Fray Torres – another victim in the conflict over land in Magdalena and throughout Colombia.

Fray Torres represented communities in land reclamation processes in the department of Magdalena until his murder in September 2022.

Originally published: Oct 2, 2023

11 min read

Article written by Natalia Cueto, Laura Diaz & Yicela Espinoza.

For many years social leaders in Colombia have been targeted for trying to protect the human rights of vulnerable sectors such as indigenous groups, Afro-descendants and rural communities. Nowadays, violence committed by illegal armed groups has taken different forms of abuses in remote areas known as “Brown Spots”. These are the zones where the State does not apply the law and the armed groups are in effective control, allowing them to intimidate the population, harm the community, and cultivate drugs, among other acts. But also, these illegal groups are focused on preventing implementation of components of the peace process as they have been interpreted as being bad for their business interests. Consequentially, Human Rights defenders, journalists, demobilized FARC fighters, indigenous and Afro-descendent leaders often face death threats and violence to halt their work, which is often seen as an obstacle to the interests of the illegal groups. On that point, according to a special report of Indepaz (2020), between the signing of the peace agreement in Colombia in 2016 until July 15th, 2020, almost 971 leaders and Human Rights defenders were killed, and 681 of these cases targeted peasant, indigenous, Afro-descendant, environmental and community organizations. These cases have occurred throughout Colombian territory, with departments such as Cauca, Antoquia and Nariño being the most affected. However, the Caribbean region has also seen prevalent cases of violence against social leaders, with murders occurring in all the departments of the region (Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Sucre, Córdoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and the islands of San Andres and Providencia. This article will explore this issue by taking a look at the department of Magdalena. According to the reports published from 2020 to 2023 by Indepaz, during that period in the department of Magdalena there have been a total of 25 murders of social leaders. In recent years, there have been some well-known leaders murdered in the department. These include the cases of Maritza Quiroz, a leader of women victims of displacement, and Wilton Orrego, a park ranger defending Colombia’s national parks were both murdered within days of each other in January 2019, while Cristina Cantillo, a well-known trans activist, was murdered in her home in Santa Marta in 2021. This text will focus primarily on the case of Fray Torres, a leader involved in land restitution projects, who was shot dead in September of 2022.

Fray David Torres Marroquín was a leader who was forty-one years old. He worked as treasurer of the Community Action Board (JAC) of the locality of Nueva América, near to Palmore de la Sierra, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Ciénaga, Magdalena (El Espectador, 2022). Fray Torres was a social leader involved in land restitution processes for the rural population of Palmore de la Sierra. According to Urieles (2022), this region has been severely affected by the presence of different illegal actors and armed groups in recent times such as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces and Conquistador Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada. Also, this author affirmed that these are both illegal armed groups which were established following the demobilization process of the right-wing AUC paramilitaries and are both heavily involved in illegal economies such as drug trafficking. At the same time, Urieles (2022) analyzed that both groups have been in conflict since early 2022 to determine which group would have control over this territory and its strategic routes. Torres’s work was also aligned with the promotion of farming families living in the countryside until his life was taken abruptly. According to Infobae (2022) citing the news site Diario del Magdalena, the incident took place at 11:00 in the morning on September 21st, 2022. Torres was with his partner and his son, who both witnessed the attack. As mentioned previously, the killing of Fray Torres is part of a worrying pattern in the department.

What results more alarming is the numerous cases of murdered social leaders in this zone of Colombia. In Magdalena there have been many homicides of these advocates such as the case of Maritza Quiroz. This courageous woman was murdered on the 5th of January 2019, years after having been displaced from the village of Palmor, in the jurisdiction of Ciénaga, to San Isidro, a rural area of Santa Marta. Maritza was known for her work as an alternate member of the Victims Board in Santa Marta, sticking up for Afro-Colombian women displaced from the Sierra Nevada and her leadership in land restitution processes too (La Paz en el Terreno, n.d.). Another relevant event happened on January 14th, 2019, in Don Diego, a small village, an hour from the capital, Santa Marta. In this place, Wilton Orrego was killed after arriving at his home. This leader worked to protect the environment in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta as a defender of nature since he labored as a park ranger in the Parque Nacional Natural Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (Mojica, 2023). Like Fray’s story, it seems both were viewed as “obstacles” to the interests of armed groups by carrying out their work in areas where they have drug plantations and trafficking routes. Not only have these unfortunate cases taken place in this region, but also there are many other stories, such as the case of Patricia Pérez, a woman from Ciénaga who was killed on the 1st of October 2021 after she left her attorney’s office (HOY Diario del Magdalena, 2021). According to Indepaz (2021), Patricia and her husband’s lives were taken in the middle of their fight for claiming land ownership, which is an issue that has arisen in the department of Magdalena and throughout Colombia, especially for social leaders and advocates who are disputing these territories against illegal armed groups still active following the peace agreement of 2016. To understand why these people who were working with transparency for honest causes were targets of homicides, it is necessary to reflect briefly on the fact that Colombia has a historical land ownership problem. This issue was caused by the unequal distribution of land, the complex geographical location of Colombian regions, and the legacy of colonization where a few powerful rich families inherited the majority of land and the rest, a poor and powerless majority, had to survive with what was left (Pardo, 2022). As reported by the National Center of Historical Memory (2018), “this historical debt of the State was deepened by the armed conflict, which put thousands of peasants in the middle of the fire, forcing them to leave their land”. After looking at the cases, each one of the covered social leaders had their own lines of work such as campesino communities’ rights, environmental conservation, displacement of Afro-descendant groups, and land restitution processes. However, the common thread among all these cases is land: its repartition and ownership are issues that have been arising because of the internal conflict and the presence of many different actors depending on the region in question.

The previously mentioned cases all occurred in Magdalena, home of the Sierra Nevada. This majestic coastal mountain range, home to four indigenous cultures and an incredible array of wildlife, has also been home to two-armed groups in expansion who dispute the control over this zone: the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), also known as Gulf Clan Cartel, and the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACS), commonly referred to as Los Pachenca. The ACS has been operating in this zone since the 80s when most paramilitary groups were created. The scope of the ACS operations covers 40% of the street-level drug dealing in Santa Marta in comparison to the AGC, which has only 10% (Posada, 2021), which makes them the actors with the most political and military control, financed by drug trafficking and extortion in places such as Sierra Nevada, Palomino (from the department of La Guajira), Santa Marta, Ciénaga, Aracataca and the Zona Bananera. However, the Gulf Clan is well known throughout all the Colombian territory as a ramification of the AUC paramilitaries and has specialized in the continued growth of their organization to have complete influence over drug trafficking resources, which explains why they have been seeking dominance in this department (El Heraldo, 2022). As a result of this, the civilian population of Magdalena is being left in the middle of these circumstances, which blend with the exacerbation of other social issues such as poverty, racism, ecological damage, land restitution, internal conflict, and a lack of guarantees for rural communities. Collectives focused on these causes are the most affected by the conflict between the AGC and ACS in the whole department since they represent territories that are of interest for the plantation of illegal crops and the proximity to the maritime ports to export illegal drugs (Llamas, 2022). Consequently, the great power vacuum created by the weak presence of the Colombian government has allowed for the presence of illicit groups to persist for decades, leaving consequences such as impunity for the murders of social leaders. Based on the data provided by Indepaz, between 2022 and so far in 2023 (April at the time of writing). There have been 5 cases of murdered social leaders in Magdalena. Perhaps 5 can be seen as low figure, but it represents simply a fraction of, as reported by Indepaz on the 12th of April 2023, the 1,457 leaders that have been killed since the peace agreements of 2016 in Colombia.

If we analyze the issue at the national level, the situation is no less complex. Violence has now taken new forms and abuses by armed groups in remote areas, reaching levels in 2022 like those that existed before the peace process (Human Rights Watch world report, 2023). Therefore, indigenous leaders, Afro-descendants and other activists face death threats and widespread violence from these armed groups. On the other hand, as for the current government (led by President Gustavo Petro and in office since August 2022), it promised to fight for the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement and prioritize “total peace” in search of agreements with the ELN (National Liberation Army guerrilla) and the negotiated disarmament of other armed groups and criminal gangs (Human Rights Watch world report, 2023). However, the Colombian Caribbean has its own peculiarities according to the Indepaz Report on armed groups, as that part of the country is characterized by the actions of narco-militaries. This area is of special interest due to the corridor that connects the Colombian Caribbean port cities, key to drug and arms trafficking (2022). However, there are efforts by national institutions to manage the situation, for example, the truth commission is developing a monitoring system for the implementation of its work, with the purpose of continuing to raise awareness and foster the appropriation of the recommendations among state institutions and civil society, in order to guarantee their inclusion in the National Development Plan (Security Council, UN Verification Report, 2022). Likewise, the creation of the PDET (Development Programs with a Territorial Focus) represents part of this effort, given that, as a 10-year planning and management instrument, they prioritize those territories most affected by the armed conflict, that is, areas with higher poverty rates, presence of illicit economies and institutional weakness (Confianza y Paz territorial, PDET, 2017). Generally speaking, such areas that have been historically affected by the conflict continue to see high rates of violence against social leaders, as can be seen in Ciénaga and the Sierra Nevada areas of Magdalena. The previously mentioned programs and measures have the aim of achieving a comprehensive, stable and lasting peace in Colombia. Therefore, although armed conflict does not continue to be the same as in its beginnings, its evolution has implied new negotiation strategies between government entities and armed groups and criminal gangs. But despite the difficulties with the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, the current government and institutions such as the truth commission and the PDET programs aim to contribute to an improvement in the situation of vulnerability faced by social leaders and other vulnerable groups in civil society. Although, these efforts are recognized, the arduous work that remains to guarantee security in these areas of the country cannot be ignored, and it is imperative for Colombia to arrive at a point where our activists do not run the risk of death threats and persecution for their social work within their communities.

Finally, as we have seen, social leaders in Colombia have been assassinated by armed groups for trying to protect the human rights of vulnerable communities such as indigenous people, Afro-descendants, and marginalized rural communities. Additionally, the figures shown at the beginning of the article are shocking when we realize the number of social leaders who have died over the years because of armed groups. This alarming situation has been sadly reiterated in the case of the social leader Fray Torres, and his situation is unfortunately quite common in places such as the Magdalena region, which is affected by narco-paramilitaries and guerrilla groups and criminal gangs that are also seen throughout the Caribbean region. This problematic issue can also be evidenced in the stories of other leaders such as Wilton Orrego, Patricia Pérez and Maritza Quiroz, who dedicated a large part of their lives and time to helping others, despite the risk and pain that not only they go through but also their families after their deaths. However, as we mentioned in the previous paragraph, the government and state institutions have developed strategies such as the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET). These programs and resolutions of the truth commission have been supported by international organizations such as the UN and Human Rights Watch. But despite these efforts, the situation continues to be alarming, which means that there is still much work to be done to ensure the protection of the leaders by the State and to end the attacks by the armed groups. Therefore, we believe that social leaders should receive effective support and protection from the State and relevant institutions. In addition, it is imperative to give greater visibility to the cases of social leaders for communities in both rural and urban areas, and to share information regarding the work they had done for their community. Likewise, considering the impact that the deaths of these leaders have on families, where in most cases that leader is the head of the household and the one who provides the income in their homes, more should be done to support the families of victims financially. Finally, we suggest the creation of historiographic files on the leaders to have more data recorded and have more information about their work and their projects with the community. Such a measure would provide timely support and raise awareness of their work and perhaps even to attain support from organizations related to the causes of the leaders.

