Infobae. (2023b). No se sabe si era pariente del presidente la lideresa social Mary Cruz Petro, asesinada en Ciénaga de Oro (Córdoba). Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/04/26/no-se-sabe-si-era-pariente-del-presidente-la-lideresa-social-mary-cruz-petro-asesinada-en-cienaga-de-oro-cordoba  

Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz & Temblores. (2023). Balance de Seguridad: Primer Año del Gobierno Petro. Indepaz. https://indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/INFORME_UN_AN%CC%83O_GOBIERNO_PETRO_2023.pdf  

Mejía, E. (2023). Asesinan a presidente de cooperativa de transportadores en La Guajira. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/asesinan-a-presidente-de-cooperativa-de-transportadores-en-la-guajira-79008  

Fray Torres – another victim in the conflict over land in Magdalena and throughout Colombia.

Fray Torres represented communities in land reclamation processes in the department of Magdalena until his murder in September 2022. 

Originally published: Oct 2, 2023 

11 min read 

Article written by Natalia Cueto, Laura Diaz & Yicela Espinoza. 

For many years social leaders in Colombia have been targeted for trying to protect the human rights of vulnerable sectors such as indigenous groups, Afro-descendants and rural communities. Nowadays, violence committed by illegal armed groups has taken different forms of abuses in remote areas known as “Brown Spots”. These are the zones where the State does not apply the law and the armed groups are in effective control, allowing them to intimidate the population, harm the community, and cultivate drugs, among other acts. But also, these illegal groups are focused on preventing implementation of components of the peace process as they have been interpreted as being bad for their business interests. Consequentially, Human Rights defenders, journalists, demobilized FARC fighters, indigenous and Afro-descendent leaders often face death threats and violence to halt their work, which is often seen as an obstacle to the interests of the illegal groups. On that point, according to a special report of Indepaz (2020), between the signing of the peace agreement in Colombia in 2016 until July 15th, 2020, almost 971 leaders and Human Rights defenders were killed, and 681 of these cases targeted peasant, indigenous, Afro-descendant, environmental and community organizations. These cases have occurred throughout Colombian territory, with departments such as Cauca, Antoquia and Nariño being the most affected. However, the Caribbean region has also seen prevalent cases of violence against social leaders, with murders occurring in all the departments of the region (Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Sucre, Córdoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and the islands of San Andres and Providencia. This article will explore this issue by taking a look at the department of Magdalena. According to the reports published from 2020 to 2023 by Indepaz, during that period in the department of Magdalena there have been a total of 25 murders of social leaders. In recent years, there have been some well-known leaders murdered in the department. These include the cases of Maritza Quiroz, a leader of women victims of displacement, and Wilton Orrego, a park ranger defending Colombia’s national parks were both murdered within days of each other in January 2019, while Cristina Cantillo, a well-known trans activist, was murdered in her home in Santa Marta in 2021. This text will focus primarily on the case of Fray Torres, a leader involved in land restitution projects, who was shot dead in September of 2022.  

Fray David Torres Marroquín was a leader who was forty-one years old. He worked as treasurer of the Community Action Board (JAC) of the locality of Nueva América, near to Palmore de la Sierra, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Ciénaga, Magdalena (El Espectador, 2022). Fray Torres was a social leader involved in land restitution processes for the rural population of Palmore de la Sierra. According to Urieles (2022), this region has been severely affected by the presence of different illegal actors and armed groups in recent times such as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces and Conquistador Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada. Also, this author affirmed that these are both illegal armed groups which were established following the demobilization process of the right-wing AUC paramilitaries and are both heavily involved in illegal economies such as drug trafficking. At the same time, Urieles (2022) analyzed that both groups have been in conflict since early 2022 to determine which group would have control over this territory and its strategic routes. Torres’s work was also aligned with the promotion of farming families living in the countryside until his life was taken abruptly. According to Infobae (2022) citing the news site Diario del Magdalena, the incident took place at 11:00 in the morning on September 21st, 2022. Torres was with his partner and his son, who both witnessed the attack. As mentioned previously, the killing of Fray Torres is part of a worrying pattern in the department.  

What results more alarming is the numerous cases of murdered social leaders in this zone of Colombia. In Magdalena there have been many homicides of these advocates such as the case of Maritza Quiroz. This courageous woman was murdered on the 5th of January 2019, years after having been displaced from the village of Palmor, in the jurisdiction of Ciénaga, to San Isidro, a rural area of Santa Marta. Maritza was known for her work as an alternate member of the Victims Board in Santa Marta, sticking up for Afro-Colombian women displaced from the Sierra Nevada and her leadership in land restitution processes too (La Paz en el Terreno, n.d.). Another relevant event happened on January 14th, 2019, in Don Diego, a small village, an hour from the capital, Santa Marta. In this place, Wilton Orrego was killed after arriving at his home. This leader worked to protect the environment in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta as a defender of nature since he labored as a park ranger in the Parque Nacional Natural Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (Mojica, 2023). Like Fray’s story, it seems both were viewed as “obstacles” to the interests of armed groups by carrying out their work in areas where they have drug plantations and trafficking routes. Not only have these unfortunate cases taken place in this region, but also there are many other stories, such as the case of Patricia Pérez, a woman from Ciénaga who was killed on the 1st of October 2021 after she left her attorney’s office (HOY Diario del Magdalena, 2021). According to Indepaz (2021), Patricia and her husband’s lives were taken in the middle of their fight for claiming land ownership, which is an issue that has arisen in the department of Magdalena and throughout Colombia, especially for social leaders and advocates who are disputing these territories against illegal armed groups still active following the peace agreement of 2016. To understand why these people who were working with transparency for honest causes were targets of homicides, it is necessary to reflect briefly on the fact that Colombia has a historical land ownership problem. This issue was caused by the unequal distribution of land, the complex geographical location of Colombian regions, and the legacy of colonization where a few powerful rich families inherited the majority of land and the rest, a poor and powerless majority, had to survive with what was left (Pardo, 2022). As reported by the National Center of Historical Memory (2018), “this historical debt of the State was deepened by the armed conflict, which put thousands of peasants in the middle of the fire, forcing them to leave their land”. After looking at the cases, each one of the covered social leaders had their own lines of work such as campesino communities’ rights, environmental conservation, displacement of Afro-descendant groups, and land restitution processes. However, the common thread among all these cases is land: its repartition and ownership are issues that have been arising because of the internal conflict and the presence of many different actors depending on the region in question.  

The previously mentioned cases all occurred in Magdalena, home of the Sierra Nevada. This majestic coastal mountain range, home to four indigenous cultures and an incredible array of wildlife, has also been home to two-armed groups in expansion who dispute the control over this zone: the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), also known as Gulf Clan Cartel, and the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACS), commonly referred to as Los Pachenca. The ACS has been operating in this zone since the 80s when most paramilitary groups were created. The scope of the ACS operations covers 40% of the street-level drug dealing in Santa Marta in comparison to the AGC, which has only 10% (Posada, 2021), which makes them the actors with the most political and military control, financed by drug trafficking and extortion in places such as Sierra Nevada, Palomino (from the department of La Guajira), Santa Marta, Ciénaga, Aracataca and the Zona Bananera. However, the Gulf Clan is well known throughout all the Colombian territory as a ramification of the AUC paramilitaries and has specialized in the continued growth of their organization to have complete influence over drug trafficking resources, which explains why they have been seeking dominance in this department (El Heraldo, 2022). As a result of this, the civilian population of Magdalena is being left in the middle of these circumstances, which blend with the exacerbation of other social issues such as poverty, racism, ecological damage, land restitution, internal conflict, and a lack of guarantees for rural communities. Collectives focused on these causes are the most affected by the conflict between the AGC and ACS in the whole department since they represent territories that are of interest for the plantation of illegal crops and the proximity to the maritime ports to export illegal drugs (Llamas, 2022). Consequently, the great power vacuum created by the weak presence of the Colombian government has allowed for the presence of illicit groups to persist for decades, leaving consequences such as impunity for the murders of social leaders. Based on the data provided by Indepaz, between 2022 and so far in 2023 (April at the time of writing). There have been 5 cases of murdered social leaders in Magdalena. Perhaps 5 can be seen as low figure, but it represents simply a fraction of, as reported by Indepaz on the 12th of April 2023, the 1,457 leaders that have been killed since the peace agreements of 2016 in Colombia.  

If we analyze the issue at the national level, the situation is no less complex. Violence has now taken new forms and abuses by armed groups in remote areas, reaching levels in 2022 like those that existed before the peace process (Human Rights Watch world report, 2023). Therefore, indigenous leaders, Afro-descendants and other activists face death threats and widespread violence from these armed groups. On the other hand, as for the current government (led by President Gustavo Petro and in office since August 2022), it promised to fight for the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement and prioritize “total peace” in search of agreements with the ELN (National Liberation Army guerrilla) and the negotiated disarmament of other armed groups and criminal gangs (Human Rights Watch world report, 2023). However, the Colombian Caribbean has its own peculiarities according to the Indepaz Report on armed groups, as that part of the country is characterized by the actions of narco-militaries. This area is of special interest due to the corridor that connects the Colombian Caribbean port cities, key to drug and arms trafficking (2022). However, there are efforts by national institutions to manage the situation, for example, the truth commission is developing a monitoring system for the implementation of its work, with the purpose of continuing to raise awareness and foster the appropriation of the recommendations among state institutions and civil society, in order to guarantee their inclusion in the National Development Plan (Security Council, UN Verification Report, 2022). Likewise, the creation of the PDET (Development Programs with a Territorial Focus) represents part of this effort, given that, as a 10-year planning and management instrument, they prioritize those territories most affected by the armed conflict, that is, areas with higher poverty rates, presence of illicit economies and institutional weakness (Confianza y Paz territorial, PDET, 2017). Generally speaking, such areas that have been historically affected by the conflict continue to see high rates of violence against social leaders, as can be seen in Ciénaga and the Sierra Nevada areas of Magdalena. The previously mentioned programs and measures have the aim of achieving a comprehensive, stable and lasting peace in Colombia. Therefore, although armed conflict does not continue to be the same as in its beginnings, its evolution has implied new negotiation strategies between government entities and armed groups and criminal gangs. But despite the difficulties with the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, the current government and institutions such as the truth commission and the PDET programs aim to contribute to an improvement in the situation of vulnerability faced by social leaders and other vulnerable groups in civil society. Although, these efforts are recognized, the arduous work that remains to guarantee security in these areas of the country cannot be ignored, and it is imperative for Colombia to arrive at a point where our activists do not run the risk of death threats and persecution for their social work within their communities.  

Finally, as we have seen, social leaders in Colombia have been assassinated by armed groups for trying to protect the human rights of vulnerable communities such as indigenous people, Afro-descendants, and marginalized rural communities. Additionally, the figures shown at the beginning of the article are shocking when we realize the number of social leaders who have died over the years because of armed groups. This alarming situation has been sadly reiterated in the case of the social leader Fray Torres, and his situation is unfortunately quite common in places such as the Magdalena region, which is affected by narco-paramilitaries and guerrilla groups and criminal gangs that are also seen throughout the Caribbean region. This problematic issue can also be evidenced in the stories of other leaders such as Wilton Orrego, Patricia Pérez and Maritza Quiroz, who dedicated a large part of their lives and time to helping others, despite the risk and pain that not only they go through but also their families after their deaths. However, as we mentioned in the previous paragraph, the government and state institutions have developed strategies such as the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET). These programs and resolutions of the truth commission have been supported by international organizations such as the UN and Human Rights Watch. But despite these efforts, the situation continues to be alarming, which means that there is still much work to be done to ensure the protection of the leaders by the State and to end the attacks by the armed groups. Therefore, we believe that social leaders should receive effective support and protection from the State and relevant institutions. In addition, it is imperative to give greater visibility to the cases of social leaders for communities in both rural and urban areas, and to share information regarding the work they had done for their community. Likewise, considering the impact that the deaths of these leaders have on families, where in most cases that leader is the head of the household and the one who provides the income in their homes, more should be done to support the families of victims financially. Finally, we suggest the creation of historiographic files on the leaders to have more data recorded and have more information about their work and their projects with the community. Such a measure would provide timely support and raise awareness of their work and perhaps even to attain support from organizations related to the causes of the leaders.  

