Narciso Beleño: A Legacy of Resistance and Justice for the Rural Communities of Bolívar.

Originally published Dec 13, 2024.

Narciso Beleño was a renowned rural leader who fought for the rights of communities in the south of Bolívar

Article written by Shadia Arango, Maria Isabel Mariano & Josue Urueta

The situation of social leaders in Colombia is critical, as they face significant risks and violence while advocating for their communities. Orbegozo (2021) implies that social leaders are typically understood as local activists representing various civil organizations, such as community councils or action boards. They also include human rights and environmental activists who mobilize communities, implement policies, and demand state services in their territories. Their role is crucial in initiating and sustaining collective action within their communities. Some data sources, such as Reliefweb (2024), mention that, in 2023, 168 social leaders and human rights defenders were killed, and there were 1,732 recorded attacks against them from 2022 to March 2024. According to Human Rights Watch (2024), there have been over 1,700 social leaders murdered in Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla group. The violence is particularly acute in rural regions, areas that have long suffered from an absence of true state presence. This situation is repeated across nearly all 32 departments in Colombia.

One such example is the department of Bolívar, where the presence of armed groups has meant a long legacy of violence associated with the armed conflict and has led to an alarming increase in displacement. In 2023, 145,049 individuals were displaced nationwide, with Bolívar experiencing a 94% increase compared to the previous year (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024). As stated by Indepaz (2024), in Colombia, the departments with the highest number of social leader murders are Cauca (27 deaths) and Valle del Cauca (17 deaths), with Cauca consistently reported as the most dangerous region for social activism. Bolívar ranks third in this grim tally, where 8 social leaders have been murdered during the same period. This alarming trend highlights the ongoing violence and risks faced by those advocating for human rights and social justice in these regions, particularly in areas heavily influenced by armed groups and criminal organizations, reflecting the persistent threats to human rights defenders in Colombia’s most volatile territories. This text will explore this dynamic by focusing on the admiral work and tragic murder of one such leader.

The challenges faced by social leaders in Colombia are exemplified by Narciso Beleño, a leader born in San Martín de Loba, in the rural heart of Bolívar. Beleño grew up working as a farmer and muleteer, confronting the hardships that rural communities endure from an early age. His awareness of the injustices and neglect suffered by his community drove him to action in the 1990s, when he organized and founded Agromisbol, later known as ‘Federación Agrominera del Sur de Bolívar’ (Fedeagrobismol). According to the National Center for Historical Memory (2024), Fedeagrobismol is now one of the oldest and most significant organizations in the Magdalena Medio region, with over twenty years of advocacy for peasant rights. Fedeagrobismol, composed mainly of peasants and artisanal miners, operates across nine municipalities in southern Bolívar, from Cantagallo to Tiquisio. It is structured into four subregions, or zonal teams, to enhance its territorial reach and advocacy efforts. This structure enables Fedeagrobismol to represent and support local communities in defending their rights against threats from large-scale mining and armed groups. Over the years, the organization has emerged as a powerful symbol of resistance and a space for regional and national dialogue, participating in events like the Congress of Peoples and establishing the Southern Bolívar Interlocution Commission, a critical platform for dialogue between peasant communities and the national government.

The historical context of Bolívar is marked by conflict and violence stemming from armed groups vying for territorial control. Narciso Beleño was deeply involved in processes that advocated for agrarian reform and defended peasant rights against these threats. Under his leadership, Fedeagrobismol became a stronghold against large-scale mining operations that threatened both the environment and local communities. Beleño’s public denunciations against illegal mining practices and the extortion imposed by armed groups reflect his commitment to social justice. Fedeagrobismol’s areas of focus reflect Narciso Beleño’s vision for the fundamental rights of his community: the defense of land and territory, the right to a dignified life, the preservation of historical memory, human rights, and environmental respect against extractive practices. It is pertinent to highlight that this vision aligns closely with several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 16 on promoting peace, justice, and strong institutions; SDG 1 on ending poverty; SDG 5 on achieving gender equality; SDG 11 on fostering inclusivity; and SDG 13 on combating climate change. Social leaders like Beleño play a crucial role in advocating for these goals within their communities by promoting human rights while also pushing for sustainable practices that protect their environment. They represent fundamental pillars of cohesion and commitment at the local, regional, and national levels.

In recent years, under Beleño’s leadership as president, Fedeagrobismol has become a stronghold of resistance against large-scale mining, particularly gold extraction, which threatens to devastate both the environment and the social fabric of southern Bolívar. It is important to distinguish between the types of resource exploitation that exist in the department of Bolívar—such as artisanal, ancestral, and informal mining—in order to understand the role that communities play. Artisanal mining, in particular, is a small-scale activity based on traditional, manual practices, in which local communities extract resources in a limited manner and without heavy machinery, thus reducing its environmental impact and supporting the livelihoods of these populations. This practice is quite different from large-scale mining, which is typically controlled by large companies and involves the use of heavy machinery, toxic chemicals, and invasive techniques to extract substantial amounts of minerals. Unlike artisanal mining, large-scale mining has a significant environmental impact, leading to issues such as river pollution, deforestation, and the displacement of communities, profoundly disrupting the ecological and social balance of the region. There is also the issue of illegal mining, which differs from large-scale mining in its lack of formal approval and in terms of scale. However, this practice also causes a huge amount of environmental damage as it employs similar approaches to the practice of extraction in terms of its use of heavy machinery and chemicals such as mercury in its process. While mining represents a clear threat to the environment, residents in the region also face danger due to armed actors.