References:

El Espectador (2022). Asesinaron frente a su familia a líder social en el Palmor de la Sierra, Magdalena. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/asesinaron-frente-a-su-familia-a-lider-social-en-el-palmor-de-la-sierra-magdalena/

Human rights watch , 2023, World Report.

I. (2022, 22 septiembre). Asesinan líder social delante de su mujer e hijo en Magdalena. infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/09/22/asesinan-lider-social-delante-de-su-mujer-e-hijo-en-magdalena/

Indepaz. (2021, 14 noviembre). líderes sociales, defensores de dd.hh y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2021 – https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-asesinados-en-2021/

Indepaz. (2020, 1 Enero). Líderes sociales y defensores de Derechos Humanos asesinados en 2020. https://indepaz.org.co/lideres/

Indepaz. (2022, 31 Diciembre). líderes sociales, defensores de dd.hh y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2022 https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-dd-hh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2022/

Indepaz. (2023, 11 Abril). líderes sociales, defensores de dd.hh y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2023 https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-dd-hh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2023/

Indepaz. (2020). Registro de líderes y personas defensoras de DDHH asesinadas desde la firma del acuerdo de Paz Del 24/11/2016 al 15/07/2020.

INDEPAZ, 2022, Report on illegal groups.

Security Council, 2022, UN Verification Report.

PDET, 2017 (https://confianzaypaz.com/pdet/)

UNCARIBE. (2019). Líderes sociales asesinados en el Caribe Enero- junio 2019 Universidad del Norte.

Urieles, R. (2022, Agosto 10). Temor en pueblo de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta por amenaza de Clan del Golfo. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/clan-del-golfo-confinamiento-en-sierra-nevada-de-santa-marta-693919

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (n.d.). Tierras. https://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/balances-jep/tierras.html#:~:text=No%20hay%20mayor%20problema%20en,oblig%C3%A1ndolos%20a%20dejar%20sus%20tierras.

El Heraldo. (2022, 24 de enero). La Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, merced de los violentos. El Heraldo. https://www.elheraldo.co/magdalena/la-sierra-nevada-de-santa-marta-merced-de-los-violentos-930499.

Hoy Diario del Magdalena. (2022, 25 de enero). Asesinan a una mujer en Ciénaga. Hoy Diario del Magdalena. https://www.hoydiariodelmagdalena.com.co/archivos/575285/asesinan-a-una-mujer-en-cienaga/.

Indepaz. (2022a, 1 de marzo). Ciénaga, Magdalena. 80 familias desplazadas por conflicto armado. [Tweet]. Twitter. Recuperado el 13 de abril de 2023, de https://twitter.com/Indepaz/status/1646229715240333313?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet.

Indepaz. (2022b, 2 de octubre). #ATENCIÓN| Con profunda tristeza y dolor denunciamos el asesinato de nuestro compañero Wilton Orrego, quien se desempeñaba como líder en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. [Foto adjunta de Wilton Orrego]. [Tweet]. Twitter. Recuperado el 13 de abril de 2023, de https://twitter.com/Indepaz/status/1444843594435735553/photo/1.

Mojica, J. (2023). Asesinato de Wilton Orrego, líder de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/asesinato-de-wilton-orrego-lider-de-la-sierra-nevada-de-santa-marta-611607

Posada, J. (2021). Los Urabeños y Pachenca luchan por los puertos de Santa Marta, Colombia. Insight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/urabenos-pachenca-lucha-puertos-santa-marta-colombia/.

La Paz en el Terreno. (n.d.). Maritza Quiroz Leyva. https://www.lapazenelterreno.com/lider-social/maritza-quiroz-leyva.

Radio Nacional de Colombia. (2022). Ciénaga, Magdalena: 80 familias desplazadas por conflicto armado. Radio Nacional de Colombia. https://www.radionacional.co/regiones/caribe/cienaga-magdalena-80-familias-desplazadas-por-conflicto-armado

Córdoba’s crop substitution leaders continue to be murdered having banked on change.

Rural leader Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata was the 62nd social leader murdered in the department of Córdoba since the 2016 peace agreement was signed with the FARC. Like the majority of social leaders targeted in the Caribbean department, Jorge Luis had been attached to the PNIS crop substitution program.

Originally published: Jun 14, 2023

10 min read

Updated: Jun 23, 2023

Article written by Mayda Campo, Dalgys Carbal & Luisa Riondo

The armed conflict in Colombia, well-known as “La Violencia”, is a phenomenon that has permeated the relations between the State and its citizens. According to Vargas and Caruso (2014), this circle of violence in Colombia transcends decades, since the independence war, the conflict between liberals and conservatives, the assassination of the presidential candidate J. E. Gaitan, the birth of guerrilla organizations and right-wing paramilitaries, and drug trafficking ties with the violence. Thus, Colombian authors, such as Melamed (2018) have said that the armed conflict in the country is difficult to define since the dynamics of execution, localization and causality tend to change depending on the period in which the conflict is studied. In particular, the conflict actors have transformed the scope of this one: according to Tate (2001) at the time of writing, Colombian paramilitary groups were “responsible for major drug trafficking operations and the majority of political violence” (pp. 163). Furthermore, the FARC guerrilla received financing through these illicit operations. Because of this connection between the illegal groups and the cartels of drug, oligopolies of coercion were established, a situation in which these organizations have simultaneous and overlapping control of the means of coercion necessary to regulate societal transactions in Colombia (Duncan, 2014). In this respect, the violence has directly impacted the civilian population through forced displacement, kidnapping, selected murders and massacres, among others (Riascos & Vargas, 2011). However, it is important to mention that the links between illicit groups and drug trafficking have also affected the civilian population in Colombia: dynamics, such as the cultivation of illicit crops for cocaine, have impacted in the life of campesinos because of the power vacuums that were exploited by these illegal groups in order to control the economy and the social interactions in marginalized zones. On the other hand, illicit crops have also provided a stable income for these marginalized rural dwellers; that is why, according to Norman (2017), this problematic situation remains a key aspect in the conflict, so much so that in the 2016 Peace Agreement, there was a chapter dedicated to the narcotization of the violence in Colombia, and how best to deal with the issue. As an extension of the impact on civil society, the armed conflict has also impacted social activism in Colombia: according to Albarrancín et al (2023), violence against social leaders has grown throughout the conflict, and, even following the peace agreement with the FARC-EP guerrilla organization in 2016. Much of this violence against social activism in Colombia is related to illegal crops and narcotrafficking (Mejía & Restrepo, 2013), since the social leaders represent the interest of the community in replacing illicit crops —as an illegal economic dynamic— which goes against these illegal group’s sources of incomes. Hence, the focus in this article on the issue of illegal crops in Colombia and the ties between the illicit crops substitution program (PNIS) and the violence against social leaders.

The production of illicit crops in Colombia can be traced back to the 1960s when farmers began cultivating coca as a cash crop. The growth of the illicit drug trade in Colombia led to the expansion of coca cultivation and the emergence of other illegal crops such as marijuana and opium poppies. There were several factors that contributed to the growth of illicit crops in the country. One of the main reasons was the high demand for drugs in the United States and Europe. According to Colombia Reports (2023), “the drug labs are generally run by farmers under control of local drug trafficking clans, individual guerrilla units, or associates of the international criminal organizations that traffic the drugs to the US, Europe or the Southern Cone”. Another factor is the poverty and lack of economic opportunities in rural areas of Colombia, leading farmers to turn to coca cultivation as a means of earning stable income and supporting their families. Additionally, the power vacuum in some areas of the country, allied to the presence of armed groups, such as guerrilla groups and drug cartels in Colombia has facilitated the growth of illicit crops. These groups provided protection to coca growers and controlled the production, processing, and trafficking of drugs (Palacios, 2012). Besides, according to Mejía and Restrepo (2013): “…the FARC and paramilitaries also fight each other and the state over the control of productive areas for coca cultivation and threaten or attack local populations to gain absolute control of the local cocaine trade. By doing so, these groups earn the rents associated to the control of land suitable for coca cultivation and cocaine production, a scarce and inelastic factor (pp. 5).” Due to this link between the illegal drug economy and the armed conflict in Colombia, the issue was one of immense importance when the Colombian government was negotiating with the FARC guerrillas during the mandate of Juan Manuel Santos.

The PNIS crop substitution program was created as part of the implementation of the Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, signed by the government and the FARC guerrillas in 2016. Likewise, Decree Law 896 of 2017 defines the objective of the PNIS as «to promote the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, through the development of programmes and projects to contribute to overcoming conditions of poverty and marginalisation of peasant families who derive their subsistence from illicit crops» (pp. 5). However, this programme has inadvertently increased the violence against social leaders: the cohesion of the state security apparatus, and the competition in the illegal market determines traffickers’ incentives to employ violence (Duran, 2015). For instance, according to Llanes (2020), the program’s agreement raised the monthly probability of a social leader’s killing by 1.5 percentage points, representing a 167 % increase, considering that the pre-treatment controls mean was 0.9 %. Findings are robust to several specifications and the identification assumptions are likely to be fulfilled in all econometric models (pp. 4). Essentially, the problem around illegal crops arises from the interest of the social leaders —who have signed up and are part of the PNIS—, who defend the purpose of the programme and reject the violence perpetrated by armed groups. Effectively, by signing up to the crop substitution programs, they have been identified as obstacles to the interests of those who wish to see coca cultivation continue. Besides, Holmes et al (2006) say that there is a “relationship between coca production and guerrilla violence by reviewing national-level data over time and studying Colombia by department, exploring the interactions among guerrilla violence, exports, development, and displacement” (pp. 1). As previously mentioned, the production of coca is concentrated in the territories with less state control, which implies a strong interaction between the actors involved, not only in the cultivation/harvesting processes but also in the extraction and cocaine trafficking. Likewise, these interactions have strong consequences for civil society. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2019) estimate that 80% of homicide victims in the context of the armed conflict in 2018 occurred in municipalities that were affected by coca crops. On the other hand, the greater presence of coca crops is directly related to dynamics such as internal forced displacement, with the inherent effects on the forces of order (murders or injuries), and with terrorist acts, attacks and combats carried out at the municipal level (UNODC, 2019).