References:  

El Espectador (2022). Asesinaron frente a su familia a líder social en el Palmor de la Sierra, Magdalena. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/asesinaron-frente-a-su-familia-a-lider-social-en-el-palmor-de-la-sierra-magdalena/  

Human rights watch , 2023, World Report.  

I. (2022, 22 septiembre). Asesinan líder social delante de su mujer e hijo en Magdalena. infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/09/22/asesinan-lider-social-delante-de-su-mujer-e-hijo-en-magdalena/  

Indepaz. (2021, 14 noviembre). líderes sociales, defensores de dd.hh y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2021 https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-asesinados-en-2021/  

Indepaz. (2020, 1 Enero). Líderes sociales y defensores de Derechos Humanos asesinados en 2020. https://indepaz.org.co/lideres/  

Indepaz. (2022, 31 Diciembre). líderes sociales, defensores de dd.hh y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2022 https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-dd-hh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2022/  

Indepaz. (2023, 11 Abril). líderes sociales, defensores de dd.hh y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2023 https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-dd-hh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2023/  

Indepaz. (2020). Registro de líderes y personas defensoras de DDHH asesinadas desde la firma del acuerdo de Paz Del 24/11/2016 al 15/07/2020.  

INDEPAZ, 2022, Report on illegal groups.  

Security Council, 2022, UN Verification Report.  

PDET, 2017 (https://confianzaypaz.com/pdet/)  

UNCARIBE. (2019). Líderes sociales asesinados en el Caribe Enero- junio 2019 Universidad del Norte.  

Urieles, R. (2022, Agosto 10). Temor en pueblo de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta por amenaza de Clan del Golfo. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/clan-del-golfo-confinamiento-en-sierra-nevada-de-santa-marta-693919  

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (n.d.). Tierras. https://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/balances-jep/tierras.html#:~:text=No%20hay%20mayor%20problema%20en,oblig%C3%A1ndolos%20a%20dejar%20sus%20tierras.  

El Heraldo. (2022, 24 de enero). La Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, merced de los violentos. El Heraldo. https://www.elheraldo.co/magdalena/la-sierra-nevada-de-santa-marta-merced-de-los-violentos-930499.  

Hoy Diario del Magdalena. (2022, 25 de enero). Asesinan a una mujer en Ciénaga. Hoy Diario del Magdalena. https://www.hoydiariodelmagdalena.com.co/archivos/575285/asesinan-a-una-mujer-en-cienaga/.  

Indepaz. (2022a, 1 de marzo). Ciénaga, Magdalena. 80 familias desplazadas por conflicto armado. [Tweet]. Twitter. Recuperado el 13 de abril de 2023, de https://twitter.com/Indepaz/status/1646229715240333313?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet.  

Indepaz. (2022b, 2 de octubre). #ATENCIÓN| Con profunda tristeza y dolor denunciamos el asesinato de nuestro compañero Wilton Orrego, quien se desempeñaba como líder en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. [Foto adjunta de Wilton Orrego]. [Tweet]. Twitter. Recuperado el 13 de abril de 2023, de https://twitter.com/Indepaz/status/1444843594435735553/photo/1.  

Mojica, J. (2023). Asesinato de Wilton Orrego, líder de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/asesinato-de-wilton-orrego-lider-de-la-sierra-nevada-de-santa-marta-611607  

Posada, J. (2021). Los Urabeños y Pachenca luchan por los puertos de Santa Marta, Colombia. Insight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/urabenos-pachenca-lucha-puertos-santa-marta-colombia/.  

La Paz en el Terreno. (n.d.). Maritza Quiroz Leyva. https://www.lapazenelterreno.com/lider-social/maritza-quiroz-leyva.  

Radio Nacional de Colombia. (2022). Ciénaga, Magdalena: 80 familias desplazadas por conflicto armado. Radio Nacional de Colombia. https://www.radionacional.co/regiones/caribe/cienaga-magdalena-80-familias-desplazadas-por-conflicto-armado  

Córdoba’s crop substitution leaders continue to be murdered having banked on change.

Rural leader Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata was the 62nd social leader murdered in the department of Córdoba since the 2016 peace agreement was signed with the FARC. Like the majority of social leaders targeted in the Caribbean department, Jorge Luis had been attached to the PNIS crop substitution program. 

Originally published: Jun 14, 2023 

10 min read 

Updated: Jun 23, 2023 

Article written by Mayda Campo, Dalgys Carbal & Luisa Riondo 

The armed conflict in Colombia, well-known as “La Violencia”, is a phenomenon that has permeated the relations between the State and its citizens. According to Vargas and Caruso (2014), this circle of violence in Colombia transcends decades, since the independence war, the conflict between liberals and conservatives, the assassination of the presidential candidate J. E. Gaitan, the birth of guerrilla organizations and right-wing paramilitaries, and drug trafficking ties with the violence. Thus, Colombian authors, such as Melamed (2018) have said that the armed conflict in the country is difficult to define since the dynamics of execution, localization and causality tend to change depending on the period in which the conflict is studied. In particular, the conflict actors have transformed the scope of this one: according to Tate (2001) at the time of writing, Colombian paramilitary groups were “responsible for major drug trafficking operations and the majority of political violence” (pp. 163). Furthermore, the FARC guerrilla received financing through these illicit operations. Because of this connection between the illegal groups and the cartels of drug, oligopolies of coercion were established, a situation in which these organizations have simultaneous and overlapping control of the means of coercion necessary to regulate societal transactions in Colombia (Duncan, 2014). In this respect, the violence has directly impacted the civilian population through forced displacement, kidnapping, selected murders and massacres, among others (Riascos & Vargas, 2011). However, it is important to mention that the links between illicit groups and drug trafficking have also affected the civilian population in Colombia: dynamics, such as the cultivation of illicit crops for cocaine, have impacted in the life of campesinos because of the power vacuums that were exploited by these illegal groups in order to control the economy and the social interactions in marginalized zones. On the other hand, illicit crops have also provided a stable income for these marginalized rural dwellers; that is why, according to Norman (2017), this problematic situation remains a key aspect in the conflict, so much so that in the 2016 Peace Agreement, there was a chapter dedicated to the narcotization of the violence in Colombia, and how best to deal with the issue. As an extension of the impact on civil society, the armed conflict has also impacted social activism in Colombia: according to Albarrancín et al (2023), violence against social leaders has grown throughout the conflict, and, even following the peace agreement with the FARC-EP guerrilla organization in 2016. Much of this violence against social activism in Colombia is related to illegal crops and narcotrafficking (Mejía & Restrepo, 2013), since the social leaders represent the interest of the community in replacing illicit crops —as an illegal economic dynamic— which goes against these illegal group’s sources of incomes. Hence, the focus in this article on the issue of illegal crops in Colombia and the ties between the illicit crops substitution program (PNIS) and the violence against social leaders.  

The production of illicit crops in Colombia can be traced back to the 1960s when farmers began cultivating coca as a cash crop. The growth of the illicit drug trade in Colombia led to the expansion of coca cultivation and the emergence of other illegal crops such as marijuana and opium poppies. There were several factors that contributed to the growth of illicit crops in the country. One of the main reasons was the high demand for drugs in the United States and Europe. According to Colombia Reports (2023), “the drug labs are generally run by farmers under control of local drug trafficking clans, individual guerrilla units, or associates of the international criminal organizations that traffic the drugs to the US, Europe or the Southern Cone”. Another factor is the poverty and lack of economic opportunities in rural areas of Colombia, leading farmers to turn to coca cultivation as a means of earning stable income and supporting their families. Additionally, the power vacuum in some areas of the country, allied to the presence of armed groups, such as guerrilla groups and drug cartels in Colombia has facilitated the growth of illicit crops. These groups provided protection to coca growers and controlled the production, processing, and trafficking of drugs (Palacios, 2012). Besides, according to Mejía and Restrepo (2013): “…the FARC and paramilitaries also fight each other and the state over the control of productive areas for coca cultivation and threaten or attack local populations to gain absolute control of the local cocaine trade. By doing so, these groups earn the rents associated to the control of land suitable for coca cultivation and cocaine production, a scarce and inelastic factor (pp. 5).” Due to this link between the illegal drug economy and the armed conflict in Colombia, the issue was one of immense importance when the Colombian government was negotiating with the FARC guerrillas during the mandate of Juan Manuel Santos.  

The PNIS crop substitution program was created as part of the implementation of the Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, signed by the government and the FARC guerrillas in 2016. Likewise, Decree Law 896 of 2017 defines the objective of the PNIS as «to promote the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, through the development of programmes and projects to contribute to overcoming conditions of poverty and marginalisation of peasant families who derive their subsistence from illicit crops» (pp. 5). However, this programme has inadvertently increased the violence against social leaders: the cohesion of the state security apparatus, and the competition in the illegal market determines traffickers’ incentives to employ violence (Duran, 2015). For instance, according to Llanes (2020), the program’s agreement raised the monthly probability of a social leader’s killing by 1.5 percentage points, representing a 167 % increase, considering that the pre-treatment controls mean was 0.9 %. Findings are robust to several specifications and the identification assumptions are likely to be fulfilled in all econometric models (pp. 4). Essentially, the problem around illegal crops arises from the interest of the social leaders —who have signed up and are part of the PNIS—, who defend the purpose of the programme and reject the violence perpetrated by armed groups. Effectively, by signing up to the crop substitution programs, they have been identified as obstacles to the interests of those who wish to see coca cultivation continue. Besides, Holmes et al (2006) say that there is a “relationship between coca production and guerrilla violence by reviewing national-level data over time and studying Colombia by department, exploring the interactions among guerrilla violence, exports, development, and displacement” (pp. 1). As previously mentioned, the production of coca is concentrated in the territories with less state control, which implies a strong interaction between the actors involved, not only in the cultivation/harvesting processes but also in the extraction and cocaine trafficking. Likewise, these interactions have strong consequences for civil society. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2019) estimate that 80% of homicide victims in the context of the armed conflict in 2018 occurred in municipalities that were affected by coca crops. On the other hand, the greater presence of coca crops is directly related to dynamics such as internal forced displacement, with the inherent effects on the forces of order (murders or injuries), and with terrorist acts, attacks and combats carried out at the municipal level (UNODC, 2019).  

Currently, it is estimated that Colombia is the world’s largest cocaine producer. According to the annual report by UNODC (2021), 143,000 hectares with coca crops were identified as of December 31, 2020. There were significant increases of coca crops in Antioquia, Córdoba, and Bolívar (nearly 4,800 hectares). This year’s records estimate that “Cordoba contributes 50 % of the total number of hectares with coca crops in the buffer zones” (p. 35) and “has the largest departmental increase (30 %) which corresponds to an increase of nearly 3,500 hectares” (p. 93). Despite the problem, there were no interventions to reduce coca cultivation, indicating that there are multiple factors driving the trend. The one program clearly targeting coca cultivation is the PNIS, as agreed in the 2016 peace agreement. Yet, the Colombian state has failed to move quickly enough to enact the terms of this program, leaving those leaders and communities in limbo as different armed actors moved in to replace the demobilised FARC units. In areas where coca is cultivated, there has been a surge in violence against those involved in crop substitution programs. This trend can be most clearly observed in the Caribbean region in the department of Córdoba. In Córdoba and in the illicit crops growing territories, civil society has waged a constant struggle for their rights and autonomy in the face of government policies and pressure from illegal armed groups. These communities are trapped in a cycle of violence and poverty, being stigmatized as drug producers and being victims of the violence generated by drug trafficking. However, the communities have managed to resist and organize themselves, demanding the recognition of their land rights, the protection of their leaders and the search for sustainable economic alternatives that allow them to escape the stigma. However, in many cases, these leaders are victims of political violence, both from illegal armed groups and drug cartels, since they see them as obstacles to their interests and illegal activities.  