Resource exploitation is not the only issue in the region; there is also the presence of armed groups like the Gulf Clan/AGC, dissidents of the demobilized FARC, and the ELN, which are currently vying for territorial control. These illegal organizations seek to dominate this strategically located and resource-rich area, which connects the Caribbean, Antioquia, and eastern Colombia. Understanding the implications of this conflict, Narciso Beleño publicly denounced the abuses and extortion faced by communities at the hands of these groups. They not only profit from illegal mining but also impose extortion fees on local miners. According to Vorágine, the ELN and dissidents demand 5% of the extracted gold, while the Gulf Clan/AGC imposes a fee of 15%. Additionally, these groups promote mining in areas that Fedeagrobismol has designated as natural reserves, where mining is prohibited due to its significant ecological and cultural value. Understanding the implications of this conflict, Narciso Beleño publicly denounced the abuses and extortion faced by communities at the hands of these groups. They not only profit from illegal mining but also impose extortion fees on local miners. According to Vorágine, the ELN and dissidents demand 5% of the extracted gold, while the Gulf Clan/AGC imposes a fee of 15%. Additionally, these groups promote mining in areas that Fedeagrobismol has designated as natural reserves, where mining is prohibited due to its significant ecological and cultural value.

In raising his voice against injustice, Narciso Beleño became the target of death threats. Tragically, these threats culminated in his assassination on the night of April 21st, 2024, when he was entering his home in Santa Rosa del Sur. An assailant shot him multiple times, resulting in his death. After the assassination of Narciso, the Colombian Attorney General’s Office launched an extensive investigation to identify and prosecute those responsible. This investigation led to the identification of José Alejandro Castro Cadavid as the person behind the crime. Castro Cadavid, a former military officer with ties to the Gulf Clan/AGC, allegedly ordered the murder in retaliation for Beleño’s activism against illegal mining in the region. In October 2024, four alleged members of the Gulf Clan were charged with aggravated homicide, illegal possession of firearms, and conspiracy to commit a crime in connection with Beleño’s murder. The individuals identified were Nicolás Giraldo Quintero, alias Cartago; Juan Carlos Castaño Cardona, alias Calvo or Paisa; Nelson Fernando Gutiérrez Arismendi, alias Malito or Matón; and Yenifer Barragán Correa. One of the accused, alias “Malito” or “Matón,” pleaded guilty to the charges. The remaining three are awaiting trial. The legal process regarding Beleño’s murder is ongoing, and authorities continue to investigate the extent of the Gulf Clan’s involvement in the crime (RCN, 2024).

The case of Narciso Beleño highlights several critical points that warrant a profound reflection on the importance of social leaders in social transformation and the challenges they face in Colombia. First, it is essential to address the responsibility of the state. The tragic death of Narciso represents a failure of human rights due to inaction, as public authorities and their agents neglected their responsibility to intervene in situations requiring such attention. This lack of action resulted in insufficient protection measures for at-risk human rights defenders such as Narciso, who need responses tailored to their specific contexts. Furthermore, it is vital to implement policies that ensure the cessation of attacks against these defenders, allowing them to continue their work without fear of reprisals. This is not only a moral imperative but also aligns with Colombia’s international obligations regarding human rights, emphasizing the need for a genuine commitment from the state to protect those who tirelessly advocate for justice and the respect of everyone’s rights.

Despite figures like Narciso Beleño emerging as powerful symbols of resistance and advocacy within their communities, their presence alone is insufficient to galvanize widespread action or recognition among Colombians at large. While cases involving social leaders often gain media attention -drawing public outrage- this awareness rarely translates into sustained engagement or significant policy changes at higher levels. Many Colombians remain disconnected from these struggles due to several factors such as urban-rural divides or political apathy toward rural issues. Following the murder of Narciso Beleño, a wave of condemnations swept across Colombia. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights representative in Colombia (2024) swiftly condemned the assassination through social media, acknowledging Beleño’s crucial work in defending human rights in San Lucas and called for urgent protection measures for social leaders, highlighting the critical need for greater awareness and action to ensure their safety. As such, it becomes crucial not only to honor leaders like Beleño but also to foster broader societal involvement that transcends individual cases if meaningful progress toward justice and equity is to be achieved.

Narciso Beleño left behind a hugely important legacy and the communities he defended will not forget what he represented. His legacy will hopefully serve as inspiration for new leaders and organizations in the region that will maintain the memory of Beleño for many years to come. His commitment to social justice and environmental protection has ignited a spark among younger generations, encouraging them to continue advocating for their rights and the preservation of their land. The solidarity shown during his funeral and the subsequent gatherings reflect a collective determination to honor his memory by standing against the injustices that plague their communities. This sense of unity is crucial as it fosters resilience among the people of southern Bolívar, inspiring them to organize and mobilize against threats from armed groups and exploitative practices. As new leaders emerge, they carry forward Narciso’s vision of a peaceful and equitable society, demonstrating that his legacy transcends his life. If agrarian reform and sustainable development that benefit communities and protect the environment are truly desired at a governmental level, the work of leaders like Narciso and those who continue his struggle needs to be celebrated and their safety guaranteed.

References

Front Line Defenders. (2024). Killing of human rights defender Narciso Beleño. https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/killing-human-rights-defender-narciso-beleno

Human Rights Watch. (2024). World report 2024: Colombia chapter. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/colombia

Indepaz. (2024). Líderes sociales, defensores de DD. HH y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2024.https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-dd-hh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2024/

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2024). The human cost of armed conflicts in Colombia. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/human-cost-armed-conflicts-Colombia

La Vóragine. (2024). Las pruebas contra un coronel (r) del ejército que habría ordenado el asesinato del líder Narciso Beleño. https://voragine.co/historias/investigacion/las-pruebas-contra-un-coronel-r-del-ejercito-que-habria-ordenado-el-asesinato-del-lider-narciso-beleno/

ONU Derechos Humanos Colombia [@ONUHumanRights]. (2024, April 22). Condenamos el asesinato del líder social Narciso Beleño, presidente de la Federación Agrominera del Sur de Bolívar, ocurrido ayer en Santa Rosa del Sur [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/ONUHumanRights/status/1782436331567665230

RCN Radio. (2024). Fiscalía imputó a cuatro presuntos responsables del asesinato del líder social Narciso Beleño. RCN Radio. https://www.rcnradio.com/judicial/fiscalia-imputo-a-cuatro-presuntos-responsables-del-asesinato-del-lider-social-narciso-beleno

ReliefWeb. (2024). Situation of human rights defenders, social leaders, and communities in Colombia. Oidhaco. https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/situation-human-rights-defenders-social-leaders-and-communities-colombia-september-2024

Centro de Memoria Histórica. (n.d.). Iniciativas y acciones. https://accioneseiniciativas.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co

Orbegozo, G. (2021). Consequences of violence against social leaders in Colombia. Documentos CEDE 19320, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE. https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/019320.html

The historical and present-day violence in the Bananera zone of Magdalena.