Currently, it is estimated that Colombia is the world’s largest cocaine producer. According to the annual report by UNODC (2021), 143,000 hectares with coca crops were identified as of December 31, 2020. There were significant increases of coca crops in Antioquia, Córdoba, and Bolívar (nearly 4,800 hectares). This year’s records estimate that “Cordoba contributes 50 % of the total number of hectares with coca crops in the buffer zones” (p. 35) and “has the largest departmental increase (30 %) which corresponds to an increase of nearly 3,500 hectares” (p. 93). Despite the problem, there were no interventions to reduce coca cultivation, indicating that there are multiple factors driving the trend. The one program clearly targeting coca cultivation is the PNIS, as agreed in the 2016 peace agreement. Yet, the Colombian state has failed to move quickly enough to enact the terms of this program, leaving those leaders and communities in limbo as different armed actors moved in to replace the demobilised FARC units. In areas where coca is cultivated, there has been a surge in violence against those involved in crop substitution programs. This trend can be most clearly observed in the Caribbean region in the department of Córdoba. In Córdoba and in the illicit crops growing territories, civil society has waged a constant struggle for their rights and autonomy in the face of government policies and pressure from illegal armed groups. These communities are trapped in a cycle of violence and poverty, being stigmatized as drug producers and being victims of the violence generated by drug trafficking. However, the communities have managed to resist and organize themselves, demanding the recognition of their land rights, the protection of their leaders and the search for sustainable economic alternatives that allow them to escape the stigma. However, in many cases, these leaders are victims of political violence, both from illegal armed groups and drug cartels, since they see them as obstacles to their interests and illegal activities.

To highlight the situation faced by social leaders, and those involved in crop substitution, it is important to look at two important cases of murdered social leaders which took place in Córdoba. The first case was that of Andrés Alfonso Arteaga Cuadrado, a beneficiary of the PNIS program and member of the Asociación Campesina para el Desarrollo del Alto Sinú, a development association aimed at rural communities in the Alto Sinu region (Asodecas for its initials in Spanish). Andres Alfonso had previously been forced to flee his home in Tierralta Córdoba because of threats from armed groups. On the afternoon of January 7th, 2023, the body of this leader was found on the road outside the municipality of Palmira, Córdoba. According to Asodecas, at 6 pm on January 6th, some armed men had intercepted him and vilely murdered him with three gunshot wounds. Although those responsible for the homicide have not been identified, the Clan del Golfo, an armed group with a presence in all the municipalities of the department, is suspected. Within a month, the community in Tierralta and Asodecas had lost yet another leader. Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata was recognized for his leadership in Asodecas and, like Andres Arteaga, was also a beneficiary of the PNIS. Furthermore, he was a member of the conciliation committee of the village of El Juli, in rural Tierraalta. On February 4th, 2023, at 2:00 in the afternoon, the body of this social leader was found in the Aguas Vivas sector. According to the information collected, Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata had received five bullet wounds after being tortured by his attackers (La Primicia, 2023). The grim murder of Jorge Luis was the 1,421st case of a murdered social leader since 2016. As noted above, both Andrés Arteaga and Jorge Jaraba had been affiliated to Asodecas and had also been also beneficiaries of the PNIS crop substitution program, established as part of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas. In Asodecas, they had been dedicated leaders of their community in the process of community articulation of peasant society after a period of intense violence dating back to the 1960s. As mentioned, part of their responsibility representing their community was their support for the PNIS, which seeks the voluntary substitution of illicit crops. This objective is sought by developing programs and projects that help to overcome the conditions of poverty and marginalization of peasant families who derive their livelihood from the cultivation of illicit crops (Infobae, 2023). The killings of Andres and Jorge are but two of the 62 cases of murdered social leaders in the department of Cordoba between October 2016 and April 2023. Most of these cases have included leaders associated with crop substitution programs.

In short, violence in Colombia has been a persistent and complex problem for decades, with multiple factors contributing to its existence. The presence of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, economic and social inequality, corruption, and the lack of access to justice and basic services have marginalized the population. Although, the Colombian government has implemented various policies and strategies to address the violence, including peace agreements with armed groups and strengthening security in areas, violence remains a significant problem in the country. It is evident that the dynamic of narco-trafficking is a huge factor in this violence. The struggle of social leaders is important in consolidating peace and building a fairer and more equitable society. They play a fundamental role in the vindication of the human rights of the most vulnerable and forgotten by the state. However, in the Colombian context, these groups may face risks and threats, as exemplified by the cases of Andrés Arteaga and Jorge Jaraba in the department of Córdoba. These murders not only generate great pain and suffering in the affected communities but are also an obstacle to safeguarding human rights by the State. Therefore, it is necessary for governments to take concrete measures to protect the life and safety of social leaders, as well as to guarantee justice and reparation for their families and communities. Likewise, the problem of illicit crops, the conflict and the violence, is not only an internal problem, but its consequences expand to the international sphere. This is why it is important to highlight the role of cooperation in the construction of a better society where the protection and guarantee of human rights and basic needs are not just a privilege of few.

References

Albarracín, J., Corredor, J., Milanese, J., Valencia, I. & Wolff, J. (2023). Pathways of post-conflict violence in Colombia. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 34(1), 138 – 164. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363279890_Pathways_of_post-conflict_violence_in_Colombia

Colombia Reports. (2023, January 12). Colombia’s drug trade. Colombia News | Colombia Reports; Colombia News|Colombia Reports. https://colombiareports.com/colombia-drug-trafficking/

Duncan, G. (2014). Drug Trafficking and Political Power: Oligopolies of Coercion in Colombia and Mexico. Latin American Perspectives, 41(2), 18–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X13509071

Durán, A. (2015). To Kill and Tell? State Power, Criminal Competition, and Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8), 1377–1402. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587047

Garzón, J., Rueda, M., & Dueñas, C. (2022). ¿Qué hacer con el PNIS? Decisiones claves para los primeros 100 días de Gobierno [Archivo PDF]. https://multimedia.ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_NE_QueHacerConelPNIS.pdf

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Córdoba and the war on those wishing to move away from illicit crops.

Ofenix de Jesús Concha and Luis Alberto Ramos Bertel were representatives of rural communities that have traditionally been reliant on illicit crops

Originally published: Apr 28, 2023

8 min read

Updated: Jun 23, 2023

Article written by Susana Rengifo, Maria Carolina Sierra & Sebastian Soler

Córdoba is a department located in northwestern Colombia, on the shores of the Caribbean Sea, and is one of the departments that make up this Caribbean region. It is divided into 28 municipalities and its capital is the city of Montería. The main economic source of this department is livestock, but agriculture also plays an influential role. Córdoba tends to be one of the most violent departments in the Caribbean region. Historically, it has been one of the municipalities with the highest uninterrupted presence of armed groups since 1949, before becoming a department. This region has a significant opportunity for wealth due to the fertility of its soils and its strategic location between two gulfs and proximity to the border with Panama. However, these factors are also very beneficial for illegal armed groups to establish themselves here. They can take advantage of the fertile soil to grow illicit crops and the strategic location to export illicit drugs. In addition to this, it is an even more vulnerable territory due to the lack of state presence. It has been a department left aside in development issues; there have been very few state initiatives to reduce poverty and inequality in the territory, so its inhabitants have been practically left to their own devices to deal with inequality, poverty, and violence, and many of the social initiatives proposed by the population and leaders have been directly affected and coerced by these illegal actors. The humanitarian consequences of armed violence in the department of Córdoba are persistent and seem to have no solution. As the number of victims of violence has risen in recent years, the risks and gaps in the implementation of rights and guarantees to the civilian population by the authorities in charge have also increased. In the south of the department, the vulnerability of the population is even greater, since the initial problems of this territory, such as health, water, hygiene, and food security, among others, have been aggravated by the increase in violence in the territory. Furthermore, in the south of this department, there are still illicit drug crops. This is a factor that has contributed to the armed confrontations impacting the civilian population there. At present, threats and constant murders of social leaders and politicians are among the most pressing problems afflicting the territory. Social leaders have been defined by the Royal Spanish Academy (RAE by their initials in Spanish) as “someone who leads or conducts a political party, social group, or other collective”. But their work reaches beyond that definition; social leaders serve as defenders of their territory, asking for respect and justice for the community they represent. Moreover, they are a direct connection between the government and the community in need, which helps the people to access different types of resources that they need. A neglected department such as Córdoba relies heavily on the actions of its social leaders to develop. However, social leaders in Córdoba, as in many other parts of Colombia, frequently face threats and violence for their work.

Between the signing of a peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas in 2016 and the end of April 2023, in Córdoba 62 social leaders have been murdered (Indepaz) due to the climate of violence, and numerous threats have been received. Such levels of violence have led to urgent calls for support from those on the ground, especially in conflicted sub-regions such as the south of Córdoba: “We have not felt any support from the government to improve the public order situation and to clarify the crimes” said José David Ortega, director of the Association of Peasants of the South of Córdoba. Leading social leaders have been victims of these murders, leaving a big vacuum in the department. Social leaders are the ones brave enough to stand up for the rights of the community; furthermore, they are the ones that lead actions and movements for the greater good and the correction of injustices in the territory. The death of any social leader means the voice of the community is lost. In other words, there would be no one fighting for justice in that territory, causing fear in the people. Additionally, the public discontent over the deaths is growing, owing to the failures of political leaders to bring justice to the injustices present in the territory. In order to better understand this worrying dynamic, it is worth looking into some of the individual cases to understand the importance of each leader to the community.

Jose Gregorio Luguez was assassinated on July 2nd, 2021, in La Chica Córdoba. His murder was associated with his work in the program and the redistribution of crops. Luguez was a single father of three and with him passing, the future of his children is uncertain. Moreover, Luguez was part of the Junta de Accion Comunal of La Chica, in Córdoba. The Junta de Accion Comunal , or JAC, helps the community by being the instrument that helps to build participatory democracy in the management of community development. It is a space for citizen participation, made up of representatives of the local government and five residents of the municipality. In a region such as the south of Córdoba, where many rural communities have long relied on the stable economy of coca cultivation, many JACs are responsible for organizing the programs to help these communities transition to solely legal forms of agriculture. Due to the previously mentioned problem of drug-trafficking, the National Illicit Crop Replacement Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos, PNIS) was implemented. The PNIS is a crop substitution program agreed upon as part of the 2016 peace agreement (between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas) with the aim of promoting the voluntary substitution of illicit crops. It is achieved by implementing programs and projects aimed at overcoming the conditions of poverty and marginalization of families that depend on subsistence crops. PNIS was created as a way of helping families in places like the south of Cordoba move away from growing illegal crops. However, it is striking how the authorities seem to have left the leaders of this program in abandonment. On the one hand, the authorities are not keeping their part of the agreement. On the other hand, the criminal groups are targeting the leaders in charge since they no longer grow these crops, and this is seen as damaging for the financial interests of the illegal groups. Since September 2017, there have been numerous attacks and intimidation against the voluntary substitution program for illicit crops and its leaders. The Gulf clan, among other groups, have been the perpetrators of such actions, according to El Espectador. Such a situation means that cases like Jose Gregorio’s are far too common.