To highlight the situation faced by social leaders, and those involved in crop substitution, it is important to look at two important cases of murdered social leaders which took place in Córdoba. The first case was that of Andrés Alfonso Arteaga Cuadrado, a beneficiary of the PNIS program and member of the Asociación Campesina para el Desarrollo del Alto Sinú, a development association aimed at rural communities in the Alto Sinu region (Asodecas for its initials in Spanish). Andres Alfonso had previously been forced to flee his home in Tierralta Córdoba because of threats from armed groups. On the afternoon of January 7th, 2023, the body of this leader was found on the road outside the municipality of Palmira, Córdoba. According to Asodecas, at 6 pm on January 6th, some armed men had intercepted him and vilely murdered him with three gunshot wounds. Although those responsible for the homicide have not been identified, the Clan del Golfo, an armed group with a presence in all the municipalities of the department, is suspected. Within a month, the community in Tierralta and Asodecas had lost yet another leader. Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata was recognized for his leadership in Asodecas and, like Andres Arteaga, was also a beneficiary of the PNIS. Furthermore, he was a member of the conciliation committee of the village of El Juli, in rural Tierraalta. On February 4th, 2023, at 2:00 in the afternoon, the body of this social leader was found in the Aguas Vivas sector. According to the information collected, Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata had received five bullet wounds after being tortured by his attackers (La Primicia, 2023). The grim murder of Jorge Luis was the 1,421st case of a murdered social leader since 2016. As noted above, both Andrés Arteaga and Jorge Jaraba had been affiliated to Asodecas and had also been also beneficiaries of the PNIS crop substitution program, established as part of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas. In Asodecas, they had been dedicated leaders of their community in the process of community articulation of peasant society after a period of intense violence dating back to the 1960s. As mentioned, part of their responsibility representing their community was their support for the PNIS, which seeks the voluntary substitution of illicit crops. This objective is sought by developing programs and projects that help to overcome the conditions of poverty and marginalization of peasant families who derive their livelihood from the cultivation of illicit crops (Infobae, 2023). The killings of Andres and Jorge are but two of the 62 cases of murdered social leaders in the department of Cordoba between October 2016 and April 2023. Most of these cases have included leaders associated with crop substitution programs.  

In short, violence in Colombia has been a persistent and complex problem for decades, with multiple factors contributing to its existence. The presence of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, economic and social inequality, corruption, and the lack of access to justice and basic services have marginalized the population. Although, the Colombian government has implemented various policies and strategies to address the violence, including peace agreements with armed groups and strengthening security in areas, violence remains a significant problem in the country. It is evident that the dynamic of narco-trafficking is a huge factor in this violence. The struggle of social leaders is important in consolidating peace and building a fairer and more equitable society. They play a fundamental role in the vindication of the human rights of the most vulnerable and forgotten by the state. However, in the Colombian context, these groups may face risks and threats, as exemplified by the cases of Andrés Arteaga and Jorge Jaraba in the department of Córdoba. These murders not only generate great pain and suffering in the affected communities but are also an obstacle to safeguarding human rights by the State. Therefore, it is necessary for governments to take concrete measures to protect the life and safety of social leaders, as well as to guarantee justice and reparation for their families and communities. Likewise, the problem of illicit crops, the conflict and the violence, is not only an internal problem, but its consequences expand to the international sphere. This is why it is important to highlight the role of cooperation in the construction of a better society where the protection and guarantee of human rights and basic needs are not just a privilege of few.  

References  

Albarracín, J., Corredor, J., Milanese, J., Valencia, I. & Wolff, J. (2023). Pathways of post-conflict violence in Colombia. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 34(1), 138 – 164. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363279890_Pathways_of_post-conflict_violence_in_Colombia  

Colombia Reports. (2023, January 12). Colombia’s drug trade. Colombia News | Colombia Reports; Colombia News|Colombia Reports. https://colombiareports.com/colombia-drug-trafficking/  

Duncan, G. (2014). Drug Trafficking and Political Power: Oligopolies of Coercion in Colombia and Mexico. Latin American Perspectives, 41(2), 18–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X13509071  

Durán, A. (2015). To Kill and Tell? State Power, Criminal Competition, and Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8), 1377–1402. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587047  

Garzón, J., Rueda, M., & Dueñas, C. (2022). ¿Qué hacer con el PNIS? Decisiones claves para los primeros 100 días de Gobierno [Archivo PDF]. https://multimedia.ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_NE_QueHacerConelPNIS.pdf  

Holmes, J., Gutiérrez, S., & Curtin, K. (2006). Drugs, Violence, and Development in Colombia: A Department-Level Analysis. Latin American Politics and Society, 48(3), 157-184. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/abs/drugs-violence-and-development-in-colombia-a-departmentlevel-analysis/91A8B050F2067018FE924C18ED8DD753  

Infobae. (2023). Asociación campesina pide justicia por el asesinato a un beneficiario de sustitución de cultivos. https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2023/01/10/asociacion-campesina-pide-justicia-por-el-asesinato-a-un-beneficiario-de-sustitucion-de-cultivos/#:~:text=Asodecas%20asegur%C3%B3%20que%20Arteaga%20Cuadrado,informante%20de%20la%20fuerza%20p%C3%BAblica.  

La Primicia. (2023). Líder campesino fue encontrado sin vida y con señales de tortura en Tierralta. La Primicia de Colombia. https://laprimicia.com.co/judiciales/lider-campesino-fue-encontrado-sin-vida-y-con-senales-de-tortura-en-tierralta/  

Mejía, D. & Restrepo, P. (2013). Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence in Colombia. Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico CEDE, (53), 1 – 53. https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=371123008121095010004119120094110108008078052034005027126123022123127069024085069098123016027043114100046123085066102105110017011094012087050103068073108100070085004026089041090112099122069082118101068064005101085006084004078106026097023023083081122006&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE  

Melamed, J. (2018). Transformación de la violencia y la criminalidad en Colombia: El caso de las FARC-EP. Editorial Universidad del Norte. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv513cqn  

Norman, S. V. (2017). Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug Trade in Colombia. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41(8), 638-659. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338052  

Palacios, P. (2012). Forced Displacement: Legal Versus Illegal Crops. Defence and Peace Economics, 23(2), 133-160. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242694.2011.597238  

Prem, M., Vargas, J., & Mejía, D. (2023). The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 105(2), 344–358. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/105/2/344/100985/The-Rise-and-Persistence-of-Illegal-Crops-Evidence  

Riascos, A. & Vargas, J. (2011). Violence and growth in Colombia: A review of the quantitative literature. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 6(2), 15 – 20. https://pure.urosario.edu.co/ws/portalfiles/portal/27214147/Violence_and_growth_in_colombia.pdf  

Tate, W. (2001). Paramilitaries in Colombia. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 8(1), 163-175. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa8&div=22&id=&page=  

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2019). Survey of Territories Affected by Illegal Crops 2018. UNODC, Government of Colombia. https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2019/Octubre/Survey_of_Territories_Affected_by_Illegal_Crops_2018.pdf  

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2021). Survey of Territories Affected by Illegal Crops 2020. UNODC, Government of Colombia. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/Colombia_Monitoreo_de_territorios_afectados_por_cultivos_ilicitos_2020.pdf  

Vargas, J. & Caruso, R. (2014). Conflict, Crime, and Violence in Colombia. De Gruyter, 20(1), 1 – 4. https://repository.urosario.edu.co/server/api/core/bitstreams/b4b1a80f-df88-4862-afad-c4d7829436b9/content  

Córdoba and the war on those wishing to move away from illicit crops. 

Ofenix de Jesús Concha and Luis Alberto Ramos Bertel were representatives of rural communities that have traditionally been reliant on illicit crops

Originally published: Apr 28, 2023 

8 min read 

Updated: Jun 23, 2023 

Article written by Susana Rengifo, Maria Carolina Sierra & Sebastian Soler 

Córdoba is a department located in northwestern Colombia, on the shores of the Caribbean Sea, and is one of the departments that make up this Caribbean region. It is divided into 28 municipalities and its capital is the city of Montería. The main economic source of this department is livestock, but agriculture also plays an influential role. Córdoba tends to be one of the most violent departments in the Caribbean region. Historically, it has been one of the municipalities with the highest uninterrupted presence of armed groups since 1949, before becoming a department. This region has a significant opportunity for wealth due to the fertility of its soils and its strategic location between two gulfs and proximity to the border with Panama. However, these factors are also very beneficial for illegal armed groups to establish themselves here. They can take advantage of the fertile soil to grow illicit crops and the strategic location to export illicit drugs. In addition to this, it is an even more vulnerable territory due to the lack of state presence. It has been a department left aside in development issues; there have been very few state initiatives to reduce poverty and inequality in the territory, so its inhabitants have been practically left to their own devices to deal with inequality, poverty, and violence, and many of the social initiatives proposed by the population and leaders have been directly affected and coerced by these illegal actors. The humanitarian consequences of armed violence in the department of Córdoba are persistent and seem to have no solution. As the number of victims of violence has risen in recent years, the risks and gaps in the implementation of rights and guarantees to the civilian population by the authorities in charge have also increased. In the south of the department, the vulnerability of the population is even greater, since the initial problems of this territory, such as health, water, hygiene, and food security, among others, have been aggravated by the increase in violence in the territory. Furthermore, in the south of this department, there are still illicit drug crops. This is a factor that has contributed to the armed confrontations impacting the civilian population there. At present, threats and constant murders of social leaders and politicians are among the most pressing problems afflicting the territory. Social leaders have been defined by the Royal Spanish Academy (RAE by their initials in Spanish) as “someone who leads or conducts a political party, social group, or other collective”. But their work reaches beyond that definition; social leaders serve as defenders of their territory, asking for respect and justice for the community they represent. Moreover, they are a direct connection between the government and the community in need, which helps the people to access different types of resources that they need. A neglected department such as Córdoba relies heavily on the actions of its social leaders to develop. However, social leaders in Córdoba, as in many other parts of Colombia, frequently face threats and violence for their work.  

Between the signing of a peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas in 2016 and the end of April 2023, in Córdoba 62 social leaders have been murdered (Indepaz) due to the climate of violence, and numerous threats have been received. Such levels of violence have led to urgent calls for support from those on the ground, especially in conflicted sub-regions such as the south of Córdoba: “We have not felt any support from the government to improve the public order situation and to clarify the crimes” said José David Ortega, director of the Association of Peasants of the South of Córdoba. Leading social leaders have been victims of these murders, leaving a big vacuum in the department. Social leaders are the ones brave enough to stand up for the rights of the community; furthermore, they are the ones that lead actions and movements for the greater good and the correction of injustices in the territory. The death of any social leader means the voice of the community is lost. In other words, there would be no one fighting for justice in that territory, causing fear in the people. Additionally, the public discontent over the deaths is growing, owing to the failures of political leaders to bring justice to the injustices present in the territory. In order to better understand this worrying dynamic, it is worth looking into some of the individual cases to understand the importance of each leader to the community.  