Originally published on Jun 17, 2024 and updated on Jun 24, 2024.

Rural leaders Martin Escobar and Willington Tovar were both shot dead in August 2023 in Magdalena. The department has a long and tragic history of violence faced demanding their rights and a more just society.

Article written by Armando de la Valle, Santiago Huguett & Danna Rey

In the heart of Colombia, the Magdalena region has experienced decades of violence and conflict, leaving a profound imprint on its social and political landscape. From the 1928 massacre of banana workers to recent clashes between armed groups, violence has shaped the history and daily reality of its inhabitants. The history of violence in Magdalena is a painful narrative of conflicts rooted in social and political injustice. From the dark days of the banana workers’ massacre to contemporary clashes between armed groups, the region has seen an endless cycle of violence and repression. In recent years, one of the forms of violence that has been most apparent, in Magdalena and throughout Colombia, is the violence faced by social leaders and human rights defenders in the country. According to Indepaz, there have been more than 1,600 such activists murdered since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas. In this context, it is imperative to explore how this history of violence affects present-day social leaders who, despite constant threats and risks, continue to fight for human rights and the construction of a fairer and more peaceful society. To fully understand the impact of violence on social leaders in Magdalena today, it is crucial to analyze the historical and political context of the area, highlighting the influence of factors such as socio-economic inequality, the presence of armed groups, and institutional corruption. Additionally, we must examine how these conditions have created a power vacuum, leaving social leaders vulnerable to threats and risks due to their work in defending human rights and seeking justice. Moreover, we must address the disadvantaged position of these leaders and the need to establish strategies and measures to protect and support them in their brave struggle for a more peaceful and just Magdalena and Colombia.

The historical violence in Magdalena is emblematic of the broader conflict’s origins and manifestations. One particularly grim event was the banana workers massacre, which occurred in 1928. This atrocity saw multitudes of striking plantation workers brutally killed by government forces and paramilitary groups at the behest of the privately owned corporation, the United Fruit Company, highlighting the ruthless exploitation and suppression of labor movements. The massacre’s causes stemmed from the monopolistic practices of the United Fruit Company, exacerbated by the collusion between political elites and armed groups. Its impact reverberated throughout Colombian society, fueling resentment and mistrust toward authorities and elite interests. The legacy left by the banana workers massacre serves as a poignant reminder of the deep-seated injustices and violence that have plagued Magdalena, shaping the trajectory of the prolonged armed conflict that unfolded across the region and the nation. Nevertheless, the memory of this tragic event remains a subject of contention, with individuals continuing to diminish its significance, dismissing it as exaggerated or politically motivated, even after nearly a century has passed. Despite estimates ranging from acknowledging as few as 9 deaths to reporting over 100 deaths shortly after the massacre, and even reaching up to 500-600 deaths as suggested by a legal advisor from the United Fruit Company (UFC) in Bogotá, it is stated that the actual death toll surpassed 1,000 (Brittanica). The staggering scale of the tragedy underscores the brutality inflicted upon the banana workers and the severity of the repression they endured. Denials leading up to even the present day not only detract from the suffering and loss experienced by the victims and their families but also reflects the deeply polarized state of the nation, where historical truths are often distorted for political gain. In an environment where historical narratives are manipulated for political ends, the importance of facing the past and recognizing its intricacies becomes strikingly evident. The varying viewpoints on events like the Banana workers massacre serve as stark reminders of the deep divisions within Colombian society. While some acknowledge the gravity of this tragedy and push for justice, others opt to minimize its importance or outright deny its existence. This stark contrast highlights the enduring societal rifts that remain, almost one hundred years on from the bloody incident. Such positions have been hardened through the decades of armed conflict in Colombia.

The armed conflict in Colombia is rooted deeply in the country’s history, characterized by political, social, and economic tensions that have simmered for decades, both before and after the massacre in 1928. One pivotal moment in this history was the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, which sparked a period of intense violence known as “La Violencia.” Gaitán’s death marked a turning point, unleashing pent-up frustrations among Colombia’s marginalized populations. La Violencia pitted liberals against conservatives, leading to a bloody civil conflict that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions. This period was fundamental due to emergence of armed groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), groups whose main goal was to fight against the status quo. The growth of guerrilla groups in the mid-20th century further escalated tensions, as they clashed with government forces and sought to advance their agendas through armed struggle. These groups often operated in remote regions, including the Magdalena River basin and in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta mountain range. The impact of the armed conflict on Colombia, and the Magdalena region in particular, has been profound. Communities throughout the region have borne the brunt of displacement, as clashes between armed groups and government forces have forced families to flee their homes in search of safety. Moreover, the presence of armed actors has hindered economic development and exacerbated social inequalities, perpetuating a cycle of poverty and violence. While not the only factor (the region, like many others throughout Colombia has been disputed for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes), the use and ownership of agricultural land, and access to vital resources such as water, would become an increasing source of tension in a region with long established and divisive forms of mono-cultivation.

The use of water would become the field of confrontation for the actors present in this scenario. The environmental conflict in Zona Bananera is essentially a clash over the dominance of one form of production over another. This conflict highlights the critical role that water plays in sustaining agricultural practices and the competing interests that arise as a result. One real-world example of such a conflict is the water disputes between farmers and mining companies in various regions. Farmers rely on water for irrigation of crops, while mining operations require significant amounts of water for their processes (Entre Banano, Palma Y Violencias En La Zona Bananera De Magdalena, 2018). Furthermore, tensions have been created due to the question of access to water sources by large-scale landowners and industrialized agriculture. This competition for water resources often leads to tensions and conflicts, showcasing the complex interplay between different stakeholders. Various theories, such as the tragedy of the commons, can be applied to understand the dynamics of water usage conflicts. The tragedy of the commons theory posits that individuals, acting in their self-interest, deplete shared resources, leading to negative outcomes for all. In the context of Zona Bananera, the overexploitation of water resources by competing industries can be seen as a manifestation of this theory. By delving deeper into the concept of water as a common pool resource, we can better grasp the challenges faced in managing water usage conflicts. In more recent times, communities who are fighting to create more prosperity and inclusion of the local communities that have historically been overlooked and marginalized due to the interests of agro-industrial and monocultures, have been on the receiving end of threats and violence. Such situations evoke painful memories for communities that suffered greatly during the worst years of the armed conflict in the region.