Sadly, as mentioned above, José Gregorio Luguez is far from being the only victim of such violence in Córdoba. One month after the killing of José Gregorio, in August 2021, Ofenix de Jesús Concha was killed and with him, it summed up to a total of 108 social leaders who were killed during 2021, according to Indepaz. The death of Ofenix was not only sad, but it created anger in the territory, because of the large number of deaths with the same modus operandi. These deaths have remained unsolved. Ofenix was also a member of the JAC (Community Action Board), in his case in the town of Río Sucio, a rural area of the municipality of Puerto Libertador in Córdoba. Besides the JAC participation, Concha was recognized for leading agricultural projects in the locality and, like Jose Gregorio, being a beneficiary of the PNIS crop substitution program. As with the case of José Gregorio, it is difficult to ignore the fact that involvement in these programs was a factor in his murder. As mentioned above, these crop substitution programs were established as part of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC. They were established to improve rural development and steer communities away from activities that involve contact with illegal organizations. However, while the FARC may no longer be present in the south of Córdoba, other illegal groups such as the Clan del Golfo, the Caparros, and FARC dissidents are. These groups rely heavily on the drug trade. Therefore, these groups see the substitution plan as a threat to their interests. It seems like this is a huge factor in violence against leaders in the south of the department. That violence continues.

Like Jose Gregorio and Ofenix, Luis Alberto Ramos Bertel was an influential figure in the department, but, just like both of those leaders, Luis Alberto was also killed; stabbed to death not far from his home. Luis Alberto was president of the JAC of the village of San Antonio, in the rural area of Montelíbano, and he was invested in creating job opportunities for the communities where they can develop their capacities and, in that way, get out of poverty in a legal and more beneficial way. Unlike other social leaders, he had received no death threats. Even though it is imprudent to assume that his death was due to the work he played as a social leader, it seems the only reason that makes sense. People in the territory believe that the activities that these social leaders led could be related to why they were murdered. Equally, it is believed that the perpetrators of such crimes are the organized narco-paramilitary armed group that operates in the area, the Clan del Golfo. In addition to their antagonism towards crop substitution, groups such as these are inherently suspicious of any activity which brings state attention to the sub-regions where they hold control, as attention and opportunities are incompatible with the conditions that allow their activities to flourish without interference. Not only that but a lot of social leaders in this department have been killed in areas such as Tierralta, Montelíbano, Puerto Libertador and San José de Uré. As a response, the Colombian Police have now established an alarm in case of an emergency situation. However, it is worth noting that the police too have been victims of these illegal groups; 12 policemen have been murdered as a result of criminal organizations that not only attack innocent civilians but also continue to terrorize social leaders throughout the entire department.

As can be seen from the tragic stories shared above, Córdoba is one of the most affected departments in Colombia. This is because of illegal crops, armed groups, demobilization, and strategic drug routes among other factors. Encountering and investigating such cases in such a violent context is sadly all too predictable due to the low presence of the state and low response from the Colombian government. It is also demoralizing since people who are helping the country and those in need are getting killed. Most of the Colombian population will neither hear about the cases nor help the communities affected by armed groups across the country. Keeping in mind all that has been said, Córdoba accounts for only 62 of the more than 1,400 leaders that have been killed by armed groups throughout Colombia between 2016 and April 2023 according to Indepaz. It is by far the most violent department for social leaders in the Caribbean region. Since 2016 the number of cases has increased due to the various illegal military forces that are claiming territory to fill the power vacuum left by demobilized FARC troops following the peace treaty with the Colombian government. It is a sad irony that many of these victims should be benefiting from programs that were created as part of that agreement instead of being persecuted for trying to build a more hopeful future. We recommend further research on why social leaders are being killed in Colombia and connecting this with the root problems that have affected the country for the last 70-plus years and getting the word out to the public, so mass attention is brought to these people in need. Finally, the Colombian government must expand its state presence into the regions affected by the killings of social leaders in order to provide support and opportunities for the communities and to act and punish those responsible for the violence.

Information sourced from:

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/colombia-denuncian-asesinato-lider-campesino-cordoba-20210704-0021.html

https://larazon.co/cordoba/este-ano-han-asesinado-a-cuatro-lideres-comunales-en-cordoba-indepaz

https://www.elciudadano.com/actualidad/asesinan-a-lider-campesino-ofenix-de-jesus-concha-en-colombia/08/16/

https://www.eluniversal.com.co/regional/cordoba/asesinan-a-lider-campesino-en-el-sur-de-cordoba-GF5205549

https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/asesinan-al-presidente-de-la-accion-comunal-en-zona-rural-de-cordoba-631026

https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2021/11/08/monteria/1636348472_004344.html

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/karina-cuesta-ortega-was-brutally-murdered-her-life-was-then-stigmatized-by-authorities-who-should

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/strong-em-the-reality-of-social-leaders-in-colombia-the-case-of-fredman-herazo-padilla-em

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/the-killing-which-momentarily-shook-the-nation

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/rural-leaders-colombia-s-hidden-heroes

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/arcangel-pantoja-omar-agudelo-two-more-lives-extinguished-by-the-violence-which-reigns-in-the

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/jorge-luis-betancourt-the-dangers-of-defending-human-rights-in-the-south-of-c%C3%B3rdoba

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/the-role-of-luis-dario-rodriguez-in-the-south-of-c%C3%B3rdoba-a-social-leader-to-remember

https://www.lalibertadsublime.com/post/the-dynamics-of-violence-in-cordoba

https://cmio.org/en/world/latin-america/706529-a-social-leader-is-assassinated-in-the-colombian-department-of-cordoba-news

https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/left-undefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombias-remote-communities

The thin green line: the challenges and dangers faced by those defending nature in Colombia.

Luis Guevara. Gloria Ocampo and the imprint of deforestation.

Originally published: Sep 29, 2022

7 min read

Article researched and written by Catalina Calderon & Paulo Coronell.

Magnificent landscapes, amazing biodiversity, beautiful people, and multicultural metropolises. These are some of the characteristics through which Colombia could be described, but something deeper and darker permeates all of these positive characteristics. Biodiversity and the environment in general are constantly at risk in Colombia, generally caused by corporate greed or illegal groups. Few Colombians dare to give all they have to protect the environmental treasure of the country, and those that do fight for environmental preservation, those who are referred to here as environmental leaders, have their lives threatened and often taken. Human rights organizations like “Somos Defensores” counted 837 social and environmental leaders assassinated from 2005 to 2019; another human rights organization named “Front Line Defenders” reported that only in the year 2019, 40% of the assassinated leaders could be identified as environmental leaders. This situation should not keep escalating as these environmental leaders are a fundamental part of society; this being said, environmental leaders are reported as being one of the most affected and assassinated as part of the wave of violence towards social leaders in Colombia as they are seen as an interference regarding the exploitation of natural resources. This text will share some experiences of these leaders with the purpose of informing people about their work and their importance.

The first environmental leader mentioned will be Luis Guevara. Luis is a social leader and the president of the “Junta de Acción Comunal” (JAC), a non-profit civic corporation made up by the residents of a place who join efforts and resources to find solutions for their community, from the “Las Colinas” neighborhood situated in the town of Acacías, in the department of Meta. Originally from Santander, he had to relocate to the department of Meta as the hydrocarbon and refinery industry, which in addition to the emission of carbon monoxide that contributes to climate change and also pollutes the water by dumping its waste materials near water sources , had taken a significant toll not only on the ecosystem, but also on the health of Luis and his family. In the year 2010 Luis learned that a seismic exploration carried out by the petrol company Ecopetrol was about to take place in his new home, “Piedemonte llanero” in Meta. This triggered Luis who refused to relive this environmental catastrophe again, so he studied how this seismic exploration would damage the ecosystem, and he discovered that the water systems around the area would be contaminated, generating a disaster for the local community and the ecosystem. Luis organized the community and other social leaders to protest against Ecopetrol’s actions. As formal approaches were not successful, he educated the community and even started to unite with other leaders to plan how to ask the government to extend environmental protection licenses to “El Piedemonte”. Peaceful protests have been met with strict responses from the public forces such as imprisonment and profiling of protestors as terrorists. It is alleged that infiltrators have entered protests as saboteurs and managed to foment chaos through the use of violent acts such as fighting and vandalism. Furthermore, the petrol company also treats people like Luis as eco-terrorists, claims which have caused threats not only against Luis’s life but against his family’s well-being, a pattern of behaviour well known to environmental leaders in Colombia as it just keeps on occurring; activists who stand up in defense of the environment or of basic human rights are equated with violent insurgents. This is a perilous situation in a country such as Colombia with so many dangerous armed actors. Luis has managed to keep on protecting the environment, but few are the lucky ones who get to not only continue their work, but to avoid being killed.

Marlene Arévalo is another of the lucky environmental leaders that has managed to keep on doing her work and not lose her life in the process. Cancer survivor, wife, mother and social leader, Marlene has also taken matters into her own hands to protect water sources and natural corridors, stretching from the Orinoquía region to the rest of the country, from petroleum companies. She assumed the difficult task of educating communities about the importance of natural resources and how to maintain them. Marlene has organized peaceful protests and blockades to prevent massive drills which would have caused environmental disasters, and she has also inspired more than 60 thousand families that depend on various rivers to become more conscious about not only their economic value but their environmental worth. Marlene has suffered an enormous amount of threats, not only consisting of phone calls, but also face to face threats. She has become so accustomed to the threats that she even jokes about them to show that she is not afraid and that her work is more valuable than her own life. Sadly for many other leaders such threats have escalated resulting in the loss of their lives and of their work. The gravity of this situation is shockingly demonstrated seeing as Colombia went from being the second country in the world with environmental leaders assassinated with 24 cases in 2019 to taking the first position the following year with 64 assassinations in 2020. In order to fully understand the scale and depth of this issue, it is vital to learn about the cases of these slain environmental defenders.

The third environmental leader in this text, Yamid Alonso Silva, did not count with the luck of the first two leaders previously mentioned. Yamid was killed for defending and promoting the environmental lands of Boyaca, situated in the middle of the country. On February 6th of 2019, at 11:20am, Yamid Silva was found dead at his place of work. Yamid’s life had always been one of service. He finished high school and later joined the Colombian national army. Following this, he returned to Boyaca to work as treasurer of community action boards (JAC) in some villages in the municipality of Cocuy where he was a natural park official. Like many cases involving the murder of leaders and activists in Colombia, Yamid’s murderers arrived by motorcycle. In the investigation that was carried out, both murderers were identified as being part of the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional), as part of a structure called the Páramo Commission that belongs to the front of Adonai Ardila, one of the heads of the group. This structure is also responsible for committing crimes in Arauca, Casanare and Boyacá. Yamid was a man enchanted with his land, in love with the moors and a defender of the natural resources generated by these lands. He liked to work in the fields, care for and preserve the land. This was his life and he loved it. It is said that one of the reasons for Yamid’s death is that, as mentioned before, he had been a soldier in the national army, and he had spent time there in the high mountain battalion, which is where they ended his life. Yamid was singled out by the ELN as an informer to the military forces, being there as a point of contact for the operations that can be carried out in the zones. The ELN has the objective of dividing the population, attacking with fear and interfering in this area of the department of Boyacá. From the moment he got killed, the family continues to hope that the aggressors pay, that they don’t get away with murder without paying consequences. Yamid’s father called out for a better level of security and justice with the case that was presented for his son. Such scenarios play out in various parts of the country. The armed actors may vary from region to region but those working in defense of nature or their community’s interests face dire consequences for their noble work, and Yamid is far from being the only victim.