Jose Gregorio Luguez was assassinated on July 2nd, 2021, in La Chica Córdoba. His murder was associated with his work in the program and the redistribution of crops. Luguez was a single father of three and with him passing, the future of his children is uncertain. Moreover, Luguez was part of the Junta de Accion Comunal of La Chica, in Córdoba. The Junta de Accion Comunal , or JAC, helps the community by being the instrument that helps to build participatory democracy in the management of community development. It is a space for citizen participation, made up of representatives of the local government and five residents of the municipality. In a region such as the south of Córdoba, where many rural communities have long relied on the stable economy of coca cultivation, many JACs are responsible for organizing the programs to help these communities transition to solely legal forms of agriculture. Due to the previously mentioned problem of drug-trafficking, the National Illicit Crop Replacement Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos, PNIS) was implemented. The PNIS is a crop substitution program agreed upon as part of the 2016 peace agreement (between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas) with the aim of promoting the voluntary substitution of illicit crops. It is achieved by implementing programs and projects aimed at overcoming the conditions of poverty and marginalization of families that depend on subsistence crops. PNIS was created as a way of helping families in places like the south of Cordoba move away from growing illegal crops. However, it is striking how the authorities seem to have left the leaders of this program in abandonment. On the one hand, the authorities are not keeping their part of the agreement. On the other hand, the criminal groups are targeting the leaders in charge since they no longer grow these crops, and this is seen as damaging for the financial interests of the illegal groups. Since September 2017, there have been numerous attacks and intimidation against the voluntary substitution program for illicit crops and its leaders. The Gulf clan, among other groups, have been the perpetrators of such actions, according to El Espectador. Such a situation means that cases like Jose Gregorio’s are far too common.  

Sadly, as mentioned above, José Gregorio Luguez is far from being the only victim of such violence in Córdoba. One month after the killing of José Gregorio, in August 2021, Ofenix de Jesús Concha was killed and with him, it summed up to a total of 108 social leaders who were killed during 2021, according to Indepaz. The death of Ofenix was not only sad, but it created anger in the territory, because of the large number of deaths with the same modus operandi. These deaths have remained unsolved. Ofenix was also a member of the JAC (Community Action Board), in his case in the town of Río Sucio, a rural area of the municipality of Puerto Libertador in Córdoba. Besides the JAC participation, Concha was recognized for leading agricultural projects in the locality and, like Jose Gregorio, being a beneficiary of the PNIS crop substitution program. As with the case of José Gregorio, it is difficult to ignore the fact that involvement in these programs was a factor in his murder. As mentioned above, these crop substitution programs were established as part of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC. They were established to improve rural development and steer communities away from activities that involve contact with illegal organizations. However, while the FARC may no longer be present in the south of Córdoba, other illegal groups such as the Clan del Golfo, the Caparros, and FARC dissidents are. These groups rely heavily on the drug trade. Therefore, these groups see the substitution plan as a threat to their interests. It seems like this is a huge factor in violence against leaders in the south of the department. That violence continues.  

Like Jose Gregorio and Ofenix, Luis Alberto Ramos Bertel was an influential figure in the department, but, just like both of those leaders, Luis Alberto was also killed; stabbed to death not far from his home. Luis Alberto was president of the JAC of the village of San Antonio, in the rural area of Montelíbano, and he was invested in creating job opportunities for the communities where they can develop their capacities and, in that way, get out of poverty in a legal and more beneficial way. Unlike other social leaders, he had received no death threats. Even though it is imprudent to assume that his death was due to the work he played as a social leader, it seems the only reason that makes sense. People in the territory believe that the activities that these social leaders led could be related to why they were murdered. Equally, it is believed that the perpetrators of such crimes are the organized narco-paramilitary armed group that operates in the area, the Clan del Golfo. In addition to their antagonism towards crop substitution, groups such as these are inherently suspicious of any activity which brings state attention to the sub-regions where they hold control, as attention and opportunities are incompatible with the conditions that allow their activities to flourish without interference. Not only that but a lot of social leaders in this department have been killed in areas such as Tierralta, Montelíbano, Puerto Libertador and San José de Uré. As a response, the Colombian Police have now established an alarm in case of an emergency situation. However, it is worth noting that the police too have been victims of these illegal groups; 12 policemen have been murdered as a result of criminal organizations that not only attack innocent civilians but also continue to terrorize social leaders throughout the entire department.  

As can be seen from the tragic stories shared above, Córdoba is one of the most affected departments in Colombia. This is because of illegal crops, armed groups, demobilization, and strategic drug routes among other factors. Encountering and investigating such cases in such a violent context is sadly all too predictable due to the low presence of the state and low response from the Colombian government. It is also demoralizing since people who are helping the country and those in need are getting killed. Most of the Colombian population will neither hear about the cases nor help the communities affected by armed groups across the country. Keeping in mind all that has been said, Córdoba accounts for only 62 of the more than 1,400 leaders that have been killed by armed groups throughout Colombia between 2016 and April 2023 according to Indepaz. It is by far the most violent department for social leaders in the Caribbean region. Since 2016 the number of cases has increased due to the various illegal military forces that are claiming territory to fill the power vacuum left by demobilized FARC troops following the peace treaty with the Colombian government. It is a sad irony that many of these victims should be benefiting from programs that were created as part of that agreement instead of being persecuted for trying to build a more hopeful future. We recommend further research on why social leaders are being killed in Colombia and connecting this with the root problems that have affected the country for the last 70-plus years and getting the word out to the public, so mass attention is brought to these people in need. Finally, the Colombian government must expand its state presence into the regions affected by the killings of social leaders in order to provide support and opportunities for the communities and to act and punish those responsible for the violence.  

Information sourced from:  

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/colombia-denuncian-asesinato-lider-campesino-cordoba-20210704-0021.html

https://larazon.co/cordoba/este-ano-han-asesinado-a-cuatro-lideres-comunales-en-cordoba-indepaz

https://www.elciudadano.com/actualidad/asesinan-a-lider-campesino-ofenix-de-jesus-concha-en-colombia/08/16/

https://www.eluniversal.com.co/regional/cordoba/asesinan-a-lider-campesino-en-el-sur-de-cordoba-GF5205549

https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/asesinan-al-presidente-de-la-accion-comunal-en-zona-rural-de-cordoba-631026

https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2021/11/08/monteria/1636348472_004344.html

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/karina-cuesta-ortega-was-brutally-murdered-her-life-was-then-stigmatized-by-authorities-who-should

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/strong-em-the-reality-of-social-leaders-in-colombia-the-case-of-fredman-herazo-padilla-em

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/the-killing-which-momentarily-shook-the-nation

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/rural-leaders-colombia-s-hidden-heroes

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/arcangel-pantoja-omar-agudelo-two-more-lives-extinguished-by-the-violence-which-reigns-in-the

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/jorge-luis-betancourt-the-dangers-of-defending-human-rights-in-the-south-of-c%C3%B3rdoba

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/the-role-of-luis-dario-rodriguez-in-the-south-of-c%C3%B3rdoba-a-social-leader-to-remember

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/the-dynamics-of-violence-in-cordoba

https://cmio.org/en/world/latin-america/706529-a-social-leader-is-assassinated-in-the-colombian-department-of-cordoba-news

https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/left-undefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombias-remote-communities

Barranquilla – The capital of life? 

Community leaders Miguel Arrieto and Johnny Agudelo were murdered in the metropolitan area of Barranquilla, highlighting the issues of insecurity faced in the city. 

Originally published: Sep 14, 2023 

7 min read 

Updated: Sep 27, 2023 

Article written by Isabella Avila, Camilo Gomez & Sofia Moreno 

Barranquilla, also called the golden gate, or the capital of life, is a city located 19 kilometers from the mouth of the Magdalena River, near the Caribbean coast of Colombia, and it is the capital of department of Atlántico. Barranquilla is well known for its carnival, its warm people, and its artistic tradition. Most foreigners consider this city a wonderful place to visit and for some to live. Barranquilla is a city of development, considering the number of jobs, buildings, and parks being created for a better life in the city, in comparison to other big cities of the country. Curramba the Beautiful (curramba la bella) is a relatively young city and day by day it keeps growing. However, all this development Barranquilla is seeing does not tell the whole story about how reality is here. These characteristics are overshadowed by the acts of violence, poverty, and criminal groups that have impoverished the city in recent decades. The image of the city promoted by the government is mostly biased towards the richer part, and it has left behind the rest of the city and surroundings.  

Barranquilla is progressively improving the quality of life for its inhabitants. One example of this is seen in the creation of new universities such as La Universidad de Barranquilla, which is a free university for those of lower socio-economic capacity. Social interest housing projects and subsidies from the government have helped, as has investment in tidying up and expanding the parks and other recreational facilities in the city. However, this progress does not tell the whole story. For example, the violence on the streets keeps growing, and the insecurity that the citizens’ experience is undeniable. One of the biggest reasons for insecurity is the level of poverty that some areas present, and there is a clear contrast between the northern part of the city and the southern part, despite the fact that this sense of insecurity seems to permeate throughout. One important factor to have in mind when we are talking is the pandemic. Before the pandemic, Barranquilla closed the poverty level with 35.7% (DANE), and during this time a lot of enterprises closed, people stopped working and earning money because they couldn’t get out of their houses. Unemployment went up and so did poverty. Nevertheless, When the pandemic “finished” thanks to the reactivation, trade started to open again, people got new jobs and started to look for stabilization again, the poverty was reduced in Barranquilla by 5.5 percentage points, going from 41.2 % in 2020 to 35.7 % in 2022, which meant that more than 99,000 citizens had got out of this condition. However, it is important to point out that the majority of the population (58%) work in the informal sector (El Heraldo, 2023). Furthermore, there are other important issues present in the city.  

Insecurity in the city is evident in many distinctive ways. Perhaps the most prevalent issue is robbery; one of the most pressing problems affecting the citizens of Barranquilla and the metropolitan area in different ways. Theft is the crime that most worries Barranquilla’s society There were more than 15,000 reports of thefts against private property in 2022, with an increase of 41% over the previous year, and this causes an alert that does not go unnoticed by the government; much less the specialization around the theft from financial institutions, which recorded 23 cases in 2022, compared to 11 in 2021. Street crimes, including the threat of violence via the use of guns and other weapons, is a reality throughout the entire metropolitan area, and there have been several high-profile armed robberies in commercial and residential areas in the more well-off north of Barranquilla. However, these street crimes disproportionately affect more deprived areas of the city, and public transport services and their passengers have often been targets. These street crimes are impossible to ignore for the residents of the metropolitan area. However, the violence and threats caused by more organized criminal structures seem to have become more common in recent times. According to the authorities’ records the department concluded January 2023 with 74 murders in that month alone, 22 more cases than the previous year, when there were 52. Janiel Melamed, director of the Citizen Security Observatory says that Barranquilla and its metropolitan area have become the scene of a strong confrontation between criminal organizations, which has led to the consolidation of high homicide rates in recent years: “These criminal structures have been spatially distributed throughout the department, especially in municipalities with lower institutional capacities, either on the eastern side, in Soledad, Malambo or Santo Tomás, or on the coastal side, in Puerto Colombia or Tubará”. However, the crimes of these organized criminal structures have impacted the civilian population in different ways.  

Regarding the issues of violence in Barranquilla, we have multiple case studies that give us a worrying picture of the city. As was seen in the previous paragraph, violence in recent years has had a significant increase over the past years. There are multiple cases that allow us to reach this conclusion, but they can be summarized in certain situations that are repeated within the territory. For example, we have the extortion of bus drivers by criminal groups, the murder of social leaders in territories with little state presence and the narco-parties. The cases of extortion of bus drivers were a significant part of the violence in Barranquilla in 2022 with several bus drivers being indiscriminately murdered. The modus operandi of certain criminal groups is basically to offer a protection service for drivers belonging to bus companies, and if they refuse to pay, they use intimidation and in extreme cases murder to cause widespread terror in the companies. Situations like these had already occurred in past years such as 2012 and 2013 where the same cases had been perpetrated by the same groups that are attributed to those that occurred in 2022. The criminal group known as “Los Costeños” had the main objective to kill the drivers to intimidate the victims. The workers of the companies affected by these events coincide in the fact that these events have a clear intention to intimidate the business community, and this has given rise to many cases of worried relatives and others devastated by the events, showing that the problem in the capital of Atlantico has been aggravating. All of this started last July when Willington Hernández Borja who operated a Cootrab bus was shot. After that, until this day there have been more than 5 bus drivers murdered in the whole metropolitan area, Because of these issues, bus drivers made a strike asking the government for more security and for them to find the culprit of all these murders, as in addition, the universities and schools had to start remote classes once again because of the lack of mobility available to get to the schools and college campuses. Furthermore, the impact caused by these criminal groups also affected people who are sticking up and defending the rights and interests of the communities in the city and the metropolitan area.  