In the case of Zona Bananera municipality, the various victimizing events intensified from 1997 onwards and began to partially decrease from 2009 onwards, coinciding with the arrival, peak, and dismantling of paramilitary units. According to the Rutas del Conflicto project by the National Center for Historical Memory and the Verdad Abierta portal, the Zona Bananera, and the region to which the municipality belongs, was a paramilitary target from the early nineties on orders from Salvatore Mancuso and the Castaño brothers, Carlos and Vicente, who sought to take control of the drug trafficking route in the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta. During this period, the Zona Bananera witnessed a profound shift in power dynamics with the emergence of paramilitary groups, whose presence unleashed a reign of terror upon the local community. The control exerted by these armed actors not only disrupted daily life but also shattered the social fabric of the municipality, leaving behind a legacy of fear, displacement, and human rights violations. Paramilitaries employed ruthless tactics such as forced recruitment, extortion, and targeted killings, instilling a pervasive climate of fear and oppression. As the region continues to grapple with the aftermath of the conflict, families and communities affected by the violence continue to seek justice and compensation for their losses. Crimes against leaders can be directly linked to this context, as families claim land and communities strive to establish their rights amidst the lingering presence of paramilitary inheritors, highlighting the ongoing struggle for justice and reconciliation in the region.

The socio-economic inequality in the Magdalena region of Colombia has been a significant factor contributing to the prevalence of violence in the area. The noticeable differences in wealth and opportunities have fueled social tensions and resentment, creating an environment conducive to conflict. Moreover, institutional corruption has further deteriorated these conditions, weakening trust in government entities and creating a vacuum of power. The lack of access to basic services and economic opportunities for marginalized communities in the Magdalena region intensifies the socio-economic divide, deepening the sense of exclusion and alienation. This exclusion, coupled with a history of neglect and weak governance, has left a void in leadership and accountability, allowing illicit actors to exploit the vulnerable population, further perpetuating the cycle of violence and instability in the region (PNUD,2021). Unfortunately, this kind of violence has continued in the new century In modern days, , the power vacuum left by the paramilitaries and the FARC guerrillas has left the opportunity for other illegal groups, who see this area as a very critical zone because of the maritime port of Santa Marta that is used to transport drugs to the US and Europe. It is a strategic area for illegal economies. Criminal organizations such as the Clan del Golfo (Autodedefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia or AGC) and the Pachencos (Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra Nevada or ACSN) have been involved in a fierce conflict to control the drug channels and other interests in the region. The autodefensas aspect of the names both organizations use to identify themselves demonstrates the paramilitary legacy from which both groups emerged following demobilization processes between 2004-2006. Like the paramilitary groups they emerged from, the presence of these groups poses huge threats for the communities and representatives of Magdalena. These threats and dangers are clearly seen in instances of violence faced by social leaders in the region.

The recent murders of Martin Darys Escobar Barón and Willington Tovar Gil underscore the persistent violence and intimidation faced by social leaders advocating for justice in Magdalena. Martin Escobar had previously survived an attempt on his life in 2020, yet the National Protection Unit had not offered the necessary protection to the rural leader. Martin was a leader representing rural communities as part of the Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos de Colombia. He was shot dead on August 16th 2023, with local human rights defenders suggesting his murder was due to the issue of land reclamation, as Martin represented a community who had been awarded plots of land at La Conquista in the Zona Bananera area. A day earlier, Willington Tovar Gil was shot dead in the San Zenon in the south of the department of Magdalena. Willington was a political activist for the Alianza Democratica Amplia (ADA) party in a zone of the department where the AGC are known to be present. Operating in environments marked by poverty and armed groups, these leaders champion the rights of marginalized communities, often at great personal risk. The Colombian government must urgently implement robust measures, including enhancing law enforcement presence, implementing witness protection programs, and prosecuting crimes against social leaders. Such actions are crucial to fostering a safe environment and deterring further violence. According to statistics from INDEPAZ, there have been 28 documented cases of social leaders killed in Magdalena since 2016 (as of May 2024), reflecting the pervasive threat of violence and impunity facing activists in the region. Some of these cases, such as that of Maritza Quiroz, gained national attention, but many are overlooked and under analyzed. Maritza, like Martin Escobar, had been awarded a plot of land in the department as compensation for being forcibly displaced years previously.

Furthermore, the murders of environmental defenders like Wilton Orrego, Nathalia Jimenez, and Alejandro Llinas highlight the dangerous consequences of raising awareness about environmental issues in Colombia. These individuals were targeted for their efforts to protect the natural environment and hold other stakeholders accountable for their actions, further illustrating the complex interplay between environmental degradation, social conflict, and violence in the Magdalena region. Their deaths, amid a backdrop of escalating violence in the region, highlight the dangers faced by those advocating for marginalized communities and sustainable development in Colombia. Social leaders in Magdalena are pivotal in advancing peace, development, and human rights. Their protection and support are vital for building a more equitable society. By prioritizing comprehensive protection strategies and backing the efforts of social leaders, Colombia can take significant strides towards creating a more peaceful and just society for all.

In conclusion, the socio-economic inequality in the Magdalena region of Colombia has created fertile ground for violence, perpetuating a cycle of conflict that has endured for decades. The historical and present-day violence in the Zona Bananera reflects deep-rooted injustices and power struggles, with armed groups vying for control over strategic territories and resources. From the 1928 banana workers massacre to the recent murders of social leaders and environmental defenders, the region has borne witness to the devastating impact of violence on its inhabitants. The ongoing struggle for justice and reconciliation underscores the urgent need for comprehensive protection strategies and support for social leaders advocating for peace and human rights. Addressing the underlying socio-economic disparities and institutional corruption is essential to breaking the cycle of violence and building a more equitable and peaceful society in Magdalena and Colombia as a whole.