The last case presented is that of Gloria Isabel Ocampo, a woman who was assassinated for promoting crop substitution programs in Putumayo. Gloria’s case is one of the most clear examples of the violence that Colombia goes through every day. Gloria (37 years old) was shot dead alongside Eladio Moreno (69 years old) by gunmen in a village in Puerto Guzman. According to information provided by the community, the woman was in a house when two subjects arrived by motorcycle and after calling her name, they shot her and Moreno repeatedly. Relatives of Moreno confirmed that since 2019 Gloria Isabel had been receiving death threats for leading the voluntary manual eradication program of illicit crops in her village. From the information provided, so far this year, 5 people have been murdered in this department in different events: two in La Hormiga, two in Puerto Guzmán, and one in Mocoa. According to the Putumayo Human Rights Network, 17 community leaders have received death threats from illegal armed groups operating in this region. Gloria’s role in crop substitution programs also situates her case in the pattern of leaders being killed for their promotion of such transitions for rural communities from illicit to legal crop cultivation. These programs were a significant aspect of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas, but in the four years following the agreement, 75 such leaders were murdered throughout various parts of Colombia (El Espectador). It is alarming all the situations and problems that social leaders have to go through. This should bring concern to the government and other social organizations, to help families and villages that have to carry on with this weight. There should be more awareness and caring about the lives that have been taken. The victims are not just the lives of countless social leaders, but the broken families and rudderless communities they leave behind.

All of the cases presented have explained the way of living and the difficulties that social and environmental leaders must cope with in their territories. Although some of them only receive threats and constant interruptions in their work, others have paid with their lives. Colombians are strong believers that they would do anything to defend their territories. The love of defending and accomplishing tasks fulfills these types of persons as they have delivered and worked their entire lives for the common good of their population. For this reason, although many of them are exposed and have to move to other places, defending and creating awareness is the most important thing for them. It is also vital to note the valuable work that so many environmental defenders conduct in the protection of Colombia’s biodiversity. By extension, their work is in defense of Colombia, and what makes the country so unique. Making sure that these leaders are free to carry out their invaluable work free from threats and violence should be a matter of urgency for all of us.

References:

Asesinan una líder social que promovía sustitución de cultivos en Putumayo. P. (2020, 7 enero) Noticias de Norte de Santander, Colombia y el mundo. https://www.laopinion.com.co/colombia/asesinan-una-lider-social-que-promovia-sustitucion-de-cultivos-en-putumayo

El doloroso llanto del Nevado. (2020, 24 marzo). openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/es/el-doloroso-llanto-del-nevado/

El peso del estigma: la amenaza contra los líderes ambientales del. (2017). Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano. https://www.utadeo.edu.co/es/articulo/crossmedialab/277626/el-peso-del-estigma-la-amenaza-contra-los-lideres-ambientales-del-meta-marlen-arevalo

Latam, M. (2021, 9 abril). La historia del ‘guardián del loro orejiamarillo’ asesinado en Colombia. El Comercio Perú. https://elcomercio.pe/tecnologia/ecologia/la-historia-del-guardian-del-loro-orejiamarillo-asesinado-en-colombia-noticia/?ref=ecr

«Si defender el territorio y el agua es ser terrorista, somos terroristas». (2018). Rutas del conflicto. https://www.rutasdelconflicto.com/especiales/LideresAmbientalesDelMetaEnAmenaza/LuisGuevara/Estigmatizacion.html

https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/entre-2016-y-2020-75-lideres-de-sustitucion-de-coca-fueron-asesinados-article/

The current plight of the Embera community in Bogotá.

Originally published: Aug 10, 2022

5 min read

Members of the Embera community at their camps on the streets of Bogotá.

Article researched and written by Danna Arrieta, Melanie Boyano & Natalia Vargas

The Emberas are an indigenous group from Colombia that live in different parts of the country. They are divided into Embera Chamí, which means “the mountain people”, and who live in the Risaralda department; Embera Katío, which means “the river people” and who live in Antioquia; Embera Epera in the Nariño and Cauca departments; and Embera Cholo in the pacific coast. Because of the armed conflict that Colombia has gone through, the Embera Katío community has been displaced from their ancestral lands and forced to move. Since 2018, a large group of displaced Embera Katío has been present in the capital city, Bogotá. In Bogotá, their life has changed completely; they are now living in improvised shelters and changing their diet and way of living completely, waiting for the moment that the government will tell them that they can finally go back to their land.

Since their arrival in Bogotá, this indigenous group has suffered numerous misfortunes, the most recent being the death of an Embera woman and her child in January 2022, run over by a truck on the Bogotá-Funza highway. This also led to the unfortunate death of the truck driver who was attacked by an incensed crowd following the incident. In time, if nothing changes, the Embera risk losing their traditions and customs, which is especially dangerous for the new generations that are being born in the big city.

Members of the Embera indigenous communities were forced to flee their territories due to the risks posed by the ongoing conflict in Colombia. Despite the 2016 peace agreement which led to the demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, many regions continue to be war-torn due to the presence of other illegal armed actors. The forced recruitment by illegal groups has displaced Emberas from their homes in the mountainous regions of western Colombia. As displaced people, some 370 indigenous people from Embera communities arrived in Bogotá asking President Iván Duque for help. According to their leaders, the government promised to help them pay rent for houses for their families. But so far, the promise has not been kept. Consequently, they felt forced to occupy a park near the presidential palace, in precarious tents, and exposed to contracting Covid-19 throughout the initial wave of the pandemic (Jaramillo, 2020).

The Emberas have been living in tents exposed to the sun and the rain; their women cooking on makeshift fires and their children playing half-naked in the Tercer Milenio Park have become part of the Bogotá scenery. Their situation is dramatic, yet there is no solution in sight because the lack of government assistance only seems to worsen (Doria, 2020). Humberto Arce, the Embera Katio authority who traveled from Pueblo Rico to Bogotá to negotiate with the government, told La Silla Vacía that they asked that while the government designs a return plan to Risaralda (the department where there lands are located) with decent housing and productive projects for them, the government must guarantee them decent housing and food (Doria, 2020). However, given the grave situation in their territories, the possibilities for returning home seem remote for now.

The home of the Embera Katio en Risaralda has long been affected by the violence of the Colombian armed conflict. When the FARC handed over their weapons as part of the 2016 peace deal, there was cautious hope that the situation would change for the better. However, like other parts of the country, the FARC withdrawal left a power vacuum in a region with a poor record of effective state presence. Like other parts of the country, this power vacuum has seen rival illegal groups establish a presence with the objective of establishing control, in this case the ELN guerrillas and the Clan del Golfo, a neo-paramilitary organization which grew out of the demobilization of the AUC paramilitary group in 2006. In Alto Andágueda, Chocó, and Pueblo Rico, Risaralda the confrontation between the ELN and the Clan del Golfo has worsened in recent years. The latter are fighting over drug trafficking routes and territories for illegal mining. The Colombian army is also there to fight them both. Indigenous people—and indigenous land—remain at the center of this war (Doria, 2020). This means that they have been forcibly displaced from their territories to avoid the violence, as well as fleeing to avoid their children being forcibly recruited by the illegal armies. Until the situation regarding security in the region is improved, there seems little hope the Embera communities can return home, meaning the issue of how to best support them in Bogotá should be of the utmost importance.

It is important to note that resources have been made available to the community in Bogotá. The local government has allocated 770 million pesos for the 260 Embera families in the city since the pandemic began. With this money they have paid for shelters, rent subsidies, and food. The national government, for its part, has given them 200 subsidies, though not all members of the community are satisfied with the government hand-outs: “120 have accepted the aid from the district and, although it is not enough, they have been able to cope with the situation. These other 140 do not want to, even though they have all received aid from the government,” Camilo Acero, undersecretary of government, told La Silla Vacia. What these indigenous communities want is a resolution which would allow them to return to their homes, and it is this issue which has motivated their protests within the city. Several indigenous people from the Tercer Milenio park told La Silla Vacia that they had already participated in other occupations in the same park in previous years. At that time, they managed to return to their territories, but they had returned to Bogotá because the confrontation in their territories has not ended and because the national governments of Santos and Duque did not comply with what they had promised. The district indicated that they would continue to work to comply with the legal ruling “with the leadership of the national institutions, and thus initiate the voluntary process (…) so that they can return to their territories with guarantees.” Whoever wishes to stay in Bogotá, the Government Secretariat indicated that they would continue to insist on relocation (Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización?, 2022). Leonival Campos, elder authority of the Emberá Katío, pointed out that the intention of the members of his community is to stay in the city rather than return to the existent danger of their territories: “We are waiting for a place with adequate conditions to move. (…) We do not want to go to a coliseum and even less to another place that does not have the necessary guarantees”, he said (Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización?, 2022).

To conclude, the current situation of Embera groups leaves them in an unprotected position, due to different factors such as the government’s negligence in complying with the agreements, or the constant threats they experience from armed groups. These groups should be established in their ancestral lands and their rights (compiled in the Indigenous Rights Declaration) must be respected and protected by the government at all costs. The creation of more direct spaces for dialogue between the Embera communities and the government could be an effective measure to reduce the negative effects of the problem. In this way, it is also necessary that in addition to just being heard, the Embera indigenous people have available to them more mechanisms for direct participation in decision-making on issues that actively affect their communities. The Embera risk losing their traditions and customs given that new generations are being born and raised far from their territories.

References

Doria, P. (2020). LOS EMBERA EN EL TERCER MILENIO, UN DRAMA CIRCULAR Y SIN FIN. La Silla Vacía .

Jaramillo, A. S. (2020). Los indígenas embera desplazados por la violencia y a la deriva en Bogotá. FRANCE24.

¿Qué viene para los emberá luego de la caracterización? (2022). EL TIEMPO.

Bohórquez, Edwin (2021). ¿Qué ha sucedido con los indígenas de la comunidad embera en Bogotá?. EL ESPECTADOR.

Social leaders still paying the highest price for state absence in the south of Bolívar.