Another problem present in the territory is the assassination of social leaders. This is a worrying dynamic that has been affecting all Colombian territories since the signing of a peace deal between the government and the FARC in 2016. As of April 17th, 2023, there had been a staggering 1,461 social leaders murdered in Colombia since the agreement. Barranquilla and the department of Atlantico may only make up a very minor fraction of this figure, but the area is still affected. These people were known as social leaders of great relevance for their role in the resolution of conflicts in different areas of the country, however; they also were mothers and fathers that were killed by unidentified criminal groups to date. Johnny Agudelo is a clear example of this issue; he was a social leader located in Barranquilla and the voice of the people. He was fighting against the eviction of some communities in the surrounding territories, and when he was carrying out this work at a meeting and in front of other leaders, he was violently murdered in Soledad on October 30th, 2022. As a message to others to stop their cause. Another recent case in the metropolitan area of Barranquilla was that of the Pibe Soledeño; Miguel Arrieta was a social leader well-known for his physical similarities with the ex-soccer player El Pibe Valderrama and for his huge passion to help others. Miguel lived in Soledad, and this was the same city where he was assassinated on March 16th, 2023. Miguel was murdered at his business locale, and since the crime happened, the local population have been rallying around his family to show their support. There is a clear pattern for these criminal organizations and speaking up is sadly not a safe option in Colombia.  

To conclude, Barranquilla is such a beautiful place to live, because of the warm people, the culture, and the development the city is going through. Nevertheless, we should never forget the bad side of Barranquilla where insecurity, poverty, murders, and extortion are negatively impacting the lives of many in and around the city. Insecurity in the streets, attacks against public transport, frequent shootings involving criminal organizations and the silencing of leaders and activists are issues that are far too serious to avoid. If the city wants to be identified as the capital of life, it needs to do more to justify the name.  

References:  

Ambivalencias en balance de seguridad en Barranquilla: bajan homicidios, suben extorsiones y hurtos. (s/f). Portal de Noticias. Recuperado el 20 de abril de 2023, de https://www.uninorte.edu.co/es/web/grupo-prensa/w/ambivalencias-en-balance-de-seguridad-en-barranquilla-bajan-homicidios-suben-extorsiones-y-hurtos  

BBC News Mundo. (2019, junio 22). María del Pilar Hurtado: el asesinato de una mujer frente a sus hijos que indigna a Colombia. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-48732381  

Gonzalez, S. (2022, noviembre 2). Asesinado mediador de desalojo en Barranquilla. HSB NOTICIAS. https://www.hsbnoticias.com/asesinado-mediador-de-desalojo-en-barranquilla/  

Heraldo, E. (2023, marzo 25). Video del atentado: “sicario le disparó al ‘Pibe’ cuando arreglaba bicicleta”. El Heraldo. https://www.elheraldo.co/judicial/video-capto-momento-del-ataque-bala-que-acabo-con-el-pibe-soledeno-988449  

INFOBAE. (2022, noviembre 1). Asesinaron a líder social que estaba mediando en las invasiones de tierras en la costa Caribe. infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/11/01/asesinaron-a-lider-social-que-estaba-mediando-en-las-invasiones-de-tierras-en-la-costa-caribe/  

Mouthon, L. (2023, February 13). Informalidad laboral no da “tregua” en la costa Caribe”. El Heraldo. https://www.elheraldo.co/economia/informalidad-laboral-bajo-2-puntos-en-barranquilla-y-soledad-977949  

Ortega, D. J. L. (2022, julio 8). Así le fue a Barranquilla con el índice de pobreza en el último año. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/barranquilla/barranquilla-indices-de-pobreza-por-el-dane-685673  

Z&uacute, A. B. (2023, enero 29). Apuntes sobre la Seguridad Ciudadana en Barranquilla. www.lasillavacia.com. https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/historias-silla-llena/apuntes-sobre-la-seguridad-ciudadana-en-barranquilla/  

What the murder of two female social leaders tells us about critical structural issues in Magdalena.

Patricia Perez & Cristina Cantillo were two of the 145 social leaders and human rights defenders murdered in Colombia during 2021. 

Originally published: Nov 25, 2022 

7 min read 

Updated: Jun 23, 2023 

Article written by Daniela Rincon & Elizabeth Jiménez 

Studying violence directed towards women in Colombia will always leave a sour taste in the mouth of those who read their stories. The department of Magdalena is not far from that reality, and in the two cases that we want to share with the reader, this will become evident. Patricia Perez Ríos and Cristina Isabel Cantillo were two social leaders who were murdered in 2021. Both fought for the rights of their community and received threats because of this work, but they did not give in until their lives were cruelly taken away. Patricia’s case shows the struggle of those who were displaced from their lands, while Cristina wanted a better life for LGBTIQ+ people as a transwoman and leader. Their lives may have been brutally extinguished, but their stories are not, and the struggles they were immersed in will not cease. In this article we want to share their stories, alongside the geo-socio-political context in order to highlight the issues regarding violence towards female leaders in Magdalena, and by extension throughout Colombia.  

Firstly, it is important to note that Colombia is no stranger to the systemic mistreatment that the LGBTIQ+ community faces every day. According to Medicina Legal (2021), only in 2021, 293 people of the LGBTIQ+ community were victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) and more than half of the victims were women. Data from Defensoría del Pueblo, the Ombudsman’s Office, (2021) states that in 2021 alone, there were 35 trans women murdered, with most of these cases classified as hate crimes. Magdalena has serious issues with structural violence that the LGBTIQ+ community is victim of, and this is shown through the lack of protection provided by the government in relation to the community, violence rates in the territory, and the discrimination they face on a daily basis. Between the start of 2020 and June 2021, there were 6 homicides related to hate crimes against the LGBTIQ+ community registered in the department (Caracol Radio Santa Marta, 2021). Given the situation, the work of social leaders becomes a necessity in these territories, where the communities’ rights are being violated as a result of the dangerous political power vacuum in the department. However, such work in defense of communities brings danger in Colombia. 

Caribe Afirmativo, an NGO dedicated to the protection and promotion of LGBTIQ+ rights in the Colombian Caribbean region, denounced the murder of Cristina Cantillo, a social leader and promoter of LGBTIQ+ rights in Santa Marta. She was also an advocate of land restitution processes through her work with Calidad Humana as the former head of the organization. Her work showed support not only for the community, but also for women’s rights: she made sure to publicly condemn violence against women in political structures alongside other women on January 9th, 2021, and actively participated in the defense of human rights in Santa Marta (Alarcón, 2021). Unfortunately, her work and denouncements made her a target of armed organizations, and her life was threatened on two occasions, which pushed her to demand a security scheme provided by Unidad Nacional de Protección (UNP), the National Protection Unit, especially designed for social leaders under threat like her. However, this was not enough to prevent her murder, as the security detail did not extend to when Cristina was at her house, as it was considered a safe place for the social leader; budget restrictions ruled out 24 hour protection. Cristina was resting in her house’s terrace on the night of December 7th, or the Día de Velitas; a popular religious holiday, when two men approached her on a motorcycle and shot her three times, instantly causing her death (Pacheco, 2021). Her death brought back the stark reality of hundreds of crimes committed against women and the LGBTIQ+ community in Magdalena, restarting the conversation about the lack of protection and guarantees for these social leaders, who often put their lives at risk in order to protect a territory that has not received enough attention from the national government in terms of the presence and influence of illegal armed actors. Unfortunately, this case will not be the last one where a female social leader gets murdered for advocating for her community’s rights.  

If the situation facing the LGBTIQ+ community is gravely serious, other dynamics in Magdalena and throughout the country are immersed in a sociopolitical and territorial reality with critical characteristics. From a national perspective, according to the Human Rights Watch Report, in 2021, Colombia has been facing major problems in respect to the implementation of the 2016 Peace accord (HRW, 2022). Referring to violence against community activists, the report addresses the ineffective measures taken by the government to guarantee leaders human rights through collective protection programs, that as of 2021 had not been implemented in totality. Thus, this issue affects different communities, including those victims of forced displacement who, in order to avoid violence related to the armed conflict, fled their homes. This situation has created a dangerous legacy as these communities, and those who represent them, seek to reclaim their lands or reparation. The HRW report highlights the issues regarding internal displacement and land restitution processes. It states how more than 8 million Colombians have been displaced by conflict-related violence since 1985, as well as how the “implementation of land restitution under the 2011 Victims’ Law continues to move slowly” (HRW, 2022). From a local context, Magdalena is considered as one of the worst-affected regions in terms of displacement due to the presence of BACRIMS (organized criminal organizations) which evolved from paramilitary groups; examples of such groups include the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Clan del Golfo), which descended from the Castaños’ AUC paramilitaries, the Rastrojos and Paisas (Stone, 2017), all of whom have a presence in Magdalena, in addition to the so-called Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra Nevada, an illegal armed group which evolved from the paramilitaries led by Hernan Giraldo, a notorious paramilitary leader who is in custody in Colombia having served a prison sentence in the US. Historically, this region has been disputed going back beyond the armed conflict. For example, there was the case of ethnic conflict with the nation of Chimila in colonial times, and later the massacre of Banana workers in Ciénaga fifty years before the arrival of guerrillas and paramilitaries unleashed a violence that “annihilated the community” and reinforced the violence in the territory, including “the reproduction of intimidation strategies against the population and criminal practices such as extortion, threats to leaders and human rights defenders, and forced displacement” (Silva-Vallejo & Franco, 2019). Issues over access to land and forced displacement caused by the armed conflict have created a situation where a significant number of the local population have to struggle through drawn out legal processes in order to reclaim land, work that demands constant activism on behalf of social leaders and social organizations.  

Patricia Perez was one such activist attempting to navigate the difficult waters of land claiming in Magdalena and throughout Colombia. Patricia experienced firsthand the problems in the region outlined above. Her husband had been murdered in June 2021 in Ciénaga Magdalena for disputes related to land ownership problems. Just four months later, on October 1st, Patricia was leaving the office of her attorney when two men intercepted her and shot her dead at the age of 30 (HOY Diario del Magdalena, 2021). Referring to this case, Indepaz (2021) mentioned that before this situation in the Ciénaga area, there had been an “early warning” from the Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office) addressing the risk that claimants, social leaders and signatories of the peace agreement were facing in the zone, due to the threats from illegal and armed groups which operate a range of illegal actions from “micro trafficking, urban control and contract killers”. In 2019, noted social leader and victim’s representative Maritza Quiroz was shot dead on land that had been awarded to her in the Sierra Nevada, demonstrating the problems faced in returning land to its rightful owners in a region where various dangerous illegal armed groups operate. Many more obstacles are complicated by economic interests whereby “big landowners and investors in large-scale projects” pressure in debted farmers to sell their lands (Stone, 2017). Finally, among other problems, the region is affected by drug trafficking, as was mentioned above, a situation which is aided by a “complex system of rivers, streams and riverside swamps” that facilitates transportation of illegal merchandise (Caracol Radio Santa Marta, 2020). Within such a culture of illegality, leaders such Cristina and Patricia face huge threats for the valuable work they do.  