References

La Libertad Sublime. (2022, June 13). Natalia and Rodrigo: The Honeymoon Murder of Colombian environmentalists that shocked the country. La Libertad Sublime. https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/natalia-and-rodrigo-the-honeymoon-murder-of-colombian-environmentalists-that-shocked-the-country

Pobreza y desigualdad en la región caribe ¿Cómo recuperar la Senda del Desarrollo Sostenible? | Programa de las Naciones unidas para el Desarrollo. (2021, April 22). https://www.undp.org/es/colombia/speeches/pobreza-y-desigualdad-en-la-region-caribe

Tiempo, R. E. (1995, April 24). ZONA BANANERA BAJO DOMINIO DE LA VIOLENCIA. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-496375

Gómez, L. (2023, November 10). Amnistía Internacional Advirtió que líderes sociales en Colombia Siguen en Riesgo y el gobierno ha fallado en su protección. infobae. https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/11/10/amnistia-internacional-advirtio-que-lideres-sociales-en-colombia-siguen-en-riesgo-y-el-gobierno-ha-fallado-en-su-proteccion/

Entre banano, palma y violencias en la zona bananera de Magdalena. (2018, July). www.cinep.org.co. Retrieved May 7, 2024, from https://www.cinep.org.co/publi-files/PDFS/20190613B4_Estudio_de_caso_territorial_Magdalena_Entre_el_banano.pdf

Asesinan a Líder de Zona Bananera: Había sobrevivido a atentado y la unp no Lo Protegió. Seguimiento.co. (2023, August 17). https://seguimiento.co/magdalena/asesinan-lider-de-zona-bananera-habia-sobrevivido-atentado-y-la-unp-no-lo-protegio-66684

The dark side of “development”: The struggles, threats and violence faced by indigenous defenders.

Members of the Nasa indigenous guard, Wayúu activist Jakeline Romero Espiayu and the open pit coal mines in the north east of Colombia.

Originally published: Aug 11, 2022

10 min read

Updated: Aug 13, 2022

Article researched and written by Isabela Armenta, Maria Angelica Salazar & Diana Theran.

Violence has been inherent in the lives of Colombians for centuries. Also in the life of indigenous people as they own land whose ownership has been long-disputed. Since colonization and independence, multiple violations have been made against them. Alzate (2016), states that since the colonial period, many processes of appropriation of indigenous lands have been done to monopolize the exploitation of raw material found there. He also points out that due to independence, there is a context where appropriations of large portions of land have taken place; land that before then had been under the governance of indigenous communities, but not anymore. It is also remarkable the impact of the internal armed conflict, drug trafficking, multinationals, and the state on this situation. According to the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2020), “Those territories are the scenario of violence and disputes for territorial control between paramilitaries, guerrillas [currently the guerrillas are the ELN and other dissidents of the FARC, the largest guerrilla group demobilized following a peace agreement signed with the state], and state forces. All of these actors want to exercise a monopoly on violence. Drug business and mineral-energetic exploitation are spread all around (…)”. This complex variability of actors in the same territory denotes the intricacy around the problem of the violence committed against indigenous leaders. One example of the work they usually do as environmental indigenous leaders according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2019) is “(…) reporting acts of corruption and for defending their rights to a healthy environment, lands, and territories, which are being affected by economic interests ranging from mining and energy projects to illicit economies.” Despite all that violence, indigenous people still fight for their rights. Nevertheless, due to the internal armed conflict outlined above, their ancestral territories have witnessed multiple and generalized violations of human and indigenous rights. Taking this into account, this article will broadly outline two main branches of the phenomenon of the assassination and displacement of indigenous communities, focusing on the threats posed by both legal and illegal economic interests.

To begin with, it can be said that the legal negligence or complicity of the government is an important factor when talking about the violence committed against indigenous environmental leaders. Indigenous communities maintain and cherish a close relationship with the land and nature; this has given them the experience and authority to know how to preserve it, and this is what they aim to do. For example, according to La Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca (n.d ), for the Nasa community (situated in the south-west of Colombia), their economy is based on respect for, and their relationship with, Mother Earth, in which they search for meaning and plenitude, in harmony with where the spiritual and material worlds converge. That is why in this relationship everybody participates, being all part of the daily relation with the earth and the rest of its beings. However, such a relationship and such defense of natural resources often means that they are opposed to practices of extraction and mineral exploitation typically favoured by the Colombian government. Since the extractive model has arisen, countries like Colombia have been in the eye of multinationals. According to Luque et al. (2018), the extractive model consists of extracting many natural resources, processes which have a high environmental impact, for exportation. This can undermine a countries’ economic sovereignty, and Luque also points out that the main countries related to the exportation of said resources tend to be the ones that have more environmental conflicts, with energetic mining and metallurgical extraction being the principal sectors. There is evidence of the complicity of the government and the military regarding favouring the interests of those multinationals, and this has been expressed in a failure to protect indigenous leaders. There have even been reports of the military threatening and murdering representatives of communities that do not permit those extractive megaprojects to take place. According to Torres et al. (n.d) “… serious violations to human rights have been present, violations that cannot be understood isolated from the implementation of an extractive model and the development of megaprojects.” But what is the role of the state in such a sorry situation?. El Pais (2019) writes that according to Aida Pesquera, director of Oxfam International Colombia: “ It is not just the absence of the state, which impacts the violence made. It is the deliberate silence. There are armed groups that act under the service of enterprises’ interests and politicians. And the government does nothing.” To illustrate this, the same report states that the members of Asociación Fuerza de Mujeres Wayúu (Wayúu Women’s Force) in the department of La Guajira, Colombia “accuse the state of links with mining companies of the zone”, with representatives of this group being threatened by illegal actors following legals cases they have taken against multinational companies operating in the region. In relation to such instances, the jointly written report, ¿CUÁLES SON LOS PATRONES? Asesinatos de Líderes Sociales en el Post Acuerdo (2018), states that since the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, there has been a reduction of victims related to the direct violence of the conflict. However, there has been an increase of violations to the right of life of many social leaders and rights defenders, in many instances including indigenous and environmental defenders. The current situation faced by numerous communities since the signing of the peace agreement and the weak response from the government has been a power vacuum in those territories that has increased violence and the assassination of social leaders in general. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, (2019) states that “Complex territorial dynamics, aggravated by the presence of extractive projects and new armed actors who are trying to move into territories that were abandoned by the FARC-EP and where the State has a very limited presence” play a big role in the wave of violence against activists. As a consequence of the historical ineffectiveness or mediocrity of the state, insurgent and paramilitary groups have arisen, assuming control in the midst of state absence, threatening and attacking many communities for their own financial benefit. However, illegal groups have a long and shadowy history of collusion with the state when it comes to the interests of private companies.