Originally published: Nov 23, 2022

8 min read

Updated: Jun 23, 2023

Slain social leaders Erminson Rivera, Martin Bayona, Jose Obdulio Sanchez & Eduardo Vanegas

Article written by Leslye Amador, Alejandra Barrios & Estefania Venegas

The armed conflict has not only killed people, but also the hopes and dreams of entire communities throughout Colombia. This is the case of many municipalities located in the south of Bolívar, where violence perpetuated by illegal actors has been a constant struggle. According to Indepaz (2021), the groups that have the strongest presence in the zone are Frente 37 of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) dissidents, the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) and the AGC (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia). Even though the Peace Agreement has tried to mitigate the effects of the conflict and bring closure to the victims, during recent years there has been an increase in threats to social leaders (people who advocate for social causes on a regional or local level) in these vulnerable areas, with threats and violence mainly perpetrated by the groups previously mentioned. The legacy of the conflict dynamics that first emerged during the 1990s during the paramilitary occupation continue to affect the communities living in the south of Bolívar. The dispute over power between paramilitary, guerrillas and state forces have provoked a clash that has turned the south of Bolívar into a battlefield. According to Rutas del conflicto (n. d.), the issue in some of these municipalities is not state abandonment, since public force is mostly present. The problem is that the strategies by which they are supposed to protect citizens and their properties are not effective, especially because much land and resources are concentrated in the hands of armed actors. Despite the implementation of the PDETs, a government program created as part of the peace agreement to promote the social and economic development of the areas that have been most affected by the armed conflict, violence remains an everyday feature. Among those targeted are social leaders, who have been systematically attacked by armed actors for standing in the way of their interests. This text will explore the cases of three social leaders who were victims of this situation.

As mentioned by Indepaz (2021), from the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016 until March 2022, 1327 people who exercised social leadership or human rights defense have been murdered in Colombia. Among the areas that have been most affected by this, there is the south of Bolívar. According to Verdad Abierta (2016), during the 1950s, some municipalities were taken over by antioqueños, cesarenses and santandereanos (people who come from the departments of Antioquia, Cesar and Santander, respectively), attracted by the booming business of timber harvesting. Their closeness to the río Magdalena and the Serranía of San Lucas also caught the attention of illegal groups dedicated to the cultivation of coca, the commercialization of cocaine, and gold exploitation. The FARC guerrillas entered the territory in 1983, followed by the AUC paramilitaries in 1998. According to the Comisión de la Verdad, these groups brought an extractive business model to these territories supported by the cultivation of illicit crops and illegal mining, causing forced displacement and land grabbing. Many of these issues are still to be resolved, and this is why the role of social leaders and activists is so important in these regions.

This situation was not a primary concern for the government during the last decades of the 20th century, so these illegal practices have continued to have a presence in municipal towns such as Morales, located in the south of Bolívar. Among those who fought for a better future for their communities, there was Martín Bayona, the president of the Junta de Acción Comunal of La Cuchilla, a vereda, or small rural community, in Morales. According to the Alcaldía de Barranquilla, the Juntas de Acción Comunal are civic, social and community organizations that aim to achieve integral and sustainable development through participatory democracy. In this sense, Martín’s activities were essential for the development of his community. He was also involved in the local institute of sports and recreation. Additionally, he was a member of the PDET implemented in the area. As stated before, the PDETs (Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus) are a planning and management instrument that is intended to stabilize and transform the areas that were most affected by violence, poverty, illicit economies, and weak institutions. Nevertheless, they have not been fully implemented and that is why these problems continue to affect territories like Morales. Unfortunately, Martín’s initiative to promote La Cuchilla’s development was brutally ended on September 22nd, 2021, when unidentified armed men arrived at his farm and shot him twice. The few clues indicate that they were probably acting on behalf of the ELN or the Frente 37 of the FARC dissidents, which are the groups who have the most presence in La Cuchilla. What happened to Martín is one example of the failure of the strategies that the government has attempted to stop the violence. As stated before, extreme militarization of these peripheral areas is not enough, since the role of public forces must be accompanied by the improvement of infrastructure, education, and mitigation of poverty, which could be achieved by guaranteeing the full establishment of PDETs, along with other strategies. One of the inhabitants of Morales perfectly summarizes the situation: “Here the only State investment has been to the military. And not only weapons produce war, but also poverty and abandonment” (Verdad Abierta, 2016). Sadly, Martin Bayona has not been the only victim of armed groups in the war-torn municipalities of Bolívar.

In that sense, the following cases also show the complexity and variety of actors which intervene in the social dynamics of the region. To have a better understanding of the situation in the south of Bolivar, Pueblito Mejia is a key point for our analysis. It is a corregimiento (a rural community larger than a vereda, but not large enough to classify as a municipality) that is located in the surroundings of Barranco Loba and was once the home of Eduardo Vanegas, one of the social leaders that we will focus on. According to El Tiempo (2010), the presence of illegal groups goes back to the late ’90s. In that sense, the “paras” (paramilitary groups) arrived at the territory and recruited around 1,500 civilians from the zone to work exploiting gold mines. This developed as the main funding source of these groups, with these groups consequently establishing a regime of terror in which nobody dared to seek assistance from the government. The miners were extorted by illegal groups in order to secure the area’s control. In recent years, the situation has not gotten any better because in 2021 the alarms of fear, violence and uncertainty rang once more. Because of that, the mayor of Barranco Loba made a public statement calling out for help from local and national authorities demanding that there must be permanent security in the territory for the sake of its inhabitants. According to the Human Rights Council (2021) the “OHCHR observed an increase in the number of massacres and human rights violations against human rights defenders, primarily in municipalities with high levels of multidimensional poverty, where illicit economies that fuel endemic violence flourish.”. In the case of Pueblito Mejia, there were multiple actors that benefited from illegal mining who were interested in the area especially because of the easy access to coca plantations and gold mines.

On that account, Eduardo Vanegas was truly a light of hope for his community until his projects were terminated by gunshots. He was president of the Junta de Acción Comunal Minera of Pueblito Mejía. Also, he stood out as head of the Desarrollo Comunitario Municipal (Municipal Community Development) and had interests in developing a mining-business project, in the so-called ‘Mina La Gloria’, in his corregimiento, which due to the active presence of armed groups was declared by the State as a Special Reserve Area in 2012. Before his death, he had filed a complaint regarding threats received to the Ombudsman’s Office, however, they did not pay attention to it. After his passing, the institutional body issued an alert for the municipalities of Altos de Rosario, Barrancos de Loba, Norosí and Tiquisio in Bolívar, due to the constant instigations of irregular armed groups against members of the Juntas de Acción Comunal, mining organizations, and victims of the armed conflict. Eduardo was not only a social leader, but had also been a victim of the armed conflict. Hence, he knew plenty about the interests of the groups who had an active presence in the zone. Unfortunately, he was murdered on March 5th, 2022, and it remains uncertain as to who pulled the trigger. As with all acts of violence towards social leaders, the consequences of his murder are extensive; silencing not only his voice but that of the population he represented.

Taking into consideration the reports by Indepaz in 2021, the prospect for 2022 is not very hopeful either. According to the organization, in the first quarter of 2022, 60 social leaders and human rights defenders were assassinated throughout Colombia. In addition to those already mentioned (Martin Bayona and Eduardo Vanegas), the case of Erminson Rivera Henao stands out: he was the president of the Junta de Acción Communal in La Esperanza, a rural area of the municipality of Cantagallo. As previously stated, the growing activity of armed groups in the south of Bolívar and the lack of effective state presence in that territory has led to a situation where social leaders are risking their lives when carrying out their work. A relevant example of this is Rivera, who was taken from his home in the early hours of a Monday morning and later, was killed near the area, along with José Obdulio Sánchez, his brother in law and another social leader who supported him and his work. They were both killed on April 25th. In fact, according to the early warning 25/20 of the Ombudsman’s Office in the south of Bolívar, there are atomized groups that are difficult to categorize and confront because of the alliances that are constantly made, so it is arduous to recognize if they were both killed by one specific armed group. In relation to this, the mayor of Cantagallo stated: “That sector of the rural area is going to be reinforced with Army troops. It is a site of difficult access”, which explains the current role of the government and how it only focuses on short-term measures that do not solve the problem itself. This shows how the solutions to the conflict proposed by the government have been focused on sending more military troops, but they do not tackle the structural social factors which contribute to it. This means that the armed conflict is not over; there is still a latent, and very real, threat against social leaders and human rights defenders.

To conclude, there are multiple factors which have deepened the crisis amongst the population living in these vulnerable areas. Thus, it demands even more attention to our social leaders’ causes, given the fact that they have been disproportionally affected for many years. We suggest that the population stops normalizing violence as we have done for many decades. In order to find a solution and bring total peace to every territory, it is mandatory to spread awareness and demand that the government guarantees human rights, justice and reparation to the victims. For our country to achieve this, the state presence must be aimed at bringing the rule of law to the entirety of the territory, and to guarantee justice and equality for every citizen. Reiterating what has been said before, the conflict is not a military matter alone, so the approach should not be purely related to the use of force. Hence, the importance of broadening the government’s institutional offer in the peripheries, providing communities with access to political participation, and quality education, among other urgent needs. The strategies must not be reactive, but preventive. Only in this way will the systemic violence faced by social leaders who stand up for their people be addressed correctly.

Sources used:

https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/lider-social-asesinado-en-bolivar-luchaba-por-legalizacion-de-mineros-656722

https://www.radionacional.co/regiones/bolivar/asesinato-lideres-sociales-nuevo-caso-barranco-de-loba

https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4077670

https://www.eluniversal.com.co/sucesos/grupo-armado-incursiona-en-pueblito-mejia-un-muerto-en-sur-de-bolivar-ca4727411

https://www.eluniversal.com.co/sucesos/condenan-asesinato-de-lider-social-martin-bayona-en-el-sur-de-bolivar-JF5474281

https://rutasdelconflicto.com/especiales/conflicto-continua/sur-bolivar/postacuerdo.html

https://www.comisiondelaverdad.co/impactos-afrontamientos-y-resistencias/una-red-que-nos-sostiene

https://www.barranquilla.gov.co/participacion-ciudadana/juntas-de-accion-comunal

Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia#c278b9

IF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES ARE THE KEY, WHY DON’T WE LISTEN TO THEM?

Originally published: Aug 8, 2022

8 min read

Members if the Wiwa indigenous community. Inset: the black line of the Sierra Nevada

Article researched and written by Angeline Daino, Ronald Rocchi & Leidy Tirado.

Our planet is suffering. Nature and the world that saw us grow are being destroyed by ourselves, the so-called children of nature. Each year we see how our actions result in drastic climate changes, which have already had observable impacts on the environment in terms of extreme weather patterns, and threaten much worse such as the loss of sea ice, rapid sea-level rise, and heatwaves. Ecosystems and species have also been affected in many ways, for example, warming has forced many species to migrate from their homes or the mixture of fresh and saltwater has negatively shaped the food chain. However, there is, perhaps not a solution, but a much more beneficial and productive perspective in which this situation can be addressed; the indigenous perspective.