To conclude, violence against social leaders, especially women, represents one of the main problems in the department of Magdalena in Colombia, affecting vulnerable communities and infringing rights such as land ownership, life, expression, gender and sexuality. On one side, the historical culture of violence showed through gender inequality, intrafamilial violence and discrimination, and on the other side, the emerging problems regarding the territory while addressing the ownership of the land, displacement and land restitution, are considered some of the main issues impacting the region. As evidence of this situation, the cases of Cristina Isabel Cantillo and Patricia Pérez Rios, two brave leaders who were cruelly silenced, were presented in order to spread awareness of the situation facing women social leaders in Magdalena, and the importance that they have in terms of sticking up for their communities’ rights. In that sense, through these cases it is clear that there is still a long way to go regarding the true institutional presence of Colombian state in zones impacted by armed conflicts and illegal activities. There are also the emerging needs for social recognition from the state and the establishment of a better decision-making system where the community interests prevail over the interests of certain groups. Therefore, recognizing the issues faced by social leaders in Magdalena could make room for new strategies for the social understanding of this problem and the state action needed to face it.  

References  

Alarcón, R. (2021, December 8). Asesinan a lideresa social Cristina Isabel Cantillo Martínez en Ondas del Caribe, Santa Marta. AlCarajo.org. https://www.alcarajo.org/2021/12/08/asesinan-a-lideresa-social-cristina-isabel-cantillo-martinez-en-ondas-del-caribe-santa-marta/  

Caracol Radio Santa Marta. (2022, June 28). Magdalena, una de las regiones con mayor asesinato hacia población LGBTI. Caracol Radio. https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2021/06/28/santa_marta/1624878760_734407.html  

Caracol Radio Santa Marta. (2022, August 19). En alerta el sur del Magdalena por presencia de grupos armados ilegales. Caracol Radio. https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2021/06/23/santa_marta/1624450422_491047.html  

Caribe Afirmativo. (2022, January 19). Rechazamos el recrudecimiento de la violencia en el departamento de Magdalena – Corporación. https://caribeafirmativo.lgbt/rechazamos-el-recrudecimiento-de-la-violencia-en-el-departamento-de-magdalena/  

HOY Diario del Magdalena. (2021, October 10). Asesinada otra mujer a bala. HOY Diario Del Magdalena. https://www.hoydiariodelmagdalena.com.co/archivos/575285/asesinan-a-una-mujer-en-cienaga/  

Indepaz [@Indepaz]. (2021, October 3). Patricia Pérez Ríos Fecha: 01/10/21 Lugar: Ciénaga, Magdalena Patricia Pérez Ríos actualmente hacía parte de algunos procesos de reclamación de tierras en el municipio de Ciénaga, Magdalena. Twitter. https://twitter.com/indepaz/status/1444843594435735553?lang=en  

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). Colombia. Events of 2021. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia#c278b9  

Pacheco, M. (2021, December 9). Sicarios mataron a líder social LGTBI. HOY DIARIO DEL MAGDALENA. https://www.hoydiariodelmagdalena.com.co/archivos/604305/  

Silva- Vallejo, F., & Franco, D. (2019). The central zone of Magdalena department (Colombia): from the begining to the setting up of chaos. Jangwa Pana, 18(3), 538–552. https://www.redalyc.org/journal/5880/588066551012/html/  

Stone, H. (2017, October 6). InSight: Colombia’s Land Reform Plan Targets Trouble Spots. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/colombias-land-reform-plan-targets-trouble-spots/  

UNFPA Colombia. (2022, June 29). Igualdad de derechos para las personas LGBTIQ+, ¡ya! https://colombia.unfpa.org/es/news/igualdad-de-derechos-para-las-personas-lgbtiq-%C2%A1ya  

The thin green line: the challenges and dangers faced by those defending nature in Colombia.

Luis Guevara. Gloria Ocampo and the imprint of deforestation. 

Originally published: Sep 29, 2022 

7 min read 

Article researched and written by Catalina Calderon & Paulo Coronell. 

Magnificent landscapes, amazing biodiversity, beautiful people, and multicultural metropolises. These are some of the characteristics through which Colombia could be described, but something deeper and darker permeates all of these positive characteristics. Biodiversity and the environment in general are constantly at risk in Colombia, generally caused by corporate greed or illegal groups. Few Colombians dare to give all they have to protect the environmental treasure of the country, and those that do fight for environmental preservation, those who are referred to here as environmental leaders, have their lives threatened and often taken. Human rights organizations like “Somos Defensores” counted 837 social and environmental leaders assassinated from 2005 to 2019; another human rights organization named “Front Line Defenders” reported that only in the year 2019, 40% of the assassinated leaders could be identified as environmental leaders. This situation should not keep escalating as these environmental leaders are a fundamental part of society; this being said, environmental leaders are reported as being one of the most affected and assassinated as part of the wave of violence towards social leaders in Colombia as they are seen as an interference regarding the exploitation of natural resources. This text will share some experiences of these leaders with the purpose of informing people about their work and their importance. 

The first environmental leader mentioned will be Luis Guevara. Luis is a social leader and the president of the “Junta de Acción Comunal” (JAC), a non-profit civic corporation made up by the residents of a place who join efforts and resources to find solutions for their community, from the “Las Colinas” neighborhood situated in the town of Acacías, in the department of Meta. Originally from Santander, he had to relocate to the department of Meta as the hydrocarbon and refinery industry, which in addition to the emission of carbon monoxide that contributes to climate change and also pollutes the water by dumping its waste materials near water sources , had taken a significant toll not only on the ecosystem, but also on the health of Luis and his family. In the year 2010 Luis learned that a seismic exploration carried out by the petrol company Ecopetrol was about to take place in his new home, “Piedemonte llanero” in Meta. This triggered Luis who refused to relive this environmental catastrophe again, so he studied how this seismic exploration would damage the ecosystem, and he discovered that the water systems around the area would be contaminated, generating a disaster for the local community and the ecosystem. Luis organized the community and other social leaders to protest against Ecopetrol’s actions. As formal approaches were not successful, he educated the community and even started to unite with other leaders to plan how to ask the government to extend environmental protection licenses to “El Piedemonte”. Peaceful protests have been met with strict responses from the public forces such as imprisonment and profiling of protestors as terrorists. It is alleged that infiltrators have entered protests as saboteurs and managed to foment chaos through the use of violent acts such as fighting and vandalism. Furthermore, the petrol company also treats people like Luis as eco-terrorists, claims which have caused threats not only against Luis’s life but against his family’s well-being, a pattern of behaviour well known to environmental leaders in Colombia as it just keeps on occurring; activists who stand up in defense of the environment or of basic human rights are equated with violent insurgents. This is a perilous situation in a country such as Colombia with so many dangerous armed actors. Luis has managed to keep on protecting the environment, but few are the lucky ones who get to not only continue their work, but to avoid being killed. 

Marlene Arévalo is another of the lucky environmental leaders that has managed to keep on doing her work and not lose her life in the process. Cancer survivor, wife, mother and social leader, Marlene has also taken matters into her own hands to protect water sources and natural corridors, stretching from the Orinoquía region to the rest of the country, from petroleum companies. She assumed the difficult task of educating communities about the importance of natural resources and how to maintain them. Marlene has organized peaceful protests and blockades to prevent massive drills which would have caused environmental disasters, and she has also inspired more than 60 thousand families that depend on various rivers to become more conscious about not only their economic value but their environmental worth. Marlene has suffered an enormous amount of threats, not only consisting of phone calls, but also face to face threats. She has become so accustomed to the threats that she even jokes about them to show that she is not afraid and that her work is more valuable than her own life. Sadly for many other leaders such threats have escalated resulting in the loss of their lives and of their work. The gravity of this situation is shockingly demonstrated seeing as Colombia went from being the second country in the world with environmental leaders assassinated with 24 cases in 2019 to taking the first position the following year with 64 assassinations in 2020. In order to fully understand the scale and depth of this issue, it is vital to learn about the cases of these slain environmental defenders. 

The third environmental leader in this text, Yamid Alonso Silva, did not count with the luck of the first two leaders previously mentioned. Yamid was killed for defending and promoting the environmental lands of Boyaca, situated in the middle of the country. On February 6th of 2019, at 11:20am, Yamid Silva was found dead at his place of work. Yamid’s life had always been one of service. He finished high school and later joined the Colombian national army. Following this, he returned to Boyaca to work as treasurer of community action boards (JAC) in some villages in the municipality of Cocuy where he was a natural park official. Like many cases involving the murder of leaders and activists in Colombia, Yamid’s murderers arrived by motorcycle. In the investigation that was carried out, both murderers were identified as being part of the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional), as part of a structure called the Páramo Commission that belongs to the front of Adonai Ardila, one of the heads of the group. This structure is also responsible for committing crimes in Arauca, Casanare and Boyacá. Yamid was a man enchanted with his land, in love with the moors and a defender of the natural resources generated by these lands. He liked to work in the fields, care for and preserve the land. This was his life and he loved it. It is said that one of the reasons for Yamid’s death is that, as mentioned before, he had been a soldier in the national army, and he had spent time there in the high mountain battalion, which is where they ended his life. Yamid was singled out by the ELN as an informer to the military forces, being there as a point of contact for the operations that can be carried out in the zones. The ELN has the objective of dividing the population, attacking with fear and interfering in this area of the department of Boyacá. From the moment he got killed, the family continues to hope that the aggressors pay, that they don’t get away with murder without paying consequences. Yamid’s father called out for a better level of security and justice with the case that was presented for his son. Such scenarios play out in various parts of the country. The armed actors may vary from region to region but those working in defense of nature or their community’s interests face dire consequences for their noble work, and Yamid is far from being the only victim. 

The last case presented is that of Gloria Isabel Ocampo, a woman who was assassinated for promoting crop substitution programs in Putumayo. Gloria’s case is one of the most clear examples of the violence that Colombia goes through every day. Gloria (37 years old) was shot dead alongside Eladio Moreno (69 years old) by gunmen in a village in Puerto Guzman. According to information provided by the community, the woman was in a house when two subjects arrived by motorcycle and after calling her name, they shot her and Moreno repeatedly. Relatives of Moreno confirmed that since 2019 Gloria Isabel had been receiving death threats for leading the voluntary manual eradication program of illicit crops in her village. From the information provided, so far this year, 5 people have been murdered in this department in different events: two in La Hormiga, two in Puerto Guzmán, and one in Mocoa. According to the Putumayo Human Rights Network, 17 community leaders have received death threats from illegal armed groups operating in this region. Gloria’s role in crop substitution programs also situates her case in the pattern of leaders being killed for their promotion of such transitions for rural communities from illicit to legal crop cultivation. These programs were a significant aspect of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas, but in the four years following the agreement, 75 such leaders were murdered throughout various parts of Colombia (El Espectador). It is alarming all the situations and problems that social leaders have to go through. This should bring concern to the government and other social organizations, to help families and villages that have to carry on with this weight. There should be more awareness and caring about the lives that have been taken. The victims are not just the lives of countless social leaders, but the broken families and rudderless communities they leave behind. 

All of the cases presented have explained the way of living and the difficulties that social and environmental leaders must cope with in their territories. Although some of them only receive threats and constant interruptions in their work, others have paid with their lives. Colombians are strong believers that they would do anything to defend their territories. The love of defending and accomplishing tasks fulfills these types of persons as they have delivered and worked their entire lives for the common good of their population. For this reason, although many of them are exposed and have to move to other places, defending and creating awareness is the most important thing for them. It is also vital to note the valuable work that so many environmental defenders conduct in the protection of Colombia’s biodiversity. By extension, their work is in defense of Colombia, and what makes the country so unique. Making sure that these leaders are free to carry out their invaluable work free from threats and violence should be a matter of urgency for all of us. 