Another important factor that must be recognized when looking at the present is the links between multinationals and paramilitary groups. Multiple violations of human rights have been perpetuated due to the interests of multinational corporations that have allegedly used illegal groups as a way to achieve whichever project they are planning to implement. These relationships have been observed multiple times throughout Colombian history, but one of the most well-known is the case of the Drummond coal company. Drummond is an American multinational that extracted coal on the Caribbean coast and that, allegedly, financed factions of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), factions which participated in crimes against union leaders (Semana, 2014). According to Alcides Mattos Tabares, alias ‘El Samario’, who was in command of the northern bloc of the AUC in Cesar, although the paramilitaries did not work directly with coal companies, they had payment alliances to finance the illegal group. The logic being that Drummond financed these groups in exchange for removing any threat that may arise against its interests (Stöckle & Tamayo, 2020). Relatives of victims of this paramilitary group pointed out that Drummond financed and supported this armed group trying to protect its interests from the guerrilla attacks and the claims of union leaders, some of whom suffered from persecution, murders, and disappearances/kidnappings (Verdad Abierta, 2015). Witnesses assure that the links between the AUC and the company began in response to the increasing number of kidnappings and attacks against the companies by the leftist guerrillas of the FARC and ELN (Bargent & Yagoub, 2014). As we can see in this case, powerful corporations that have the government’s endorsement in order to take advantage of natural resources in Colombia without being affected by the violent conflict that exists in the country, have turned to illegal armed groups to do whatever is deemed necessary to protect their interests. Another relevant example of this situation is the case of Banacol, a large company that produces and markets different agricultural products and that was found to have a nexus with paramilitary groups such as the AUC. This multinational was investigated for the financing of armed groups outside the law, illicit enrichment, and forced displacement (Comisión Interclesisal de Justicia y Paz, 2012). There was evidence of the presence of Banacol in the collective territories of Curvaradó, which are located in the north of the department of Chocó, in the subregion of Bajo Atrato. This presence meant that the company was starting to spread its activity invasively into these territories, which would result in these communities being forcibly displaced (Bejarano, Correa & Ospina, 2018). Multinationals, which have the governments’ tacit blessing in Colombia, have therefore had a murky history of alleged connections with illegal armed groups that violate human rights and perpetuate the violence in the country. Those instances outlined above are just some of the cases in which we find a nexus between legal and illegal actors in Colombia. Unfortunately, despite the 2016 peace agreement seeing the demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, rural communities, particularly indigenous communities, continue to face violence and displacement due to the presence of illegal actors in their territory. While there are still question marks regarding the issue of these groups acting on behalf of mega projects conducted by multinational companies, there is little doubt or debate about the lengths these groups will go to in order to defend their own illicit interests.

In addition to their links to legal mega-projects, illegal actors also use violence against environmental indigenous activists in order to further their own illegal economic interests. This is seen most clearly in the case of drug traffickers, illegal miners, guerrillas, and paramilitaries who pursue an increase in their territorial control and economic benefits. Steele (2017, cited in Mounu Prem et al., 2018) argues that “historically, leaders were selectively assassinated in Colombia as a complement to strategies used especially by paramilitaries to facilitate territorial control.” Moreover, the reasons behind the search for territorial control could in turn be associated with the exploitation of resources. Regarding this, the Somos Defensores Program, which is a space that offers protection to human rights defenders and seeks to develop proposals to prevent attacks and protect their lives, takes relevance. Carlos Guevara (cited in Mejia, 2016), the communications coordinator of the program, mentioned that although the regions of Antioquia, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Córdoba had been key areas in the internal conflict, “the high number of attacks on activists is more related to economic interests. These include illicit cultivation and illegal gold mining”. In addition to this, it is important to highlight that La Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office) estimated that in 2015 ‘illegal mining’ amounted to 56% of the illegal activity in the country” (p. 77, Defensores P. S. et al., 2018), a figure that shows the magnitude of this illegal business. The case of Celia Umenza is an example that shows the impact of illegal actors on indigenous communities and the environment. Umenza is an indigenous environmental activist, who defends the water sources near Toribío in Cauca, where illegal gold mining pollutes the water with mercury, and further north, pesticides used on illegal marijuana crops poison the soil. She mentioned that they “…have threats from governmental repression, retaliation from the guerrillas and also from the paramilitaries (…) They almost bombarded us with pamphlets.” Like Umenza, several activists suffer the same consequences for defending their territories. The threats are not perpetrated by a particular actor, and they are not limited to threats with firearms, which does not change the consequences of their actions. It just complicates the situation to the point that sometimes those actions end up connected and exacerbating the problems that indigenous communities already have. Also, in terms of illegal economies, one of the principal leadership roles targeted since the 2016 agreement has been community leaders involved in crop substitution programs. These programs were agreed as part of the 2016 deal as a way of reducing the amount of coca cultivation in areas which were traditionally under the control of the FARC. Between 2016 and 2020, 75 such leaders were murdered throughout the country (El Espectador, 2021). Figures such as these again highlight the threats faced by indigenous, Afro-Colombian, environmental and community activists trying to defend the interests of their community and the environment in the midst of a power vacuum which allows illegal interests to take precedence.