We know that indigenous communities are intwined with their culture, more specifically to the environment. Their relationship with nature, which they name as mother earth, is maternal, as children who serve and care for their mother. Their deity if you like. Based on the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Indigenous people have strong links to their territories, and they tend to live surrounded by natural resources, and ecosystems. They all have a strong connection to the place where they are living, and this is beautiful and special because they were the first people in these lands. It is therefore so sad that they are not as valued as they should be, especially when their knowledge could be of vital use to all of us. Every part of our planet is sacred to them, so they treat and protect it as such. The way indigenous people see the world could be the key to combating climate change. Learning from them and allowing them to have a voice within this context would be the beginning of a different path, and probably a more successful one.

Now, focusing specifically on Colombia, it can be said that it is a territory full of biodiversity. Indigenous communities live throughout Colombia, but the biggest indigenous populations are found in the departments of La Guajira, Cauca, and Nariño, and in those areas, there is so much diversity and different kinds of biomes. Colombia, like the rest of the world, faces a lot of challenges that involve the environment, including for example deforestation and emissions of greenhouse gases, and although we all are affected by these problems, the indigenous communities are even more affected because their way of living revolves around the environment. Indigenous peoples are the key; they play a fundamental role in the fight against climate change, but they are not being heard. In Colombia, the government does not offer these communities the rights, protections, or guarantees necessary to safely carry out their work as environmental defenders. They are being killed at the most extreme end or simply being ignored. It is time to change this. It is time to give them a voice. Furthermore, it is time to make the government listen to our indigenous brothers and sisters, and it is time to care more.

The situation for indigenous communities has been mixed in recent times. In Colombia, during the past years, the government has created strategies where the indigenous people are involved, in order to contribute and respect their culture and their territory. This is pertinent because according to a 2017 report by Minambiente and Ideam (Institute for hydrology, meteorology, and environmental studies), 53.4% of Colombia’s natural forests are in ethnic territories; of this figure, 46% is found in indigenous reservations and 7.3% in collective territories of Afro-Colombian communities. That’s why indigenous groups are so important and need to be cared for by the government. In some respects, as mentioned above, this is happening and this sounds promising, but in Colombia, it is more difficult than it seems because the authorities and the state do not always have territorial control over those territories and do not, therefore, help indigenous people a great deal in the protection of their lands and rights. And in fact, indigenous people face a lot of threats to their rights. The rights they have to their culture, their lives, and their way of life, are threatened because they want to protect the environment.

The dangers faced by indigenous communities in Colombia are both historic and current. The numbers show that the armed conflict left 5011 indigenous victims between 1958 and 2019. 2300 people were murdered throughout selective murders, 736 of whom were indigenous leaders and authorities. Also, there were 659 enforced disappearances and 742 massacres. The violence increased in 2002 due to the breaking of “Diálogos de Paz” (failed peace talks with the FARC guerrilla) in El Caguan and decreased in 2012 with the beginning of the Havana peace talks which led to the successful demobilization of the FARC (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica). However, since the FARC guerrillas handed over their weapons and vacated regions which had long been under their control, the security situation for indigenous communities has worsened. Indepaz reported that 269 indigenous leaders were killed from 2016 until June 2020, many of them being killed for objecting to the presence of illicit economies or the private interests of international companies in their territory. Indigenous communities have long been persecuted by guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, unknown armed groups, and agents of the State. Indigenous communities have their base on the land, and for them, their territory represents the beginning of life. Therefore, their territory is not just a piece of land, but the axis of their culture. Taking their home away is taking their culture away. In this respect, indigenous communities have participated in different movements protesting for their rights. A recent example of that was the national strike which began on April 28, 2021, against the tax and health reform. In accordance with Global Voices, indigenous communities, in addition to the previously mentioned issues, protested against the use of glyphosate, a substance that the current government favors for the eradication of illicit crops and one that has potentially hazardous effects on public health and the environment. Indigenous communities have established unarmed indigenous guards, some of their members, in order to protect the community due to the lack of state assistance, or even the empathy of many Colombians. The challenges and dangers they face are staggering, but so is the potential of their knowledge and experience.

As mentioned above, indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities occupy much of the areas that harbor Colombia’s precious biodiversity. According to IWGIA (A International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), almost a third of the national territory is categorized as indigenous reserves, and most of them have to face serious environmental conflicts and land grabbing due to extractive activities in the zone as was previously mentioned. To highlight this situation, it is useful to explore the case of the Wiwa, an indigenous community that lives in Colombia’s Sierra Nevada Mountain range where there are two national parks, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Tayrona National Park. This area is the home to four different indigenous communities.

This territory has been historically affected by different problems such as colonization, illicit crop plantations (marijuana and coca), and encroaching farmland. These issues, which remain pertinent in many ways, have affected a lot of the Wiwa community because they considered these places sacred, and they decided to move from there due to the presence of dangerous actors involved. In an article by Mongabay (2016), Edinson Videl Daza, a member of the Wiwa community and a spokesman for the environment mentioned that as they are part of, and live in, the Sierra, they have the responsibility for conservation and maintaining the equilibrium between man and nature as the interlocutors. They see the earth as their mother. Their father, the sea. The rivers and streams are living beings. The animals are their younger brothers. All of this illustrates how deep their connection with nature is and how they feel they must do everything they can to protect it.

The Wiwa work with NGOs in the fight against pollution because these organizations know that the indigenous communities are the right people for this task. They don’t see the land they live on as a simple territory; they think it is home and the place they must protect because it gives them everything. Eduardo Ariza, from the American NGO The Nature Conservancy (TNC) explains: “The indigenous communities have a vision, all their culture is about conservation. The strategy is to recover their traditional territory, which they believe is marked by the ‘black line’ [an invisible line that marks the outer reaches of the Sierra where there are sacred areas important to the communities]. While it’s not feasible that they will recover all this territory, they are moving in that direction, with the support of certain government offices and other NGOs.” This “black line” has been violated for years by different groups that believe they can appropriate the indigenous territories because they are considered “stronger”; groups such as (now defunct) AUC paramilitaries, the (now defunct) FARC, the ELN and various other structures which emerged following the break-up of the AUC.

These groups not only lead to the displacement of communities, but they also kill and spread terror, so we can see how this has caused a massive violation of indigenous rights. But these criminal groups are not the only interests that threaten the community. Large enterprises which want to exploit natural resources in these zones tend to see the interests of the indigenous communities as an obstacle to their own interests, which are often shared by politicians at the local and national level in terms of establishing profit-making as being pre-eminent over the interests of local communities and the defense of nature. These contrasting views have led to some drastic actions on behalf of these multinational companies and drastic consequences for local and indigenous communities. For example, the US coal company Drummond has been accused of funding right-wing paramilitaries during the 90s, groups which were responsible for fierce violence and the forced displacement of many rural communities at that time. In the nearby department of La Guajira, home to Colombia’s most populous indigenous group, the Wayúu, the Swiss-based coal multinational Cerrejón has been accused of diverting water sources and causing the displacement of many communities.

In the end, we must acknowledge the stark difference between indigenous people and the global economic order in terms of how to understand the world in which we live. Indigenous people have the role of guardians of nature, and they believe so deeply that all of their needs as a community are ruled by the belief that the health of their environment, be it the Sierra Nevada, or anywhere else, affects the whole world. Whereas too many of us see nature as something we are going to have benefits from if we exploit it, and we don’t see the limits of our actions.

So how about if we start to become more conscious of the fact that the place in which we are living is not ours, and we cannot do what we want. We must care and care a lot because Colombia is beautiful, but all the resources we have are not there forever. How different would Colombia be if we started to care more?

References

Aristizabal, D. (2021, June 15). Indigenous Peoples in Isolation in Colombia: A recent history of the challenges involved in their protection – Amazon Conservation Team. Amazon Conservation Team. https://www.amazonteam.org/indigenous-peoples-in-isolation-or-a-natural-state-in-colombia-a-recent-history-of-the-challenges-involved-in-their-protection/

Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad (2021). If Indigenous People Are Key to Combating Climate Change, Why Doesn’t Colombia Listen to Them? |.. https://www.ambienteysociedad.org.co/if-indigenous-people-are-key-to-combating-climate-change-why-doesnt-colombia-listen-to-them/

C. (2021, 27 julio). Pueblos indígenas, víctimas de violencias de larga duración. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. https://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/pueblos-indigenas-victimas-de-violencias-de-larga-duracion/

Colombia – IWGIA – International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs – Results from #6. (2021, February 11). Iwgia.org. https://www.iwgia.org/en/colombia.html?start=6

Con tradición, cultura y conocimiento, los pueblos indígenas aportan al medio ambiente – Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. (2021, August 9). Ministerio de Ambiente Y Desarrollo Sostenible. https://www.minambiente.gov.co/bosques-biodiversidad-y-servicios-ecosistemicos/con-tradicion-cultura-y-conocimiento-los-pueblos-indigenas-aportan-al-medio-ambiente/}

Dejusticia. (2017, April 11). Historic attacks on the Wiwa indigenous people. Dejusticia. https://www.dejusticia.org/en/column/historic-attacks-to-the-wiwa-indigenous-people/

Fernanda Sánchez Jaramillo, J. (2021, 14 mayo). Indigenous peoples join the national struggle in Colombia’s strike. Global Voices. https://globalvoices.org/2021/05/14/indigenous-peoples-join-the-national-struggle-in-colombias-strike/

Indigenous communities take the lead on conservation in Colombia. (2016, September 30). Mongabay Environmental News. https://news.mongabay.com/2016/09/indigenous-communities-take-the-lead-on-conservation-in-colombia/

La libertad sublime 2018. (2021, May 11). Colombia and its debt with the protectors of nature. La Libertad Sublime; La Libertad Sublime. https://lalibertadsublime.home.blog/2021/05/11/colombia-and-its-debt-with-the-protectors-of-nature/

Leonardo González. (2020, junio). Líderes indígenas asesinados. Indepaz. http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/L%C3%ADderes-ind%C3%ADgenas-asesinados.pdf

Llewellyn, R. (2017, 11 diciembre). An Inside Look at Colombia’s Indigenous Guards. Intercontinental Cry. https://intercontinentalcry.org/inside-look-colombias-indigenous-guards/

The Invaluable Role of Indigenous Peoples. (2020). Wwf.org.co. https://www.wwf.org.co/?365599/The-Invaluable-Role-of-Indigenous-Peoples

Thomson Reuters Foundation. (2022). How indigenous culture protects Colombia’s rainforest. News.trust.org. https://news.trust.org/item/20220203143018-7txrh/

UNEP. (2020). Indigenous peoples and the nature they protect. UNEP. https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/indigenous-peoples-and-nature-they-protect

UNEP. (2021). How indigenous knowledge can help prevent environmental crises. UNEP. https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/how-indigenous-knowledge-can-help-prevent-environmental-crises

Children, Education, and Conflict in Colombia.

Originally published: Sep 9, 2022

9 min read

As in war zones throughout the world, children have been disproportionately affected by the conflict in Colombia.

Article researched and written by Marieth Arzuza & Valentina San Juan.