References: 

Asesinan una líder social que promovía sustitución de cultivos en Putumayo. P. (2020, 7 enero) Noticias de Norte de Santander, Colombia y el mundo. https://www.laopinion.com.co/colombia/asesinan-una-lider-social-que-promovia-sustitucion-de-cultivos-en-putumayo  

El doloroso llanto del Nevado. (2020, 24 marzo). openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/es/el-doloroso-llanto-del-nevado/  

El peso del estigma: la amenaza contra los líderes ambientales del. (2017). Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano. https://www.utadeo.edu.co/es/articulo/crossmedialab/277626/el-peso-del-estigma-la-amenaza-contra-los-lideres-ambientales-del-meta-marlen-arevalo  

Latam, M. (2021, 9 abril). La historia del ‘guardián del loro orejiamarillo’ asesinado en Colombia. El Comercio Perú. https://elcomercio.pe/tecnologia/ecologia/la-historia-del-guardian-del-loro-orejiamarillo-asesinado-en-colombia-noticia/?ref=ecr  

«Si defender el territorio y el agua es ser terrorista, somos terroristas». (2018). Rutas del conflicto. https://www.rutasdelconflicto.com/especiales/LideresAmbientalesDelMetaEnAmenaza/LuisGuevara/Estigmatizacion.html  

https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/entre-2016-y-2020-75-lideres-de-sustitucion-de-coca-fueron-asesinados-article/

The dark side of “development”: The struggles, threats and violence faced by indigenous defenders.

Members of the Nasa indigenous guard, Wayúu activist Jakeline Romero Espiayu and the open pit coal mines in the north east of Colombia. 

Originally published: Aug 11, 2022 

10 min read 

Updated: Aug 13, 2022 

Article researched and written by Isabela Armenta, Maria Angelica Salazar & Diana Theran. 

Violence has been inherent in the lives of Colombians for centuries. Also in the life of indigenous people as they own land whose ownership has been long-disputed. Since colonization and independence, multiple violations have been made against them. Alzate (2016), states that since the colonial period, many processes of appropriation of indigenous lands have been done to monopolize the exploitation of raw material found there. He also points out that due to independence, there is a context where appropriations of large portions of land have taken place; land that before then had been under the governance of indigenous communities, but not anymore. It is also remarkable the impact of the internal armed conflict, drug trafficking, multinationals, and the state on this situation. According to the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2020), “Those territories are the scenario of violence and disputes for territorial control between paramilitaries, guerrillas [currently the guerrillas are the ELN and other dissidents of the FARC, the largest guerrilla group demobilized following a peace agreement signed with the state], and state forces. All of these actors want to exercise a monopoly on violence. Drug business and mineral-energetic exploitation are spread all around (…)”. This complex variability of actors in the same territory denotes the intricacy around the problem of the violence committed against indigenous leaders. One example of the work they usually do as environmental indigenous leaders according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2019) is “(…) reporting acts of corruption and for defending their rights to a healthy environment, lands, and territories, which are being affected by economic interests ranging from mining and energy projects to illicit economies.” Despite all that violence, indigenous people still fight for their rights. Nevertheless, due to the internal armed conflict outlined above, their ancestral territories have witnessed multiple and generalized violations of human and indigenous rights. Taking this into account, this article will broadly outline two main branches of the phenomenon of the assassination and displacement of indigenous communities, focusing on the threats posed by both legal and illegal economic interests.  

To begin with, it can be said that the legal negligence or complicity of the government is an important factor when talking about the violence committed against indigenous environmental leaders. Indigenous communities maintain and cherish a close relationship with the land and nature; this has given them the experience and authority to know how to preserve it, and this is what they aim to do. For example, according to La Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca (n.d ), for the Nasa community (situated in the south-west of Colombia), their economy is based on respect for, and their relationship with, Mother Earth, in which they search for meaning and plenitude, in harmony with where the spiritual and material worlds converge. That is why in this relationship everybody participates, being all part of the daily relation with the earth and the rest of its beings. However, such a relationship and such defense of natural resources often means that they are opposed to practices of extraction and mineral exploitation typically favoured by the Colombian government. Since the extractive model has arisen, countries like Colombia have been in the eye of multinationals. According to Luque et al. (2018), the extractive model consists of extracting many natural resources, processes which have a high environmental impact, for exportation. This can undermine a countries’ economic sovereignty, and Luque also points out that the main countries related to the exportation of said resources tend to be the ones that have more environmental conflicts, with energetic mining and metallurgical extraction being the principal sectors. There is evidence of the complicity of the government and the military regarding favouring the interests of those multinationals, and this has been expressed in a failure to protect indigenous leaders. There have even been reports of the military threatening and murdering representatives of communities that do not permit those extractive megaprojects to take place. According to Torres et al. (n.d) “… serious violations to human rights have been present, violations that cannot be understood isolated from the implementation of an extractive model and the development of megaprojects.” But what is the role of the state in such a sorry situation?. El Pais (2019) writes that according to Aida Pesquera, director of Oxfam International Colombia: “ It is not just the absence of the state, which impacts the violence made. It is the deliberate silence. There are armed groups that act under the service of enterprises’ interests and politicians. And the government does nothing.” To illustrate this, the same report states that the members of Asociación Fuerza de Mujeres Wayúu (Wayúu Women’s Force) in the department of La Guajira, Colombia “accuse the state of links with mining companies of the zone”, with representatives of this group being threatened by illegal actors following legals cases they have taken against multinational companies operating in the region. In relation to such instances, the jointly written report, ¿CUÁLES SON LOS PATRONES? Asesinatos de Líderes Sociales en el Post Acuerdo (2018), states that since the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, there has been a reduction of victims related to the direct violence of the conflict. However, there has been an increase of violations to the right of life of many social leaders and rights defenders, in many instances including indigenous and environmental defenders. The current situation faced by numerous communities since the signing of the peace agreement and the weak response from the government has been a power vacuum in those territories that has increased violence and the assassination of social leaders in general. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, (2019) states that “Complex territorial dynamics, aggravated by the presence of extractive projects and new armed actors who are trying to move into territories that were abandoned by the FARC-EP and where the State has a very limited presence” play a big role in the wave of violence against activists. As a consequence of the historical ineffectiveness or mediocrity of the state, insurgent and paramilitary groups have arisen, assuming control in the midst of state absence, threatening and attacking many communities for their own financial benefit. However, illegal groups have a long and shadowy history of collusion with the state when it comes to the interests of private companies. 

Another important factor that must be recognized when looking at the present is the links between multinationals and paramilitary groups. Multiple violations of human rights have been perpetuated due to the interests of multinational corporations that have allegedly used illegal groups as a way to achieve whichever project they are planning to implement. These relationships have been observed multiple times throughout Colombian history, but one of the most well-known is the case of the Drummond coal company. Drummond is an American multinational that extracted coal on the Caribbean coast and that, allegedly, financed factions of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), factions which participated in crimes against union leaders (Semana, 2014). According to Alcides Mattos Tabares, alias ‘El Samario’, who was in command of the northern bloc of the AUC in Cesar, although the paramilitaries did not work directly with coal companies, they had payment alliances to finance the illegal group. The logic being that Drummond financed these groups in exchange for removing any threat that may arise against its interests (Stöckle & Tamayo, 2020). Relatives of victims of this paramilitary group pointed out that Drummond financed and supported this armed group trying to protect its interests from the guerrilla attacks and the claims of union leaders, some of whom suffered from persecution, murders, and disappearances/kidnappings (Verdad Abierta, 2015). Witnesses assure that the links between the AUC and the company began in response to the increasing number of kidnappings and attacks against the companies by the leftist guerrillas of the FARC and ELN (Bargent & Yagoub, 2014). As we can see in this case, powerful corporations that have the government’s endorsement in order to take advantage of natural resources in Colombia without being affected by the violent conflict that exists in the country, have turned to illegal armed groups to do whatever is deemed necessary to protect their interests. Another relevant example of this situation is the case of Banacol, a large company that produces and markets different agricultural products and that was found to have a nexus with paramilitary groups such as the AUC. This multinational was investigated for the financing of armed groups outside the law, illicit enrichment, and forced displacement (Comisión Interclesisal de Justicia y Paz, 2012). There was evidence of the presence of Banacol in the collective territories of Curvaradó, which are located in the north of the department of Chocó, in the subregion of Bajo Atrato. This presence meant that the company was starting to spread its activity invasively into these territories, which would result in these communities being forcibly displaced (Bejarano, Correa & Ospina, 2018). Multinationals, which have the governments’ tacit blessing in Colombia, have therefore had a murky history of alleged connections with illegal armed groups that violate human rights and perpetuate the violence in the country. Those instances outlined above are just some of the cases in which we find a nexus between legal and illegal actors in Colombia. Unfortunately, despite the 2016 peace agreement seeing the demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, rural communities, particularly indigenous communities, continue to face violence and displacement due to the presence of illegal actors in their territory. While there are still question marks regarding the issue of these groups acting on behalf of mega projects conducted by multinational companies, there is little doubt or debate about the lengths these groups will go to in order to defend their own illicit interests. 

In addition to their links to legal mega-projects, illegal actors also use violence against environmental indigenous activists in order to further their own illegal economic interests. This is seen most clearly in the case of drug traffickers, illegal miners, guerrillas, and paramilitaries who pursue an increase in their territorial control and economic benefits. Steele (2017, cited in Mounu Prem et al., 2018) argues that “historically, leaders were selectively assassinated in Colombia as a complement to strategies used especially by paramilitaries to facilitate territorial control.” Moreover, the reasons behind the search for territorial control could in turn be associated with the exploitation of resources. Regarding this, the Somos Defensores Program, which is a space that offers protection to human rights defenders and seeks to develop proposals to prevent attacks and protect their lives, takes relevance. Carlos Guevara (cited in Mejia, 2016), the communications coordinator of the program, mentioned that although the regions of Antioquia, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Córdoba had been key areas in the internal conflict, “the high number of attacks on activists is more related to economic interests. These include illicit cultivation and illegal gold mining”. In addition to this, it is important to highlight that La Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office) estimated that in 2015 ‘illegal mining’ amounted to 56% of the illegal activity in the country” (p. 77, Defensores P. S. et al., 2018), a figure that shows the magnitude of this illegal business. The case of Celia Umenza is an example that shows the impact of illegal actors on indigenous communities and the environment. Umenza is an indigenous environmental activist, who defends the water sources near Toribío in Cauca, where illegal gold mining pollutes the water with mercury, and further north, pesticides used on illegal marijuana crops poison the soil. She mentioned that they “…have threats from governmental repression, retaliation from the guerrillas and also from the paramilitaries (…) They almost bombarded us with pamphlets.” Like Umenza, several activists suffer the same consequences for defending their territories. The threats are not perpetrated by a particular actor, and they are not limited to threats with firearms, which does not change the consequences of their actions. It just complicates the situation to the point that sometimes those actions end up connected and exacerbating the problems that indigenous communities already have. Also, in terms of illegal economies, one of the principal leadership roles targeted since the 2016 agreement has been community leaders involved in crop substitution programs. These programs were agreed as part of the 2016 deal as a way of reducing the amount of coca cultivation in areas which were traditionally under the control of the FARC. Between 2016 and 2020, 75 such leaders were murdered throughout the country (El Espectador, 2021). Figures such as these again highlight the threats faced by indigenous, Afro-Colombian, environmental and community activists trying to defend the interests of their community and the environment in the midst of a power vacuum which allows illegal interests to take precedence. 