To conclude, due to the past and present, indigenous communities in Colombia have faced and continue to face multiple violations of their rights by different legal and illegal actors. Throughout this article, we wanted to highlight the necessity to take into account the economic interest pursued by actors such as paramilitary groups, guerrilla organisations, multinational and transnational enterprises, and the Colombian state, as factors that influence the problem of the assassination of indigenous environmental activists in the country. It was demonstrated that some actions committed by these actors are not isolated from each other, but are linked. Additionally, different cases were presented to expose the interest and the actors involved behind problematic situations, like the case of Celia Umenza, who suffered threats from guerrillas and paramilitary groups; or the Drummond multinational company, alleged to have financed the paramilitary group AUC, in order to protect the company benefits from the guerrilla attacks and the claims of union leaders. Finally, it is important to mention that people must be aware of the issue of environmental indigenous activists in Colombia due to the importance of their fight because they not only have to deal with the risks of being environmental defenders, but also the ones of being indigenous, in a country which has historically violated, and continues to violate, their rights and territory.

References

Alzate, L. C. (2016). Entre La Violencia, la colonización y la adjudicación de reservas. Relatos sikuanis sobre el abandono, el despojo y la recuperación del territorio. Revista colombiana de antropología, 53(1), 91–122. http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/rcan/v53n1/0486-6525-rcan-53-01-00091.pdf

Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca. (n. d.). Tejido económico ambiental. nasaacin.org. https://nasaacin.org/tejidos-y-programas/tejido-economico-ambiental/

Bargent, J. & Yagoub, M. (2017). Nexos entre paramilitares y carboneras en Colombia: Drummond y Glencore se enfrentan a nuevas acusaciones. InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/nexos-paramilitares-carboneras-colombia-drummond-glencore-enfrentan-nuevas-acusaciones/

Bejarano, L. M., Correa, J. D., & Ospina, J. J. (2018). Paramilitarismo, multinacionales y modelo económico en Colombia 1997-2005: amenaza armada o afinidad ideológica. https://ciencia.lasalle.edu.co/negocios_relaciones/108

Carretero, N. (2019). Las olvidadas de la paz. El país. https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/20/actualidad/1561042492_610542.html?fbclid=IwAR1sA2J0Nwg92IQRrIHKppxqeczUIOpHhy6ddIaYp3BtFV0uAil9shoNsGs

Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz. (2012). Colombia: Banacol. Empresa implicada en paramilitarismo y acaparamiento de tierras en Curvaradó y Jiguamiandó. FDCL. https://www.tni.org/files/download/banacolcasestudyes.pdf

CNMH. (2020). Pueblos indígenas, víctimas de violencias de larga duración. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. https://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/pueblos-indigenas-victimas-de-violencias-de-larga-duracion/

¿CUÁLES SON LOS PATRONES? Asesinatos de Líderes Sociales en el Post Acuerdo. (2018). https://www.cinep.org.co/publicaciones/PDFS/20181202_cuales_son_los_patrones.pdf?

Defensores, P. S., del Catatumbo ASCAMCAT, A. C., Abierta, V., Antioquia, M. R.V., & por la Paz, P. (2018). ¿Cuáles son los patrones? Asesinatos de Líderes Sociales en el Post Acuerdo.

Rueda, S. F. (2021). Entre 2016 y 2020, 75 líderes de sustitución de coca fueron asesinados. El Espectador. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/entre-2016-y-2020-75-lideres-de-sustitucion-de-coca-fueron-asesinados-article/

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (2019). Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ColombiaDefenders.pdf

King, E., & Wherry, S. (2020). Colombia’s Environmental Crisis Accelerates Under Duque. The North American Congress on Latin America-NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/2020/04/20/colombia-environmental-crisis-duque

Luque, A., Herrero, N., & Peñaherrera, J. (2018). EXTRACTIVISMO EN AMÉRICA LATINA: ¿BIEN COMÚN O DEMOCRACIA DELEGATIVA? Revista Electrónica de Medio Ambiente, 19(1), 121–137. https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-114977/ARTICULO_6_M+A2018.1.pdf

Mejia, C. (2016). Activistas indígenas y por el medio ambiente: numerosas víctimas entre los asesinatos en Colombia. MONGABAY. https://es.mongabay.com/2016/09/indigenas-medio-ambiente-asesinatos-colombia/

Robayo, L., & Serrano, S. (2021). La historia de la líder indígena que defiende el agua en el Cauca. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/la-lider-indigena-amenazada-de-muerte-por-defender-el-agua-619048

RPV. (2017). Las cifras del cambio climático en Colombia. Red prensa verde. https://redprensaverde.org/2017/09/14/las-cifras-del-cambio-climatico-en-colombia/

Semana. (2020). Las otras acusaciones que se ciernen sobre Drummond. Semana.com https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/drummond-los-asesinatos-de-sindicalistas/371027-3/

Stöckle, C., & Tamayo, P. (2020). Carbon con sangre. DOMAR Film GmbH.

Torres, A., Ramírez, X., & Metaute, M. (n. d.). Colombia Nunca Más: Extractivismo y graves violaciones a los Derechos Humanos. Caso Hidroituango. 1990 – 2016. https://nuncamas.movimientodevictimas.org/images/abook_file/extractivismo-y-graves-violaciones-a-los-derechos-humanos.pdf?msclkid=6ffaaa97a7b811ecb0cb092340508834

Verdad Abierta. (2015). Víctimas en el Cesar, decepcionadas con fallo a favor de la Drummond. VerdadAbierta.com. https://verdadabierta.com/victimas-en-el-cesar-decepcionadas-con-fallo-a-favor-de-la-drummond/

The current plight of the Embera community in Bogotá.

Originally published: Aug 10, 2022

5 min read

Members of the Embera community at their camps on the streets of Bogotá.