No one can deny that Colombia’s long-running armed conflict is the primary source of human rights violations in the country. Indeed, it has been more than 40 years in which the Colombian civil population has dealt with the consequences of its broken social fabric. Such an armed conflict has condemned a country to economic, political and social underdevelopment. A scenario in which the opportunities of more than 13 generations of Colombians have been frustrated by the war. However, such underdevelopment cannot be generalized, but the impact on the most vulnerable population communities in the country should be emphasized: rural areas and children. Although the reconstruction of the social fabric began through different projects following the 2016 Peace Agreement between the FARC and the Santos government, rural communities continue to face a longstanding form of violence: state abandonment. Furthermore, according to Wald (2014):

“The armed conflict, for the most part, has been of a rural nature; and, secondly, rural education has been a subject that has been very much neglected by education research and needs to be thought about even more when we see that today rural areas themselves continue to experience new forms of conflict, what some have called the new conflictivities.”

The importance of these new conflictivities falls not only on current generations of Colombians, but also on future ones. This, in the long term, condemns society to the same vicious circles of violence in the country. According to Wald (2014), “rural education has been abandoned by the State, the policies it has put in place for rural education have remained in words because the type of rurality of the country is unknown”. In this sense, it is easy to imagine the consequences of State abandonment in the territories. However, it is “difficult to imagine the impact that the game of war has had on the children and adolescents who participate in it” (Chávez, Falla and Romero, 2008). It is for this reason that this article discusses the importance of recognizing rural education as a necessary tool to end the cycles of violence in areas of armed conflict in Colombia. The text wants to demonstrate that rural education is such an important tool since it takes away from the hands of violent groups, many boys, and girls who may otherwise grow up with the logic of violence in their social, family, and even school environments.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this article, the dynamics of war within the same territory have the particularity of affecting all the social spheres of a state, trampling over endless human rights. In Colombia, “education has been subjected to the logic of armed conflict, putting the lives of students and teachers in danger” (Jaramillo, 2012).

This can be evidenced in that, in Colombia, the Observatory of Memory and Conflict of the CNMH reported that between 1958 and 2018 throughout the country, 1,579 teachers have been direct victims of the armed conflict, and 1,063 (67.3%) have suffered selective assassinations. Furthermore, 201 (12.7%) teachers suffered kidnappings, and 200 (12.6%), disappearances (Martinez, 2022).

The right to education of thousands of Colombian children and young people is being impeded by the violent acts perpetrated by irregular armed actors and their clashes with state forces. Besides, as Jaramillo (2012) states, “in the seven departments where the law and order situation is most critical, 66 per cent of young people do not have access to secondary education”. More specifically, “in the municipality of Uribe (Meta), for example, the coverage rate in basic secondary education is 2%; in Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá) it is 14%, and in Puerto Asís (Putumayo) it is less than 6%” (Min Educación, n.d). Clearly, as the figures reflect, the absence of state control in the different Colombian rural territories has frustrated the possibility of studying for thousands of children and young people. This lack of opportunities is a contributing factor in the recruitment of young people by armed groups who step into the power vacuum in these isolated and long marginalized rural areas.

Moreover, the most serious aspect of this phenomenon is the consequences of a child not being able to access basic education. Perhaps one of the most serious issues that this article is seeking to address is the linking of these children to the armed groups in their territories. According to Romero & Chávez (2008), three forms of recruitment can be seen: voluntary, forced and by birth. According to the Procuraduría General de la Nación and the ICBF: “The concept of “voluntaries” in recruitment must always and in all cases be understood as the combination of external factors that force children and adolescents to make decisions that principle are vitiated (PGN and ICBF, 2004).”

Indeed, this type of voluntary connection is facilitated mainly by personal reasons, which, although they are not the direct responsibility of the State, the context of the political, social and economic system in which children and adolescents live has strongly motivated them to join an armed group. Within this situation enters the will to change their financial situation (escape poverty), the ideological alignments with the armed groups, or even the search for revenge (Romero & Chávez, 2008).

The second type of recruitment is forced recruitment. There are children and young people who participate in the hostilities of the conflict due to physical and psychological coercion. Some were handed over by their mother or father against their will, and felt pressured and threatened by one or another armed group. Others joined because in some parts of the country each family had to provide a member of the armed group in the area of influence. One such case is the story of Sebastian. He was five years old and one day the armed actors told him he could not go back home. They took him to the jungle, where they gathered him with other children and taught them not to feel pain, not to feel emotions, not to play. The guns were not plastic, on the contrary, since he was a child he used real bullets (Semana, 2021). According to a special report by Semana (2021), war does not recognize gender. Girls are also recruited, but in this case the situation can be worse, as they are not only used for war, but also they are sometimes victims of sexual crimes. Maria was not taken to the jungle by force, nor was she taken from her parents. She was used as a bargaining chip. She was 14 years old, had left home at the age of 12 and was working with a merchant, a clothing salesman. Not only that, but she helped him with his work, but seeing as he did not have enough money to take care of her welfare, he handed her over to the guerrilla. These types of cases demonstrate the lack of opportunities that young people face throughout many parts of Colombia.

And finally, there is recruitment from birth: There are boys and girls who were literally born into the guerrilla as children of combatants. They are minors who do not know another way of life and are considered property of it (Romero & Chávez, 2008). Indeed, children born in guerrilla camps did not know any other reality than war in all spheres of their lives. This not only condemned them to the violation of their human rights from birth, but even some of these children were the product of the violation of their mothers’ human rights, that is, through sexual violence. As a consequence of this cruel reality where the war took freedom and childhoods from thousands of Colombian children, today we have a broken social fabric full of adults marked from childhood by the ravages of the armed conflict. Affecting them not only socially, politically and economically, but also psychologically.

According to Jaramillo (2012), the Human Development Report produced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimated that in the year 2000 there were approximately 6,000 children associated with armed groups in Colombia. And despite the fact that this figure has been reduced over the years, and even more after the signing of the 2016 Peace Agreement, this does not indicate for any reason that this problem is close to being resolved or that the State itself is making an effort to solve it. This can be evidenced by the complaint filed by former councillor Hollman Morris that four minors were allegedly killed in an army operation against dissidents members of the FARC guerrillas, and this sparked controversy over bombardments on camps that housed under-age recruits., several of whom were killed in the attack. However, the defense secretary mentioned that they were “young people recruited and turned into war machines” , as such removing them from their role as victims and justifying that they had to be sacrificed as well (El Espectador, 2021). Such acts and comments give an impression that just because these young people were in the ranks of the dissident group, as seen above, often through little choice of their own, they automatically forfeit their rights as Colombians. In addition, there is the curse that these victims will carry for life, even after they have been released from these armed groups. According to Sánchez et al. (2021), the children who survived the armed conflict in Colombia’s Atlantic Department suffer from a variety of mental health issues, including emotional and behavioral issues. Furthermore, contextual factors such as family functioning and perceived social support were linked to these issues. These types of mental health challenges are an important public health issue since they not only affect the life of the child in the short and long term, but also that of their family and community. As peace studies indicate, war can leave an emotional footprint on children that persists throughout their lives, with indirect effects on subsequent generations (Chapple et al., 2005; Fremont, 2004; Kadir et al., 2019).

Furthermore, many of these victims continue to be persecuted even after leaving these armed groups, leading to their deaths. According to La Vanguardia (2021) since the signing of the peace agreement in September 2016, almost 250 ex-combatants have been killed. Many of these victims were participants in programs like the Havana agreement, where they complete reintegration, social work or rural productive projects for these victims. “We are lamenting, crying and demanding answers for the death of our comrades,” said Tulio Murillo Ávila, one of the FARC reinsertion leaders in Meta. One such example is the case of Albeiro, who was killed on a small cocoa plantation he was managing with other ex-combatants. The killer was a member of a FARC splinter group that had refused to lay down its arms. These testimonies show that these victims have not really been freed from their chains of pain and persecution (La Vanguardia, 2021).

In conclusion, we know that state abandonment results in a vicious circle of political rural violence, marginalizing the same territories which have historically been impacted by the conflict. Similarly, among the new conflictivities provided by armed violence are the lack of political, economic and social opportunities. Nevertheless, if there are ways of tackling the lack of development opportunities, supporting a competent educational system that can deal with the dynamics of violence in the territories is one of them. Above all, the creation an educational system that can prevent militancy, whether voluntary, forced or by birth, of thousands of Colombian children. Finally, it is clear that the establishment of a Peace Agreement with the rest of the Colombian armed groups is key to intervening with public policies that transform these marginalized territories. However, peace should never be understood as the absence of a conflict, but rather a process involving political will which must go hand in hand with projects that eradicate the violent dynamics of these communities and the country in general. In this sense, the strengthening of the educational system in rural areas, in addition to being a way to build peace and reduce the levels of violence, inequality and marginalization, represents the effective fulfillment of the human rights of thousands of Colombians.

References

El Espectador (2021). “Son máquinas de guerra”: así justificó Diego Molano bombardeo a adolescentes. https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/son-maquinas-de-guerra-asi-justifico-diego-molano-bombardeo-a-adolescentes-article/

El tiempo (s,f) Proceso de paz con las FARC: los excombatientes asesinados tras el acuerdo. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/jep-colombia/proceso-de-paz-con-las-farc-los-excombatientes-asesinados-tras-el-acuerdo-620647

Jaramillo, M. (2012). Educational environments and fear territories amid armed conflict: study about schools in Putumayo. Revista Colombiana de Educación, 62, 21–39. http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S0120-39162012000100002&script=sci_abstract&tlng=en

Martinez, J (2022) Docencia rural en Colombia: educar para la paz en medio del conflicto armado, Universidad Iberoamericana de México. https://doi.org/10.29043/liminar.v20i1.901

Revista Semana. (n.d.). Los Niños Reclutados Para La Guerra, Historias de Dolor. https://www.semana.com/especiales-editoriales/articulo/los-ninos-reclutados-para-de-la-guerra-historias-de-dolor/202122/

Robinson, A. (2021). Casi 250 ex- combatientes de las FARC, asesinados desde la paz del 2016. La Vanguardia https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20210105/6166607/casi-250-excombatientes-farc-asesinados-colombia-paz-2016.html

Romero Picón, Y., & Chávez Plazas, Y. (2008). El juego de la guerra, niños, niñas y adolescentes en el conflicto armado Colombia: Boys, Girls and Teenagers in the Armed Conflict of Colombia. Tabula Rasa, (8), 197-210. Retrieved March 09, 2022, from http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1794-24892008000100010&lng=en&tlng=es.

Sánchez-Villegas, M., Reyes-Ruiz, L., Taylor, L., Pérez-Ruíz, N., & Carmona-Alvarado, F. (2021). Mental health problems, family functioning and social support among children survivors of Colombia’s armed conflict. Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research, 13(1), 61-72.

Wald, N. (2014). Impact of Education Programs in Colombian Conflict Areas: Children Attend School More Frequently, But Performance Has Barely Improved. DIW Economic Bulletin, 4(12), 18-22. https://ideas.repec.org/a/diw/diwdeb/2014-12-4.html