To conclude, due to the past and present, indigenous communities in Colombia have faced and continue to face multiple violations of their rights by different legal and illegal actors. Throughout this article, we wanted to highlight the necessity to take into account the economic interest pursued by actors such as paramilitary groups, guerrilla organisations, multinational and transnational enterprises, and the Colombian state, as factors that influence the problem of the assassination of indigenous environmental activists in the country. It was demonstrated that some actions committed by these actors are not isolated from each other, but are linked. Additionally, different cases were presented to expose the interest and the actors involved behind problematic situations, like the case of Celia Umenza, who suffered threats from guerrillas and paramilitary groups; or the Drummond multinational company, alleged to have financed the paramilitary group AUC, in order to protect the company benefits from the guerrilla attacks and the claims of union leaders. Finally, it is important to mention that people must be aware of the issue of environmental indigenous activists in Colombia due to the importance of their fight because they not only have to deal with the risks of being environmental defenders, but also the ones of being indigenous, in a country which has historically violated, and continues to violate, their rights and territory. 

References 

Alzate, L. C. (2016). Entre La Violencia, la colonización y la adjudicación de reservas. Relatos sikuanis sobre el abandono, el despojo y la recuperación del territorio. Revista colombiana de antropología, 53(1), 91–122. http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/rcan/v53n1/0486-6525-rcan-53-01-00091.pdf 

Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca. (n. d.). Tejido económico ambiental. nasaacin.org. https://nasaacin.org/tejidos-y-programas/tejido-economico-ambiental/ 

Bargent, J. & Yagoub, M. (2017). Nexos entre paramilitares y carboneras en Colombia: Drummond y Glencore se enfrentan a nuevas acusaciones. InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/nexos-paramilitares-carboneras-colombia-drummond-glencore-enfrentan-nuevas-acusaciones/ 

Bejarano, L. M., Correa, J. D., & Ospina, J. J. (2018). Paramilitarismo, multinacionales y modelo económico en Colombia 1997-2005: amenaza armada o afinidad ideológica. https://ciencia.lasalle.edu.co/negocios_relaciones/108 

Carretero, N. (2019). Las olvidadas de la paz. El país. https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/20/actualidad/1561042492_610542.html?fbclid=IwAR1sA2J0Nwg92IQRrIHKppxqeczUIOpHhy6ddIaYp3BtFV0uAil9shoNsGs 

Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz. (2012). Colombia: Banacol. Empresa implicada en paramilitarismo y acaparamiento de tierras en Curvaradó y Jiguamiandó. FDCL. https://www.tni.org/files/download/banacolcasestudyes.pdf 

CNMH. (2020). Pueblos indígenas, víctimas de violencias de larga duración. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. https://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/pueblos-indigenas-victimas-de-violencias-de-larga-duracion/ 

¿CUÁLES SON LOS PATRONES? Asesinatos de Líderes Sociales en el Post Acuerdo. (2018). https://www.cinep.org.co/publicaciones/PDFS/20181202_cuales_son_los_patrones.pdf

Defensores, P. S., del Catatumbo ASCAMCAT, A. C., Abierta, V., Antioquia, M. R.V., & por la Paz, P. (2018). ¿Cuáles son los patrones? Asesinatos de Líderes Sociales en el Post Acuerdo. 

Rueda, S. F. (2021). Entre 2016 y 2020, 75 líderes de sustitución de coca fueron asesinados. El Espectador. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/entre-2016-y-2020-75-lideres-de-sustitucion-de-coca-fueron-asesinados-article/ 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (2019). Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ColombiaDefenders.pdf 

King, E., & Wherry, S. (2020). Colombia’s Environmental Crisis Accelerates Under Duque. The North American Congress on Latin America-NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/2020/04/20/colombia-environmental-crisis-duque 

Luque, A., Herrero, N., & Peñaherrera, J. (2018). EXTRACTIVISMO EN AMÉRICA LATINA: ¿BIEN COMÚN O DEMOCRACIA DELEGATIVA? Revista Electrónica de Medio Ambiente, 19(1), 121–137. https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-114977/ARTICULO_6_M+A2018.1.pdf 

Mejia, C. (2016). Activistas indígenas y por el medio ambiente: numerosas víctimas entre los asesinatos en Colombia. MONGABAY. https://es.mongabay.com/2016/09/indigenas-medio-ambiente-asesinatos-colombia/ 

Robayo, L., & Serrano, S. (2021). La historia de la líder indígena que defiende el agua en el Cauca. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/la-lider-indigena-amenazada-de-muerte-por-defender-el-agua-619048 

RPV. (2017). Las cifras del cambio climático en Colombia. Red prensa verde. https://redprensaverde.org/2017/09/14/las-cifras-del-cambio-climatico-en-colombia/ 

Semana. (2020). Las otras acusaciones que se ciernen sobre Drummond. Semana.com https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/drummond-los-asesinatos-de-sindicalistas/371027-3/ 

Stöckle, C., & Tamayo, P. (2020). Carbon con sangre. DOMAR Film GmbH. 

Torres, A., Ramírez, X., & Metaute, M. (n. d.). Colombia Nunca Más: Extractivismo y graves violaciones a los Derechos Humanos. Caso Hidroituango. 1990 – 2016. https://nuncamas.movimientodevictimas.org/images/abook_file/extractivismo-y-graves-violaciones-a-los-derechos-humanos.pdf?msclkid=6ffaaa97a7b811ecb0cb092340508834 

Verdad Abierta. (2015). Víctimas en el Cesar, decepcionadas con fallo a favor de la Drummond. VerdadAbierta.com. https://verdadabierta.com/victimas-en-el-cesar-decepcionadas-con-fallo-a-favor-de-la-drummond/ 

The current plight of the Embera community in Bogotá.

Originally published: Aug 10, 2022 

5 min read 

Members of the Embera community at their camps on the streets of Bogotá. 

Article researched and written by Danna Arrieta, Melanie Boyano & Natalia Vargas 

The Emberas are an indigenous group from Colombia that live in different parts of the country. They are divided into Embera Chamí, which means “the mountain people”, and who live in the Risaralda department; Embera Katío, which means “the river people” and who live in Antioquia; Embera Epera in the Nariño and Cauca departments; and Embera Cholo in the pacific coast. Because of the armed conflict that Colombia has gone through, the Embera Katío community has been displaced from their ancestral lands and forced to move. Since 2018, a large group of displaced Embera Katío has been present in the capital city, Bogotá. In Bogotá, their life has changed completely; they are now living in improvised shelters and changing their diet and way of living completely, waiting for the moment that the government will tell them that they can finally go back to their land. 

Since their arrival in Bogotá, this indigenous group has suffered numerous misfortunes, the most recent being the death of an Embera woman and her child in January 2022, run over by a truck on the Bogotá-Funza highway. This also led to the unfortunate death of the truck driver who was attacked by an incensed crowd following the incident. In time, if nothing changes, the Embera risk losing their traditions and customs, which is especially dangerous for the new generations that are being born in the big city. 

Members of the Embera indigenous communities were forced to flee their territories due to the risks posed by the ongoing conflict in Colombia. Despite the 2016 peace agreement which led to the demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, many regions continue to be war-torn due to the presence of other illegal armed actors. The forced recruitment by illegal groups has displaced Emberas from their homes in the mountainous regions of western Colombia. As displaced people, some 370 indigenous people from Embera communities arrived in Bogotá asking President Iván Duque for help. According to their leaders, the government promised to help them pay rent for houses for their families. But so far, the promise has not been kept. Consequently, they felt forced to occupy a park near the presidential palace, in precarious tents, and exposed to contracting Covid-19 throughout the initial wave of the pandemic (Jaramillo, 2020). 

The Emberas have been living in tents exposed to the sun and the rain; their women cooking on makeshift fires and their children playing half-naked in the Tercer Milenio Park have become part of the Bogotá scenery. Their situation is dramatic, yet there is no solution in sight because the lack of government assistance only seems to worsen (Doria, 2020). Humberto Arce, the Embera Katio authority who traveled from Pueblo Rico to Bogotá to negotiate with the government, told La Silla Vacía that they asked that while the government designs a return plan to Risaralda (the department where there lands are located) with decent housing and productive projects for them, the government must guarantee them decent housing and food (Doria, 2020). However, given the grave situation in their territories, the possibilities for returning home seem remote for now. 

The home of the Embera Katio en Risaralda has long been affected by the violence of the Colombian armed conflict. When the FARC handed over their weapons as part of the 2016 peace deal, there was cautious hope that the situation would change for the better. However, like other parts of the country, the FARC withdrawal left a power vacuum in a region with a poor record of effective state presence. Like other parts of the country, this power vacuum has seen rival illegal groups establish a presence with the objective of establishing control, in this case the ELN guerrillas and the Clan del Golfo, a neo-paramilitary organization which grew out of the demobilization of the AUC paramilitary group in 2006. In Alto Andágueda, Chocó, and Pueblo Rico, Risaralda the confrontation between the ELN and the Clan del Golfo has worsened in recent years. The latter are fighting over drug trafficking routes and territories for illegal mining. The Colombian army is also there to fight them both. Indigenous people—and indigenous land—remain at the center of this war (Doria, 2020). This means that they have been forcibly displaced from their territories to avoid the violence, as well as fleeing to avoid their children being forcibly recruited by the illegal armies. Until the situation regarding security in the region is improved, there seems little hope the Embera communities can return home, meaning the issue of how to best support them in Bogotá should be of the utmost importance.  

It is important to note that resources have been made available to the community in Bogotá. The local government has allocated 770 million pesos for the 260 Embera families in the city since the pandemic began. With this money they have paid for shelters, rent subsidies, and food. The national government, for its part, has given them 200 subsidies, though not all members of the community are satisfied with the government hand-outs: “120 have accepted the aid from the district and, although it is not enough, they have been able to cope with the situation. These other 140 do not want to, even though they have all received aid from the government,” Camilo Acero, undersecretary of government, told La Silla Vacia. What these indigenous communities want is a resolution which would allow them to return to their homes, and it is this issue which has motivated their protests within the city. Several indigenous people from the Tercer Milenio park told La Silla Vacia that they had already participated in other occupations in the same park in previous years. At that time, they managed to return to their territories, but they had returned to Bogotá because the confrontation in their territories has not ended and because the national governments of Santos and Duque did not comply with what they had promised. The district indicated that they would continue to work to comply with the legal ruling “with the leadership of the national institutions, and thus initiate the voluntary process (…) so that they can return to their territories with guarantees.” Whoever wishes to stay in Bogotá, the Government Secretariat indicated that they would continue to insist on relocation (Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización?, 2022). Leonival Campos, elder authority of the Emberá Katío, pointed out that the intention of the members of his community is to stay in the city rather than return to the existent danger of their territories: “We are waiting for a place with adequate conditions to move. (…) We do not want to go to a coliseum and even less to another place that does not have the necessary guarantees”, he said (Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización?, 2022). 

To conclude, the current situation of Embera groups leaves them in an unprotected position, due to different factors such as the government’s negligence in complying with the agreements, or the constant threats they experience from armed groups. These groups should be established in their ancestral lands and their rights (compiled in the Indigenous Rights Declaration) must be respected and protected by the government at all costs. The creation of more direct spaces for dialogue between the Embera communities and the government could be an effective measure to reduce the negative effects of the problem. In this way, it is also necessary that in addition to just being heard, the Embera indigenous people have available to them more mechanisms for direct participation in decision-making on issues that actively affect their communities. The Embera risk losing their traditions and customs given that new generations are being born and raised far from their territories.  

References 

Doria, P. (2020). LOS EMBERA EN EL TERCER MILENIO, UN DRAMA CIRCULAR Y SIN FIN. La Silla Vacía

Jaramillo, A. S. (2020). Los indígenas embera desplazados por la violencia y a la deriva en Bogotá. FRANCE24

¿Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización? (2022). EL TIEMPO

Bohórquez, Edwin (2021). ¿Qué ha sucedido con los indígenas de la comunidad embera en Bogotá?. EL ESPECTADOR.