Article researched and written by Danna Arrieta, Melanie Boyano & Natalia Vargas

The Emberas are an indigenous group from Colombia that live in different parts of the country. They are divided into Embera Chamí, which means “the mountain people”, and who live in the Risaralda department; Embera Katío, which means “the river people” and who live in Antioquia; Embera Epera in the Nariño and Cauca departments; and Embera Cholo in the pacific coast. Because of the armed conflict that Colombia has gone through, the Embera Katío community has been displaced from their ancestral lands and forced to move. Since 2018, a large group of displaced Embera Katío has been present in the capital city, Bogotá. In Bogotá, their life has changed completely; they are now living in improvised shelters and changing their diet and way of living completely, waiting for the moment that the government will tell them that they can finally go back to their land.

Since their arrival in Bogotá, this indigenous group has suffered numerous misfortunes, the most recent being the death of an Embera woman and her child in January 2022, run over by a truck on the Bogotá-Funza highway. This also led to the unfortunate death of the truck driver who was attacked by an incensed crowd following the incident. In time, if nothing changes, the Embera risk losing their traditions and customs, which is especially dangerous for the new generations that are being born in the big city.

Members of the Embera indigenous communities were forced to flee their territories due to the risks posed by the ongoing conflict in Colombia. Despite the 2016 peace agreement which led to the demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, many regions continue to be war-torn due to the presence of other illegal armed actors. The forced recruitment by illegal groups has displaced Emberas from their homes in the mountainous regions of western Colombia. As displaced people, some 370 indigenous people from Embera communities arrived in Bogotá asking President Iván Duque for help. According to their leaders, the government promised to help them pay rent for houses for their families. But so far, the promise has not been kept. Consequently, they felt forced to occupy a park near the presidential palace, in precarious tents, and exposed to contracting Covid-19 throughout the initial wave of the pandemic (Jaramillo, 2020).

The Emberas have been living in tents exposed to the sun and the rain; their women cooking on makeshift fires and their children playing half-naked in the Tercer Milenio Park have become part of the Bogotá scenery. Their situation is dramatic, yet there is no solution in sight because the lack of government assistance only seems to worsen (Doria, 2020). Humberto Arce, the Embera Katio authority who traveled from Pueblo Rico to Bogotá to negotiate with the government, told La Silla Vacía that they asked that while the government designs a return plan to Risaralda (the department where there lands are located) with decent housing and productive projects for them, the government must guarantee them decent housing and food (Doria, 2020). However, given the grave situation in their territories, the possibilities for returning home seem remote for now.

The home of the Embera Katio en Risaralda has long been affected by the violence of the Colombian armed conflict. When the FARC handed over their weapons as part of the 2016 peace deal, there was cautious hope that the situation would change for the better. However, like other parts of the country, the FARC withdrawal left a power vacuum in a region with a poor record of effective state presence. Like other parts of the country, this power vacuum has seen rival illegal groups establish a presence with the objective of establishing control, in this case the ELN guerrillas and the Clan del Golfo, a neo-paramilitary organization which grew out of the demobilization of the AUC paramilitary group in 2006. In Alto Andágueda, Chocó, and Pueblo Rico, Risaralda the confrontation between the ELN and the Clan del Golfo has worsened in recent years. The latter are fighting over drug trafficking routes and territories for illegal mining. The Colombian army is also there to fight them both. Indigenous people—and indigenous land—remain at the center of this war (Doria, 2020). This means that they have been forcibly displaced from their territories to avoid the violence, as well as fleeing to avoid their children being forcibly recruited by the illegal armies. Until the situation regarding security in the region is improved, there seems little hope the Embera communities can return home, meaning the issue of how to best support them in Bogotá should be of the utmost importance.

It is important to note that resources have been made available to the community in Bogotá. The local government has allocated 770 million pesos for the 260 Embera families in the city since the pandemic began. With this money they have paid for shelters, rent subsidies, and food. The national government, for its part, has given them 200 subsidies, though not all members of the community are satisfied with the government hand-outs: “120 have accepted the aid from the district and, although it is not enough, they have been able to cope with the situation. These other 140 do not want to, even though they have all received aid from the government,” Camilo Acero, undersecretary of government, told La Silla Vacia. What these indigenous communities want is a resolution which would allow them to return to their homes, and it is this issue which has motivated their protests within the city. Several indigenous people from the Tercer Milenio park told La Silla Vacia that they had already participated in other occupations in the same park in previous years. At that time, they managed to return to their territories, but they had returned to Bogotá because the confrontation in their territories has not ended and because the national governments of Santos and Duque did not comply with what they had promised. The district indicated that they would continue to work to comply with the legal ruling “with the leadership of the national institutions, and thus initiate the voluntary process (…) so that they can return to their territories with guarantees.” Whoever wishes to stay in Bogotá, the Government Secretariat indicated that they would continue to insist on relocation (Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización?, 2022). Leonival Campos, elder authority of the Emberá Katío, pointed out that the intention of the members of his community is to stay in the city rather than return to the existent danger of their territories: “We are waiting for a place with adequate conditions to move. (…) We do not want to go to a coliseum and even less to another place that does not have the necessary guarantees”, he said (Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización?, 2022).

To conclude, the current situation of Embera groups leaves them in an unprotected position, due to different factors such as the government’s negligence in complying with the agreements, or the constant threats they experience from armed groups. These groups should be established in their ancestral lands and their rights (compiled in the Indigenous Rights Declaration) must be respected and protected by the government at all costs. The creation of more direct spaces for dialogue between the Embera communities and the government could be an effective measure to reduce the negative effects of the problem. In this way, it is also necessary that in addition to just being heard, the Embera indigenous people have available to them more mechanisms for direct participation in decision-making on issues that actively affect their communities. The Embera risk losing their traditions and customs given that new generations are being born and raised far from their territories.

References

Doria, P. (2020). LOS EMBERA EN EL TERCER MILENIO, UN DRAMA CIRCULAR Y SIN FIN. La Silla Vacía .

Jaramillo, A. S. (2020). Los indígenas embera desplazados por la violencia y a la deriva en Bogotá. FRANCE24.

¿Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización? (2022). EL TIEMPO.

Bohórquez, Edwin (2021). ¿Qué ha sucedido con los indígenas de la comunidad embera en Bogotá?. EL ESPECTADOR.